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Summary
This thesis is a study of the grammar of deter¬
miners and quantifiers, as defined in the Introduction,
in Contemporary English and it attempts, within the
theory of transformational grammar, to determine the
basic grammatical systems which control their linguistic
behaviour. The thesis is divided into four parts.
Part I is an historical and critical survey of
earlier grammarians. In Chapter 1 the work of grammar¬
ians within the 'parts of speech' tradition is surveyed.
It is concluded that that theory is inadequate for a
proper analysis of determiners, although individual
grammarians show remarkable linguistic insight. In
Chapter 2 the work of notionalist grammarians is discus¬
sed; it is concluded that they provide a useful found¬
ation for further work, despite their lack of a formal
approach. In Chapter 3 structuralist analyses, includ¬
ing early transformationalist analyses, are examined.
Much of this, it is concluded, is of little value, but
the work of later structuralists is seen to be most
relevant.
Part II contains an evaluation of recent quantifier
theory, and in Chapter 4 the gramms.r of both is consid¬
ered from one current point of view. Despite theoretic¬
al inadequacies, it is seen that both contains elements
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usually associated with all, the and two. In Chanter 5
the theories of Lakoff and Carden are analysed and it is
concluded that their proposal that quantifiers are
underlying predicates is incorrect. In Chapter 6 a
rival theory proposed by Jackendoff is also found to be
inadequate.
In Part III new proposals are made for the source
of quantifiers. In Chapter 7 it is claimed that simple
existential quantifiers, e.g., some, are derived from an
NP whose verb is the abstract form EXIST. After further
remarks on some, Chapter 8 claims that compound exist-
entials, e.g., many, have a source similar to some, but
with a nonrestrictive clause dependent on the quant¬
ifier-noun and referring to quantity. In Chapter 9 it
is argued that the universal quantifier all has a source
in a rather different higher sentence than that for
some, where the predicate is quantity-referring, but
there is no higher verb EXIST. Each is seen to have a
similar source but every is more closely related to the
compound existentials. In Chapter 10 quantifier-parti¬
tive constructions and the status of any are discussed
and a modified analysis of both is also given. It is
concluded that it is correct to postulate a higher
sentence source for quantifiers, but that the rejection
of a purely predicate source is also correct. The
analyses given are a partial resolution of these claims.
-iii-
Part IV is chiefly concerned with a and the. In
Chapter 11 it is shown that a is best regarded as a
morphological realisation of countability, rather than
as an 'article' or numeral. In Chapter 1? the pronomin¬
al source for the suggested by Sommerstein is largely
accepted, but cataphoric the is seen to be derived from
a relativisation transformation. It is concluded that
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This thesis represents an attempt to provide a
satisfactory analysis of the semantic and syntactic
behaviour of determiners and quantifiers in Contemporary
English, especially British English. However there is
no claim that the analysis below is exhaustive and this
is for two reasons. Firstly, there is the purely pract¬
ical point that the range of behaviour found even within
such a relatively restricted set of grammatical categor¬
ies such as we propose to discuss is much too large for
a work of this size; secondly, the aims of the thesis
are not identifiable solely with providing a set of rules
which will generate all and only all grammatical occur¬
rences of determiners and quantifiers. Rather, they are
to determine exactly a broad typological classification
of the items under discussion and to examine what gram¬
matical differences there may be between the types which
are established. At the same time it is hoped that
sufficient evidence will be discovered to enable us to
decide at least approximately what kind of grammar is
most likely to permit us to establish the most useful
generalisations about the behaviour of determiners and
quantifiers.
Before we elaborate on these theoretical points it
is necessary, however, to clarify exactly what is meant
by the terms 'determiner' and 'quantifier'. As might be
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expected, there is considerable divergence of opinion
amongst grammarians as to what words fall under each
class, especially as to what words are determiners, and
therefore part of our task must be to evaluate the
adequacy of competing classifications, but this ought
not to deter us from beginning with a quite simple
definition which may be modified, if necessary, at a
later stage. There is one great advantage in that
determiners and quantifiers constitute a 'closed* set,
or at least a set which is nearly closed; in other words
the items so classified can be enumerated. We shall not
attempt to do so, since it seems undeniable that, say, a
new determiner could be added to the language, or that
an existing one could become obsolete, as did, at an
earlier stage of the language, fela, fele, meaning
"many". But like other closed sets, determiners can be
defined by their surface position, which simplifies
matters considerably.
Rather than engage now upon a discussion of the
various merits of competing descriptions of determiners
and quantifiers, let us simply accept a definition of
determiners given in a straightforward practical grammar
of English, where theoretical considerations are mini¬
mised. Thus Christophersen and Sandved (1969:69) state:
"Determiners are words (or word-groups) that
can occur in the positions occupied by the






etc. ('old) 'man ('men) 'died. "
Amongst the more important determiners which Christoph-
ersen and Sandved then list, there are, apart from the
above, every, each, one, those, both, many, much, this,
his, John's, no, all, some, any. We may dispute one or
two of their inclusions and omissions, but basically the
class of determiners is thus satisfactorily delimited.
In this thesis we make the further distinction that
those determiners which contain a clear semantic compon¬
ent referring to number or quantity are named quant¬
ifiers. Thus we may extract from the list above the
following quantifiers: every, each, one, both, many,
much, no, all, aome,.any. It is hoped that this seman¬
tic distinction will be shown at a later stage to be
completely justified.
Although the classification of determiners by
Christophersen and Sandved, with our later subclassific-
ation of quantifiers, is accepted here, we shall in fact
subtract a further group of items which will not be
discussed within the main body of the thesis. This
group contains the possessive pronouns my, our, etc. and
the genitive noun type exemplified by John's, above.
In the latter case there is clear evidence that such
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constructions are not determiners proper, for example,
the possibility of sequences such as the man's where the
genitive noun is preceded by the suggests that these
constructions are more profitably analysed as nouns
which may end up in surface structure in the same posi¬
tion as a determiner and that to search for further
connections would be misleading. Our exclusion of
possessive pronouns is on rather different grounds. It
is undeniable that the grammar of possessive pronouns is
intimately connected with that of personal pronouns, and
although it is probably the case, as we shall argue in
Chapter 12, that the grammar of such pronouns is closely
related to at least the amongst the (other) determiners,
there are a number of major grammatical areas, such as
coreference and pronominalisation, which are central to
the grammar of pronouns but by and large peripheral to
the grammar of determiners in general. Therefore, for
what appear to be fully justifiable reasons of space and
time on the one hand and internal coherence of study on
the other, we make virtually no reference to the grammar
of personal pronouns, and hence possessive pronouns are
also rarely mentioned.
As we have already stated, one of our principal
aims is to establish a quite basic typological classific¬
ation of the determiners and quantifiers as defined
immediately above. Indeed, we shall attempt to show
that there are four major grammatical systems which
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account for the differing behaviour of the defined items;
further, one such system, we shall arlaim, contains two
major subsystems. In order to examine the nature of
each of these systems and subsystems we shall concen¬
trate our attention upon what we shall, it is hoped,
show to be the paradigmatic members of each system, that
is, those words which most clearly demonstrate the
individual characteristics of each system. Therefore,
for a large part of this thesis we shall be primarily
interested in the following five determiners: some,
many, all, a and the. But this does not imply that a
quantifier such as few or a determiner such as this will
not be discussed; when they are discussed, however, the
major concern will be to establish the relation between
that determiner and the paradigmatic item in question.
For better or for worse we are not investigating indiv¬
idual determiners, we are investigating determiner
systems; therefore the principal aims must be the deter¬
mination of such systems (and their paradigms) and the
relation of individual items to a particular system.
Furthermore, we do not discuss words such as enough,
which although they have a considerable claim to be
considered as determiners, are apparently so idiosyn¬
cratic that they do not clearly relate to any general
system. But until such general systems are agreed upon,
there can be little hope that idiosyncratic behaviour
can be usefully analysed.
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Having now defined the area of English grammar
which is to be studied, it would now be useful to say a
few words about our theoretical approach, of which there
are two fundamental components. The first of these is
that a grammar of (a particular part of) a language
ought to deal with both semantics and syntax and that,
further, no clear distinction can be drawn between the
two. This is not to claim that there are no areas which
are exclusively syntactic, e.g., affix-moving rules, or
that there are no areas which are exclusively semantic,
e.g., selectional restrictions (perhaps), but that the
number of areas where the two are intermingled, as is
even the case in the relatively basic instance of con¬
cord, is so great and the methodology required to solve
the different problems so similar, that a separation of
syntax and semantics would lead to undue complication of
and a loss of adequacy in the grammar. Throiighout our
thesis we shall attempt to justify this claim in more
detail.
The second component of our theoretical approach is
that we accept that some variant of generative transform¬
ational grammar is most likely to permit an adequate
account of determiners and quantifiers. To a very large
extent the justification for this is presented in Part I
of our thesis, and therefore we need not now discuss the
merits and demerits of transformational grammar except
to state that it ought to be evident by the end of this
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thesis that an analysis of the surface structure of
determiners and quantifiers is alone quite insufficient
to permit useful claims and generalisations to be made
about the items concerned. Transformational grammar may
well have its defects, but it is at present the most
promising of theories which can be used to investigate
further into the grammar of a language. The particular
variant of transformational grammar which is used here is
largely a combination of that presented by Katz and
Postal (1964) and the more recent theory of 'generative
semantics' proposed in various papers by, amongst others,
Bach, Lakoff, McCawley, Postal and Ross. In more detail,
it is claimed here that base rules generate underlying
semantic representations from which surface structures
are derived by meaning-preserving transformations. But
many of the more recent accretions to transformational
theory, such as global rules and the use of logical
notation, are not used here. It is clear that if we can
do without such apparatus, and it is argued at several
different points in this thesis that this is the case,
then we have a grammatical model which is more strictly
constrained and hence, if it performs the same tasks,
more adequate. Similarly, although in fact this follows
from our use of meaning-preserving transformations only,
we do not use rules of semantic interpretation of the
type proposed by Chomsky, Jackendoff and others. It is
clearly in the interests of linguistics to restrict as
far as possible the power of specific grammatical models
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and therefore it is one of the aims of this thesis to
show that such recent additions to the power of trans¬
formational grammar are by no means as justifiable as
has been thought.
Finally, it may be in order to say a little about
the plan of this thesis. In Parts I and II we dLscuss
the work of previous and contemporary grammarians res¬
pectively on the subject of determiners and quantifiers,
while in Parts III and IV we present our own theories.
This is done not simply because it is useful to know the
intellectual background in which a study is formulated,
but also because, inevitably, many of the ideas in this
work itself cannot claim to be totally original. There¬
fore it is only proper that we first acknowledge the
debts to others. A secondary factor is that by first
noting the mistakes of others we may then eliminate them
and proceed to our own suggestions, having, hopefully,
profited from those mistakes. One possibly unfortunate
consequence of this approach, it will be discovered, is
that the 'articles' are the primary topics of discussion
in Parts I and IV, the quantifiers in Parts II and III.
This arises from purely practical considerations. For a
variety of reasons which will be discussed in Part I,
earlier grammarians concentrated their attention to a
very great extent on the 'articles', but this situation
has been reversed by contemporary writers, who have seen
quantifiers as the more interesting and more important
group of determiners. We agree with this latter opinion,
as should be clear from the arguments in Part III and,
especially, Part IV. Therefore it is perhaps not unfit¬
ting that a discussion of quantifiers should occupy the
central sections of this work, with the other determiners
in a rather more peripheral position. In one respect it
may seem unfortunate that virtually all discussion of
the 'articles' is dropped for seven chapters, only to be
resumed in the final stages, but in another respect it









Almost every aspect of linguistic investigation can
be found to have its source in the works of the Greek
and Latin grammarians. There is no need for us to ask
why this is so; rather, what we must be aware of is the
vast accumulation of linguistic knowledge which is the
indisputable result of the work of these grammarians.
Therefore the following pages are devoted to an examin¬
ation of the wildly oscillating status of the grammatic¬
al items which we have defined in the Introduction
within the theoretical framework first provided by the
Greeks and then only slightly modified by the Romans.
If we were to confine our study to classical gram¬
marians proper, that is, to commence with Plato and
Aristotle in Greece and end with Donatus and Priscian in
Rome, then we woiild seriously distort the true perspec¬
tive. For the classical tradition did not die with the
decline of the Roman Empire, but continued on through
the Middle Ages into more modern times. It may even be
claimed that it is still alive today, and it is certain¬
ly true that 20th century grammarians such as Poutsma
and Kruisinga owe their theoretical framework to the
early Greek and Latin linguists, even if that theory is
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more than a little modified. This persistence of the
classical tradition is clearly seen in much of European,
and especially Dutch, linguistics, and can be related to
more general aspects of European culture.
Therefore we cannot define the classical tradition
by chronology, but must define it by a common set of
theoretical principles. Nevertheless, we still run into
trouble, for there is no one set of such principles to
which we can confidently claim that all classical gram¬
marians have adhered, or must adhere. For example,
Aristotle, and to a slightly lesser extent the Stoics,
used semantic or notional criteria to determine their
analyses; on the other hand, the late Latin grammarians
made greatest use of morphological criteria, thus re¬
flecting a totally different philosophy of science. But
perhaps all classical grammarians have in common what we
may term the 'parts of speech' approach, which, although
it may have been present in the writings of Aristotle,
was established by, above all, the Stoics, and which
with surprising rapidity approached the status of dogma.
The dogma was not purely linguistic, it reached further:
Michael (1970:51) reports one medieval scholar as claim¬
ing that:
"The whole church, however, holds that there
are only eight [parts of speech:RMHl, and I
have no doubt that this is divinely inspired."
As we shall see, such reliance on dogma could lead
to gross absurdities, but it would not be fair to accuse
all, or even most, classical grammarians of following
this line. Most accepted that languages consisted of a
possibly universal set of categories (all too often
based on Latin), and that the description of the func¬
tion of these categories was the task of the linguist.
Thus the 'parts of speech' theory was best equipped for
a consideration of discrete parts of sentences, rather
than sentences as a whole. This is perhaps the major
distinction which we can make between the classical
tradition and other traditions of linguistic analysis;
the distinction between a notional approach and a formal
or morphological approach, cf. Chapter 2, is here essen¬
tially subsidiary.
1.2 The Greek grammarians
Although the foundations of the classical tradition
were laid by Plato in his dialogue The Cratylus, it is
only in the work of Aristotle that we first glimpse an
account of those items which are the object of our
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study.1 Aristotle believed that there were three major
syntactic categories, which he called ovofia ("onoma"),
("rhema") and wrv&cffpoo- ( "synaesmos"). These terms
are often translated, rather dubiously, as 'noun',
'verb' and 'conjunction'. The basis for this tripartite
division is both notional and morphological. As far as
our interests are concerned, it is the category of
syndesmos which is the most important, since it was
there that articles and pronouns were placed. It is not
clear into which category the quantifiers fall, but
Aristotle's system allows them to be considered either
as rhemata or syndesmoi. This is because quantifiers
appear to have a number of predicative features, as will
be discussed most especially in Chaptei* 5, and the
rhemata are essentially predicates, cf. Robins (1967:
26-27). On the other hand, quantifiers share a number'"*
of features with pronouns, and this has led the most
recent scholars within this tradition to class them as
pronouns, see below §1.5. Therefore it might not be
totally foolish to conclude that quantifiers, like
articles and pronouns, ought to be classed as syndesmoi
within an Aristotelian framework.
'
The best accounts of the Greek and latin grammar¬
ians are to be found in Robins (1951; 1967:9-65), Michael
(1970) and Dineen (1967), to all of which the reader is
referred for further information. The discussion in
§§1.2 - 1.4 is in large measure based upon these works.
Nevertheless, it is over-ambitious to attempt to
draw any serious conclusions from Aristotle's own
writings, because of the scantiness of the evidence, and
we must look to the Stoics for a more complete exem¬
plification of the early classical analyses. The
Stoic's most important innovation, as far as we are
concerned, was the division of the syndesmol into two
categories: syndesmos and StpGpov ("arthron"). Syndesmos
now covers only conjunctions and prepositions; the
arthra are what we call articles and pronouns. It is
interesting to note here that the term arthron looks as
if it covers almost exactly those elements which would
be dominated by a Determiner node in at least the early
formulations of transformational grammar, which in
essence means those items which we defined as deter¬
miners in the Introduction, cf. too Chapter 3. Quant¬
ifiers, however, still present major problems, and to
claim that quantifiers are Stoic arthra is certainly a
case of ex post facto rationalisation made on the evid¬
ence of 20th century analyses. But there is scarcely
any other problem of general principle, especially if we
note Sommerstein (1972), where it is claimed, as we
shall see below, that articles are underlying pronouns.
But it is totally false to read into the Stoic
classification the implications of Sommerstein's work,
for the very simple reason that the Stoics relied on
quite different criteria. Their main reason for
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separating out articles and pronouns from the other
syndesmol was morphological: the arthra were to he
defined as the inflected members of the original class
of syndesmoi. Nor must we forget the very close etymo¬
logical relation between the Greek definite article and
the relative pronoun; the former was o,tj , to and the
/t Jk Jk
latter was oy , tj , o . This relation is common in other
languages too, of course, cf. the German forms der, die,
das. Therefore it can be seen that the Stoic categor¬
isation relied to a very little extent on semantic or
syntactic criteria, but was based primarily on morpho¬
logical and etymological evidence. It may well be that
the former criteria lead to the same conclusion, but
that is a matter of pure coincidence unless it can be
proven that there is a logical relation between the two
different types of evidence. The assumption of such a
relation without sufficient evidence can lead to quite
unfortunate results, as is most easily observed in the
work of a number of mid-19th century linguists. Some of
the best examples of the school referred to here are to
be found in the Proceedings of the Philological Society,
which were published between 1842 and 1853, and of
course that work has its intellectual origins in the
materialistic theories of Horne Tooke (1798), which must
often seem absurd to us.
One important distinction, at least historically,
which the Stoics introduced was that between definite
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and indefinite articles. The former category included
personal pronouns; the latter included what is known
today as the 'definite article' and also the relative
pronouns. And so we find a state of utter confusion,
which, it must he supposed, is amusing to the disinter¬
ested observer, where what is now called the 'definite
article' was in Stoic terminology an indefinite art-
icle. The terminological switch appears to have taken
place in about the 18th centtiry, so we shall consider
the reasons (mainly dogmatic) behind it in §1.4. The
reason for the Stoic contrast of definite vs. indefinite
was semantic: the definite arthra referred specifically
to one of first, second or third persons, as is implic¬
itly stated in the modern term 'personal pronouns';
which person an indefinite arthron referred to had to be
determined on each occasion by looking at the context,
since all such arthra could refer to any of the three
persons, cf. Robins (1951:30).
The distinction between personal pronouns on the
one hand and relative pronouns and articles on the other
In an attempt to avoid the confusion I shall use
single quotes whenever the modern usage is intended,
e.g., "The is the English 'definite article'." It
should also be remembered that neither Greek nor Latin
had any equivalent of our 'indefinite article*.
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was characterised in rather different terms by the
Alexandrian grammarian Dionysius Thrax, who called the
former knowy'i* ("antonymia") and the latter arthra.
The former part of speech is defined by Thrax as "a part
of speech substitutable for a noun and marked for per¬
son", the latter as "a part of speech inflected for case
and preposed or postposed to nouns" (Robins, 1967:34).
Thrax probably represents the peak of the Greek
grammatical tradition, especially because it was he who
originated the classification of speech into eight
parts, which, as we have seen, was later to be theolog¬
ically approved. Therefore it is reasonable at this
point to consider the merits of these first steps in the
classical framework. The most obvious point is that the
Greek grammarians had virtually nothing to say about
quantifiers, whose status in the grammars of the time is
highly obscure. This is in fact a recurrent inadequacy
in the classical tradition and it extends right up to
the present day. On the other hand, the special status
of 'articles' and pronouns is recognised. We have
already noted, however, that the emphasis on morpholog¬
ical criteria is unsatisfactory, even if, as it happens,
it does lead to some interesting speculation, since
syntactic criteria are underestimated. The reliance on
morphological criteria is greatest in Thrax's grammar,
and this probably accounts for the sharp distinction
which that grammarian makes between arthra and antonymla,
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which ought to he considered a retrograde step.
The danger of failing to appreciate the historical
perspective is, nevertheless, always present, and there¬
fore if it does not seem to us that the early Greek
grammarians have many insights to offer us in a study of
determiner systems, we ought to remember that they were
taking the first essential steps. Even if a morpholog¬
ical bias tended to muddy the waters of linguistic
inquiry, it is apparent that semantic evidence was also
used and points such as the anaphoric use of the 'defin¬
ite article' were noticed, cf. Robins (1951:43). ^or
was the theory of 'parts of speech' yet fully hardened
into dogma, which was later to lead to the absurdities
found especially in the medieval classical grammarians.
Within a theory which is itself inadequate, the Greeks
probably accomplished rather more than did any of their
followers for some time to come.
1.3 The Latin grammarians
The most radical difference between the Latin and
the Greek grammarians is not to be found in any theoret¬
ical divergence, but in the data which Latin, as opposed
to Greek, provided. In Latin there was no eauivalent of
the Greek 'definite article', still less of Modern
English a. Therefore Thrax's classification of arthron
amongst his eight parts of speech was no longer applic-
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able, at least by reference to the immediately observ¬
able data. The most detailed Latin grammar, that of
Priscian, omits arthron - Latin artlculus - and to
preserve the number of parts of speech at eight, a new
part of speech, inter.jectlo ("interjection") is created.
This desire to keep the number of parts of speech fixed
at eight is symbolic of the derivative status of most
Latin grammars, which provide us with no deeper insights
into the status of either quantifiers or 'articles'.
Indeed, Priscian himself appears to have been in error
about the semantic uses of pronouns, see Robins (1967:
57-58). Amongst the more important Latin grammarians
only Yarro has a separate part of speech articulus, by
which he means a case-inflected word which is not a
noun, cf. Michael (1970:67). However, this retention of
articulus looks very much like a matter of purely term¬
inological dispute which is without linguistic signific¬
ance. We are, in fact, back to the Stoic position where
article and pronoun combine as one part of speech. It
is interesting, nevertheless, to note that for Yarro hie
("this") is an articulus flnitus, whereas quis ("who")
is an articulus inflnitus.
Medieval Latin grammarians almost exclusively
follow Priscian in not including articles as one of the
parts of speech, and we can reasonably suspect a fossil-
isation of the theory. Even the most percipient gram¬
marians, finding the particular facts of Latin in
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conflict with the widespread linguistic presence of
equivalents for the and a elsewhere, can find space
within their theory and practice, both of which are
language-dependent, for little other than regret. Thus
Roger Bacon admits that there is a strong case for
establishing 'article* as a part of speech, for:^
"Almost every people has them [articles:RMHl,
and the French language has in that category
li, le, las and so on."
Bacon compromises by calling hie, haec and hoc "pronom-
ina articularia" (Michael, 1970:68). We may conclude
that if this reflects a general state of linguistic
thought, there is little to be gained from a fuller
exposition of Roman and medieval theories about 'articles'
or determiners in general.
1.4 The vernacular grammarians
The early grammarians of English who followed the
classical tradition were faced with the grave difficulty
that the surface structure of English was radically
different from that of Latin; yet for the most part they
wished to retain the broad outlines of the Latin gram¬
mars. As far as we are concerned, this adherence to a
Quoted and translated from Michael (1970:68):
"Omnes fere naciones habeant eos, et lingua gallica
habet eos ut li le las et huius modi..."
-22-
theoretical position insufficiently supported by the
surface evidence is most relevant to the status of the
'articles'. It will be recalled from §1.3 that Latin
grammarians did not in general classify the 'article' as
a separate part of speech, and that this continued to be
the case through the Middle Ages, despite the conflict¬
ing evidence of the developing or developed vernacular
languages which Roger Bacon, at least, noticed. When
the writing of English grammars became a fit study for a
linguist to undertake, this conflicting evidence could
no longer be ignored.
But the question remained of how the and a could be
systematised within the theory, and, of course, a pre¬
sented a further problem in that it had existed in
neither Greek nor Latin. Some grammarians attempted to
classify a and the as signs of cases, which is interest¬
ing only for the absurdities which followed, and not for
any insights. So we find that the 17th century grammar¬
ian Jeremiah Wharton quotes the following declension of








Even Wharton, however, finds it difficult to justify the
rN. a book,
G. of a book,
V- D. to a book, ;r>
>
6 A. the book, d
CD u
c z>
• —J V. o book,
a-
kAb. in a book.
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statement that a is the sign of the nominative and the
of the accusative; but "there is no better way to dis¬
tinguish them in declining".
More interesting are those grammarians who do not
create a new part of speech 'article', but attempt to
include the 'articles' within other classes. Especially
so is the claim made by William Turner (1710:7) and
reported in Michael (1970:221, 354). Turner claims that
the is a pronoun and a an adjective. It is not clear
from Michael's comments exactly what justification, if
any, Turner gives for this, but it is certainly quite
remarkable in the light of recent linguistic research.
Turner is making exactly that claim for the which is
made by Sommerstein (1972); in the case of a. we need to
make only one jump in the argument. As we shall see
below, within the classical tradition the status of
quantifiers is always dubious, but let us, with some
justification, assume that for Turner they would be
adjectives - or, more properly, a subtype of noun, since,
in keeping with the prescriptions of Latin grammars, he
does not recognise adjectives as forming a separate part
of speech. Now let us accept that a is more quantifier¬
like than 'article'-like (where the is the paradigmatic
'article'). This seems reasonable enough, although it
cannot be justified at this point; note, however, the
claims of Perlmutter (1970), which will be discussed at
length in Chapter 11. The next step is to recognise
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that Lakoff (1970b, 1970d) and Carden (1968) have pro¬
posed that quantifiers are syntactically related to
adjectives. If this is in any measure correct, notwith¬
standing the criticisms which are made of the Lakoff-
Carden hypothesis in Chapter 5, then we can say that
there is in recent transformational writings some evid¬
ence that transformationalists too would class the as a
pronoun, a as an adjective. Whatever the rights and
wrongs of that claim, and however plausible or implaus¬
ible Turner's own arguments may be, it can hardly be
denied that he has some right to claim that he intro¬
duces an element of dfeja vu into even the most recent
and (apparently) original claims.
It was only by the end of the 18th century, cf.
Michael (1970:355) that classical grammarians of English
generally accepted that the 'article' was a separate
part of speech. The tardiness of this acceptance must
be attributed to the fact that 'article' as a category
had no traditional status in the descendants of the
Latin grammars, for the reasons which we discussed in
§1.3, above. Further, even when it was conceded that
'article' was one of the parts of speech, classical
grammarians tended to concentrate on syntactic criteria
to a rather greater extent here than was the case with
the other, morphologically-established, parts of speech.
From the modern point of view this is a theoretical
improvement, but we should not over-value the change.
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Essentially it is one forced upon the vernacular gram¬
marians by the inadequacy of the classical theory, and
it fits badly, if at all, into the classical tradition.
To summarise the results achieved by the grammar¬
ians who considered the 'article' to be one of the parts
of speech in English would be impossible within the
space which we can permit ourselves here, and therefore
the following is only an attempt to highlight a few
points of theoretical interest. The first point which
we should notice is that even when the 'article' is
classed as a separate part of speech, there is still a
tendency to regard the members of that category as
related to some other category as well. Thus Wallis
(1653:71, 72) states:
"A ... est articulus Numeralis; atq; idem
omino significat ac one unus, sed minus
emphatice."
"The est articulus Eemonstrativus, idemq;
significat ac that illud sed minus emphatice."
Wallis' terms "numerical article" and "demonstrative
article" serve also as a reminder that the opposition
'definite' vs. 'indefinite' as we know it today has not
always been in common use amongst vernacular grammarians.
Michael (1970:361-62) states that the first recorded use
in an English grammar dates back only to 1662, and that
the present-day usage becomes common only towards the
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latter part of the 18th century.'* It is fascinating to
speculate upon the usage of 'definite' and 'indefinite•,
especially when we remember that we have found a start¬
ling reversal of Greek terminology, cf. §1.2, but we can
conclude little else than that the usage has changed,
either through a misunderstanding of Greek descriptions,
a subject about which the vernacular grammarians were,
according to Michael (1970:350), rather less than well-
informed, or through simple processes of semantic change.
The 18th century classical grammarian James Harris
is worthy of attention in that he provides one of the
clearest explanations of a well-known contrast between
the and a. Harris writes (1771:215-6):
"(A) respects our primary Perception, and
denotes Individuals as unknown; (THE) re¬
spects our secondary Perception and denotes
Individuals as known. To explain by an
example - I see an object pass by, which I
never saw till now. What do I say? "There
goes a Beggar with a long beard." The Man
What Michael does not note, however, is that the
opposition of 'definite' vs. 'indefinite' is to be found
in Palsgrave's grammar of French, dated 1530, in other
words over 130 years earlier than the first recorded use
in a grammar of English.
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departs and returns a Week after. What do I
say then? "There goes the Beggar with the
long Beard." The Article only is changed,
the rest remains unaltered."
It may well he that Harris' description and exemplific¬
ation is over-crude, hut it is important in so far as it
establishes that the demands, in many cases, previous
reference of some kind. Harris (1771:217-8) also makes
the important point that the lack of an 'article' with
plural nouns shows that reference is to an unspecified
set. As we shall see at a later stage, this is most
relvant for an attempt to understand the function of
quantifiers, and we need only take issue with Harris
when he claims in the same passage that a always has the
task of showing that reference is to a one-member set.
There seems to he rather more to a than that.
After Harris has concluded his discussion of the
and a, he continues (1771:233-34):
"The ARTICLES already mentioned are those
strictly so called; hut besides these are
the PRONOMINAL ARTICLES, such as This. That.
Any, Other, Some, All, No or None, &c. Of
these we have spoken already in our Chapter
of Pronouns, where we have shewn, when they
may he taken as Pronouns, and when as Artic¬
les. Yet in truth it must he confessed, if
the Essence of an Article he to define and
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ascertaln, they are much more properly
Articles than anything else, and as such
should be considered in Universal Grammar."
This is but one example of the vacillation which is
common amongst classical grammarians when faced with the
problem of quantifiers. The classical theories offered
no obvious compartment into which quantifiers could be
pushed, and therefore many grammarians categorised them
as two, or even three, different parts of speech simul¬
taneously. Further, it is rather unfortunate that the
demonstratives this and that are separated by Harris
(and others) from the, with which they have much in
common, and instead allied to some, etc., with which
they have much less in common. But it is difficult to
see how the classical theories could be modified to
provide a more adequate framework for description. Even
if, for example, the category 'article' were subsumed
under a more general 'pronoun' category, the only result
might be an unwieldly and undifferentiated mass of highly
varied items.
In contrast to the Latin and medieval grammarians,
these early students of English certainly made a sub¬
stantial contribution to our knowledge of the semantics
and syntax of determiners and quantifiers. But all the
time it has to be recognised that they were working
within a framework which had two major disadvantages.
Firstly, it was conceived originally only as a theory
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for the description of Greek, and so it was unsuited for
either the description of English or Harris' "Universal
Grammar". Secondly, and relatedly, it was essentially a
surface structure theory and therefore ignored the
underlying semantic and syntactic regularities. In fact
this latter point is not always true, for a number of
linguists from different ages went far beyond the sur¬
face. Harris is one such example, and Chomsky (1966) is
partly a description of a similar group of linguist-
philosophers, but it seems fair to say that he does not
give sufficient acknowledgement to the predecessors of
the Cartesians, cf. Salmon (1969).
1.5 Recent classical grammarians
The classical tradition has continued up to the
present day, although perhaps in a modified form. Most
importantly, many of the more recent 'classicalists'
have been greatly influenced by the work of scholars
such as Jespersen, and indeed it is often difficult to
see what distinguishes the two types of linguist.
Nevertheless we shall delay any discussion of Jespersen
and other linguists with a similar theoretical back¬
ground until Chapter 2, and at this point concentrate
our attention on what can reasonably be regarded as the
paradigmatic classical grammars of recent times. The
major grammars to which we shall refer are those of
Kruisnga (1932a), Maetzner (1874a, 1874b) and Poutsma
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(1914). They, and other perhaps less interesting gram¬
mars, follow in outline the classical tradition in that
they too consider nouns, verbs, etc. separately within
their different functions as discrete members of the set
of 'parts of speech'. Their aims are also similar to
the early vernacular grammarians in that these later
linguists also attempt a complete survey of the English
language, although often with the marginal distinction
that there is some emphasis on the teaching of English
as a foreign language. Of course, this description also
fits a large part of the work of Jespersen too, but here
we have to differentiate between the theoretical demands
of one particular hypothesis and the general aims of any
linguist. I believe that it is fair to say that Jesper¬
sen was attempting to reach a goal which every linguist
must wish to reach in the end, but that on the other
hand the classical grammarians were fulfilling an essen¬
tial demand of the theory to which they adhered. A
'parts of speech' grammar must deal with the whole
language, albeit discretely.
As in earlier studies, the status of 'articles' and
quantifiers varies from grammar to grammar. Thus Pouts-
ma (1914) considers that the 'articles' are a separate
part of speech, but that this and that and all the other
items relevant to our study are to be regarded as sub¬
types of pronouns. These subtypes include demonstrat¬
ives, determinatives (same and such), interrogatives,
relatives and indefinites (most of the quantifiers).
Kruisinga (1932a) regards all the determiners and quant¬
ifiers, including the 'articles', as belonging to vari¬
ous subclasses of pronouns, and thus follows the pattern
first set down in the Stoic grammars, see above, §1.2.
Maetzner (1874a) is rather unusual in claiming that
there are only three primary parts of speech; these are
"noun", "verb" and "particle". The first two of these
categories resemble the categories of noun phrase and
verb phrase within transformational grammar; "particle"
is apparently a cover term used to describe all those
elements which cannot reasonably be described as "noun"
or "verb", for example, conjunctions and interjections;
a similar system is to be found in Wallis (1653).
Within Maetzner's system determiners and quantifiers are
classed in the category "noun". But Maetzner makes
numerous subclassifications which have the result that
his system is not as radically different as it first
appears to be. Thus the 'articles* are given a second¬
ary classification which is different from that for all
the other items, which are considered as various types
of pronouns. More recent classical grammars, for exam¬
ple Zandvoort (1957) and Scheurweghs (1959), tend to
separate the 'articles' from the other determiners at an
early stage, and so clearly follow the example of Pouts-
ma, and, in a less apparent manner, that of Maetzner too.
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The reason for the separation of the 'articles'
from the other determiners is that the 'articles' cannot
"be used without a noun, whereas the others can be used
nonattributively and are thus termed 'pronouns', given
Maetzner's definition to be correct (1874a:290):
"The pronoun, which represents a noun in the
sentence, or, more correctly, has the nature
of a noun, and has thence its name, is, by
its value and idea, distinguished from a
mere sign for a substantive or adjective,
although it partly serves to avoid the repet¬
ition of the same noun,"
But this is hardly a position with which we can agree,
for several reasons. It is not the case that all of the
'non-article' determiners can stand alone in a noun
phrase. Maetzner himself concedes that this is not true
in the case of every and there are alternations such as
no/none which clearly demonstrate that some determiners
when used nonattributively are subject to morphological
change, cf. Maetzner (1874a:308-15). There is also the
similar alternation in possessives, e.g., my/mine. The
argument would appear to be at its strongest with per¬
sonal pronouns, but even there it is doubtful, since, at
the very least, you cooccurs with nouns, as in you boys.
However in this last case we must beware of accepting as
a fact the analysis suggested by Postal (1966), about
which there are grave reservations. See the discussion
of this point in §12.1.
-33-
Of course, simply to point out that you is capable
of being used attributively, that is, in collocation
with a noun, does not, even if it is true, disprove
Maetzner's point, but there is an argument deriving from
this which does do so. Let us accept that all the so-
called pronouns of Maetzner, Poutsma and, indeed, Kruis-
inga may be used attributively. Given this, can we not
suggest that in fact there is always a noun cooccurring
in underlying structure but that, in certain cases, this
noun may be deleted? This would account for the position
in English where most, if not all, pronouns can be used
both alone and with a following noun. In what respect
do the 'articles' differ? In the fact that they do not
occur alone in a noun phrase. Now presumably the fact
that they do not do so is in some way connected with the
further fact that the 'articles' are proclitic, i.e.,
unaccented, and this provides us with some evidence of
relevance. If the 'articles' were ever to occupy a non-
attributive position in a noun phrase, they would per¬
force carry some measure of stress and thus would assume
different phonological forms, from which it might well
be possible, and, moreover, reasonable, to derive the
proclitic forms.
The evidence from proclitic forms leads us to the
real reason for the rejection of any classification
which separates the 'articles' from the other deter¬
miners and quantifiers, for it seems most likely that if
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the and a are proclitic derivatives it is among the
other determiners that we shall find their accented
equivalents. Indeed, for a there is considerable evid¬
ence that the accented equivalent is one, as can be
observed from the following remarks:
"The indefinite article is, speaking histor¬
ically, the weak form of attributive one."
(Kruisinga, 1932a:312)
"Numeral and article are identical in form in
OE. The possible difference in stress can¬
not be documented. About the middle of the
12th century the abbreviated form a began to
make its appearance. This is important
because it shows that the word had by then »
lost its inflexional endings and become un¬
accented. "
(Christophersen, 1939:107)
The stressed equivalent of the would appear to be the
demonstrative that:
"The name ARTICLE is given to the, weakened
from the Anglo-Saxon demonstrative pronoun
se, seo, t>at,... "
(Maetzner, 1874a:315)
"Most attempts to find a semantic distinction
between the and that can be reduced to the




It would appear very possible, therefore, that any
explanation of the reasons underlying the non-occurrence
of the and a alone in a noun phrase will involve the
hypothesis that these are proclitic forms, possibly
derived from that and one respectively, and can thus
occur only when there is a non-deleted noun in the same
noun phrase which will carry the stress. If this is the
case, then there would appear to be at least two pos-
0
sibilities. Firstly, the 'articles' could be derived
from that and one by stress and vowel reduction rules;
this type of solution has been suggested as suitable for
a by Perlmutter (1970) and as suitable for the by Thorne
(1972). Secondly, even if such a purely phonological
explanation were not accepted, one might still wish to
derive the 'articles' from a source nearly identical to
the source of the relevant demonstrative or numeral. If
either of these solutions were accepted, then it would
be clear that there would be no reason to suppose the
'articles' formed a part of speech separate from the
other determiners and quantifiers. The only distinguish¬
ing factor would be that they are proclitic, and this
can hardly be considered to be a sufficient reason for
radically segregating the 'articles', although it might
be a justification fwc a minor subclassification. How-
!
ever, in Chapter 11 v>i shall see that at least in the
case of a the above arguments cannot be accepted; but
the arguments there can in no way be construed as being
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in favour of an 'article* theory, especially since they
do not directly relate to the status of the.
Finally, there is a tactical reason for not wishing
to keep the 'articles' separate from the other deter¬
miners: many classical grammarians, having accepted that
the and a are the only members of one word-class, have
then assumed that the and a perform roughly the same
functions, with only one or two specific features of
contrast between them; hence, perhaps, the modern usage
of 'definite' and 'indefinite'. Not all classical
grammarians do so, and in this context it is worth
remembering that the tags 'definite' and 'indefinite'
have not always been attached to the 'articles'. For
example, the quotation from Wallis (1653) in §1.4 gives
a much more apt description of these items. Assuredly,
however, the hypothesis is all too tempting. Therefore,
it seems wise not to make too early a judgment in favour
of retaining the part of speech 'article' with its
implicit but doubtful assumptions.
Kruisinga (1932a:315) succinctly shows that it is
far from correct to claim that the and a perform very
nearly identical duties:
"The two articles have distinct functions
that have hardly anything in common. There
is nothing in the indefinite article that
corresponds with the defining, nor with the
anaphoric definite article. Nor is there
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any function of the definite article that is
similar to the numerical or individualizing
indefinite article. In one case, however,
the two words have functions that clearly
resemble each other; they have been denoted
by the same term: classifying."
It can be seen that, apart from the introduction of the
term 'classifying*, which is a description of the func¬
tion of the 'articles' in sentences such as:
(1.1) The lion is a dangerous animal
(1.2) A lion is a dangerous animal
Kruisinga's definition does not depart from the other
classical descriptions of the 'articles' except in his
emphasis on the wide range of differences between them.
He suggests that the 'definite article' has three func¬
tions: (i) demonstrative; (ii) defining; (iii) class¬
ifying (1932a:238), whereas the 'indefinite article' has
two functions: (i) individualising; (ii) classifying
(1932a:315). That analysis may, for the moment, be
accepted as it stands, but it should be recognised that
Kruisinga's major achievraent was his prudent refusal to
regard the 'articles' as being in simple opposition.
However, one other point which we must take note of
is that Kruisinga is most insistent about the importance
of the deictic function of the, cf. Kruisinga (1932a:
239-41), and he closely relates the functions of the to
those of this and that. From what we have said already
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about the fact that the is possibly a proclitic form of
that, taken together with Kruisinga's evidence, it would
seem clear that the relation between deixis and 'defin-
iteness' is much closer than any mere accident would
produce. It might indeed be that it is reasonable to
consider the as the unmarked member of the set of deic-
tics, thus asserting in classical terms that it may well
be a 'pronoun'. However this is still rather speculative
and cannot be considered seriously until we have looked
in rather more detail at the semantic and syntactic
behaviour of the. In this respect consider the remarks
of Thorne (1974:111, fn. 1) and, more generally, our
comments in Chapter 12, below.
With reference to the 'articles', Poutsma makes the
following remark, which is even more pertinent when it
is extended to a wider field (1914:517):
"The primary and most important function of
both the definite and the indefinite article
is to indicate that the thing of which we
have formed a conception is marked off or
defined, i.e., thought of within certain
physical or imaginary outlines or limits."
In fact one would wish to quarrel with this statement as
it stands, for it seems to be equally true of the other
determiners and quantifiers as it is of the and a, for
in:
(1.3) some boys; much milk
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some and much 'mark off' or 'define' the reference of
boys and milk to the same extent as do a and the in:
(1.4) a boy; the milk
Might not Poutsma's remark be thought of as too general
a statement to be of great interest? Hardly, for it is
precisely because of this generality that the notion
that 'delimitation' is the primary function of deter¬
miners and quantifiers is an important one.
Poutsma's claim leads to the suggestion that deter¬
miners and quantifiers are associated with the marking
of sets, in that their function is to delimit the size
of the set to which reference is made, and that perhaps
the syntax of these items can be connected with the
hypothesis presented in Bach (1968) that the underlying
structure of nouns involves variables and predicates
rather like those used in symbolic logic, cf. Chapter 7
for further discussion. Purther, it perhaps accounts
for the normal structure of generics being similar to:
(1.5) Boys are nasty creatures
(1.6) Lions live in zoos
where the noun phrases are not delimited and thus the
reference covers the whole class which forms the poten¬
tial referent, not merely a delimited set within that
class.
On the subject of quantifiers, or 'indefinite pro¬
nouns', as they are often called, the recent classical
grammarians tend to adopt a somewhat defeatist attitude,
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as is exemplified by the following statement from Kruis-
inga (1932a:129):
"Attempts have sometimes been made to improve
the classification of pronouns, but the only
result has been, at best, to show the gram¬
marian's ingenuity. The indefinite pronouns
have especially been the subject of such
experiments. And it is perfectly true that
no definition has been given that applies to
all of them. But there is no reason why we
should attempt such a definition; it is
enough to have a name to refer to a number
of pronouns. The chapter on indefinite pro¬
nouns may be considered as the lumber-room
of the pronouns; and a lumber-room may be as
convenient in grammar as it is in a house,"
The major source of the problems seems to lie not in the
fact that these grammarians are interested only in the
surface structure of language, which is patently untrue,
but that they are constrained by their methodology to
treat each item in isolation. And so, it is only when
they discard such constraints and begin to compare, for
example, each and every, that they are able to throw
much light on the relevant syntactic problems. For
instance, there is general agreement, cf. Poutsma (1914:
1066ff., 1081ff.) and Kruisinga (1932a:274-77), that
each is strongly distributive, every weakly distributive,
and all nondistributive. Such a distinction helps us to
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explain certain features of the syntax of these deter¬
miners.
On the other hand, when there is a lack of associ¬
ation, then important insights may be lost. Thus Kruis-
inga (I932a:260, 267), Zandvoort (1957:172) and Maetzner
(1874b:209) all fail to explore the relationship of both
to all as fully as they might. Although one can find
hints that both may be considered to be a dual form of
all, these grammarians are reluctant to pursue the
t;
matter systematically. Similarly, the following quota¬
tion from Maetzner (1974b:255) with regard to much only
serves to cloud the issues:
"In the positive it is only met with in the
singular, and it may nevertheless in many
cases stand opposed to the plural many, with
which it has of itself nothing in common."
Once more, therefore, we may conclude that it is
the theoretical background of these recent classical
grammarians which is the main obstacle to a satisfactor¬
ily worked-out grammar. Where that theory is at its
strongest, that is, in respect of the 'articles', the
classical grammarians have produced many important in¬
sights which it would be foolish to ignore. However,
even in that case the segregation of the 'articles' into
For a more extended consideration of the relation
between all and both see Chapters 4 and 10, below.
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a separate category means that the full implications of
the best of the proposed analyses cannot be adequately
recognised within the theory. And on the subject of
quantifiers we are presented yet again with the failure
of classical theory to provide a consistent explanation
of their syntactic and semantic behaviour. But it is
especially notable with the recent classical grammarians
that a great deal of semantic evidence is taken into
account and that this can be most illuminating. There¬
fore, in the next chapter we shall look at a group of
linguists who recognise to at least the same extent the
importance of semantic evidence, but who are not hinder¬





It is reasonable to claim that many linguists,
diverse both in time and theory, from Aristotle to
Jespersen and from Thrax to Chomsky, could with equal
justice be called 'notionalists'. We are therefore
faced with a large and potentially unwieldly body of
thought which we must attempt to define within given
limits. And therefore let us immediately accept the
following remarks of Jespersen (1924:35) as an adequate
statement of notionalist principles:
"... beside, or above, or behind the syntac¬
tic categories which depend on the structure
of each language as it is actually found,
there are some extralingual categories which
are independent of the more or less acciden¬
tal facts of existing languages; they are
universal in so far as they are applicable
to all languages, though rarely expressed in
them in a clear and unmistakable way ... for
want of a better common name for these
extralingual categories I shall use the
adjective notional and the substantive notion.
It will be the grammarian's task in each
case to investigate the relation between the
-44-
notional and the syntactic categories."
Such a statement of principle would be accepted by
many grammarians, and this is the root of the difficulty
expressed above. Therefore, for heuristic purposes we
must further restrict notionalism in the following
manner: only if a commitment to notionalism is not
accompanied by a previous commitment to some formal
system shall we claim that a notionalist theory is being
expressed. Thus a classical grammarian such as Poutsraa
will be excluded, since the basic commitment in his
grammar is to a formal system. Similarly, although many
transformational grammarians approach a notionalist
position - for an early example see Lyons (1966) - they
will not be discussed here. The grammarians discussed
in this chapter may well have formal systems, but such
systems are not prior, as is the case with the examples
above.
It therefore follows that we characterise the term
'notionalism' as it is used in this chapter in two ways.
Firstly, notionalist grammarians would all agree to
disagree with the notorious remark of Xatz and Fodor
(1963:483) that:
"linguistic description minus grammar equals
semantics."
Rather, they regard semantics as inextricably involved
with syntax, and maintain that no syntactic description
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worthy of the name can afford to ignore the semantic
aspects of the subject. Secondly, among the notionalist
grammarians discussed below, there is at least a certain
eclecticism and at most a severe scepticism about the
worth of formal systems. This is in sharp contrast to
most of the classical grammarians discussed in Chapter 1
and the structuralists and early transformationalists
who will be discussed in Chapter 3.
Yet despite this second characteristic, we can
observe a simple division amongst notionalist grammar¬
ians of this century when we consider their approaches
to 'articles1 and quantifiers; this is largely due to
the influence of the French linguist Gustave Guillaume.
We shall see below that Guillaume's theories, especially
in relation to a description of the 'articles', have
influenced a number of other notionalist grammarians.
We may therefore distinguish between works within a
Guillaumiste tradition (although 'tradition' is possibly
too strong a word) and other works which remain notion¬
alist but are unconnected with Guillaumisme. This,
incidentally, closely relates to a division of interest:
within the Guillaumiste tradition attention is focussed
exclusively on the 'articles'; when we look elsewhere
our attention will be to a large extent focussed on the
other members of the determiner and quantifier systems.
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2.2 Guillaume and the 'articles'
Despite the brevity of our remarks above, it may
already be clear that we have to place strong emphasis
on the works of Gustave Guillaume, for his theories
concerning the French 'article' system laid the theoret¬
ical foundations upon which much of the work that was to
be done by notionalist grammarians in the ensuing dec¬
ades was to be constructed; and this is true despite the
scepticism general amongst such grammarians about the
worth of formal systems. The definitive work for a
study of these theories is Guillaume (1919), but there
is further discussion and exemplification in Guillaume
(1944, 1945a, 1945b),1 Guillaume freely acknowledges
his debt to psychology, and expressly states that his
linguistic work is based on a theory which he calls
'psycho-m£canisme'; as far as we are concerned, we need
For a discussion of Guillaumiste theories and an
interesting, if, in the end, unconvincing, attempt to
relate them to the theories of transformational grammar,
see Toussaint (1967), in which there is a bibliography
of work done by the Guillaumiste school. See too Guil¬
laume (1971), especially the introduction by Roch Lavin.
Hewson (1972) is an examination of the English 'artic¬
les' from a Guillaumiste point of view, but that work
adds little of theoretical interest. For a penetrating
criticism of Hewson (1972), see Sommerstein (1974).
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only explain this theory in terms of Guillaume's des¬
cription of the 'articles'. According to 'psycho-m£can-
isme', as advanced by Guillaume, the structure of lan¬
guage has two levels, one of which may be termed the
conceptual or abstract level, the other the existential
or concrete level. It is claimed that when we use
language what in effect we are doing is taking items
from the stock of concepts (at the abstract level) and
'conceptualising' them (at the concrete level). The
further this process is taken, apparently, the more
highly evolved is the language. According to Guillaume's
theory, the purpose of the 'articles' is to signify the
transition from one level to the other. Guillaume
himself explains this as follows (1919:305):
"On passe ... d'un plan ou les noms existent
virtuelleraent a un plan ou ils se realisent
effectiveraent. Denoter les cas generaux de
cette transition constitue le r3le de
1'article, simple signe de relation entre
une idee et un fonds d'idees."
The difficulty with such a thesis is that its
acceptance is, as it were, an act of faith. Its basis
is a type of hypothesis which one can neither prove nor
blandly assume. Certainly, its acceptance might permit
the presentation of a consistent theory of the 'artic¬
les', but the thesis lacks a clarity which might be more
attainable if the theory were based upon, or at least
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had a definable connection with, linguistic evidence.
All too often Guillaume presents explanations which are
both obscure and unenlightening outside the context of
his 'psycho-m£canisme'. Even many of those linguists
who have found Guillaume's theory a valuable starting
point would assent to this criticism; for example,
O
Chrsitophersen (1939:57) says:
"His [Guillaume's:RMH] style and arrangement
are wanting in perspicuity, and he is often
so subtle that in spite of his wordiness and
frequent repetition of himself, I do not
pretend to a full understanding of all his
points."
The topic of all the above-mentioned works by
Guillaume is the two French 'articles' le (la, les, 1')
and un (une), and it is rarely that he strays further
than the partitives (de, etc.). As we have seen above,
in our discussion of some of the classical grammarians,
this is almost certainly a mistaken position from which
to consider any of the members of the determiner sys¬
tems, since it sets up, a priori, a false opposition.
The (anonymous) reviewer of Guillaume (1971) in TLS
(1972), who contributes an extreme and passionate defence
of Guillaume, also admits that Guillaume is often ob¬
scure, although the cause of this is claimed by the
reviewer to be "terseness", which seems implausible.
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This is patently true of Guillaurae, who is to an almost
exclusive degree concerned with a postulated opposition
between the 'articles'. Thus he states (1944:93):
"L'article un y indique le mouvement par
lequel la pensee, prenant de la distance par
rapport a l'universel, s'approche par degre
du singulier numerique. Autrement dit,
1'article un du franjais symbolise dans la
langue le mouvement d'approche du nombre J,
auquel il aboutit et avec lequel il ne se
confond pas. L'article l£, a 1'inverse -
une grande symetrie regne dans la partie
formelle dee langues evoluees - symbolise le
mouvement par lequel la pensee prenant son
depart au singulier deja atteint s'en
eloigne et tend, sans que des lors, aucune
limitation finale puisse lui etre assignee,
vers 1'infinitude de la vision universelle."





Mouvement de partic- Singulier Mouvement de gener-
ularisation inherent num&rique alisation inherent
& 1'article un h. 1* article le.
Le systeme cinetique et statique des
articles fondamentaux du fran^ais
\
>
Such a false opposition leads inevitably to false
conclusions: the 'definite article' is not the obverse
face of the 'indefinite article', no more so in French
than in English. The 'articles', as was argued above,
in §1.5, each fulfil essentially different and not
necessarily related functions. Also, although the syn¬
tax of number is an inherent part of the syntax of the
determiners, and most especially, of course, of the
quantifiers, its importance is considerably greater
within the syntax of the 'indefinite article' than with¬
in the syntax of the 'definite article'. This is a fact
which Guillaume cannot allow, see his remarks in Guil-
laume (1945a:209). It is impossible to discuss the
grammar of the 'articles* in a linguistic vac^uum; yet
this is precisely what Guillaurae attempts to do. A
satisfactory account of le and un (or the and a) must be
contextualised within a far larger system. And although
Guillaume does discuss much else in the grammar of
French in other works, see especially Guillaume (1971),
it is extremely difficult to claim that the necessary
contextualisation ever takes place.
Guillaurae's theories have had great appeal, however
to many European linguists, and this, we may speculate,
is for the following reasons. Firstly, at one time he
was the only linguist who had attempted to construct a
comprehensive theory of the 'articles'. Secondly, his
theory was flexible in that it was very general and
could accommodate apparent contradictions, for example,
the anaphoric and generic uses of the 'definite article'
Thirdly, his mentalistic outlook would appeal to that
large number of linguists already sympathetic to Saus-
surean theories (although it would be incorrect to
assume that de Saussure and Guillaume shared anything
other than a vague similarity of scientific philosophy).
Fourthly, there was no viable structuralist model, cf.
Chapter 3> which could have pointed out the deficiencies
of Guillaume's theories and at the same time provided a
usable alternative. Indeed, it might be claimed that it
was only after scholars such as Guillaume had achieved a
certain amount of pioneering success that it was pos¬
sible to start constructing a genuine and useful theory
of the 'articles'. Therefore, one's criticisms of
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Guillaurae must be tempered by the knowledge that he was,
essentially, attempting to do that which had not been
done before, and for this he had to develop a framework
of his own. Also, the lack of any rigorous formal
apparatus, such as, perhaps, structuralism could later
have provided, meant that the excesses to which we are
all only too susceptible could not be automatically
curbed. Guillaume's success lies not so much in his
solving the problems that he set out to solve, which he
patently did not do, but in creating an atmosphere in
which such problems could profitably be discussed.
Louis HJelmslev was perhaps the best known linguist
to accept Guillaume's theory of the 'articles' without
making major modifications. HJelmslev considered that
(1928:337):
"Le r3le grammatical de 1'article est ... de
concretiser le semanteme, celui-£i etant par
definition abstrait en lui-m§rae. L'article
dit defini est un morpheme de concretisation
qui indique que l'objet ou sa qualite est
suppose connu & 1'interlocuteur (& celui a
qui on parle). L'article dit indefini est
un morpheme de concretisation qui indique
que l'objet est suppose inconnu a 1'inter¬
locuteur. L'article zero est, par opposition
aux deux autres articles, un morpheme
d'abstraction."
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This is clearly an advance on Guillaume, for the reason
that it is more closely within the context of a rigor¬
ously defined linguistic theory, one which is trying to
cope with all types of linguistic processes, and yet one
which is not enmeshed in an unhelpful quasi-psycholog¬
ical theory. And further, Hjelmslev is at least attempt¬
ing to describe some linguistically significant facts.
Nevertheless, his debt to Guillauroe is undeniable.
As far as we are concerned, however, it is not
Hjelmslev but Paul Christophersen who is the most impor¬
tant linguist to owe some debt to the Guillaumiste
tradition. In all his works Guillaume is concerned
solely with French, paying little attention to other
languages; but in Christophersen (1939) our attention is
drawn to the description of English, and the theory
undergoes several basic, and, as Christophersen (1939:
66-67) states, necessary changes. The most important of
As will be seen, Christophersen's work goes far
beyond Guillaume's both in merit and in its implications
for a linguistic theory of the 'articles'. Thus it is
somewhat unfair to describe him as a follower of Guil¬
laume. At the same time, however, we have to recognise
that Christophersen's theories rest to some extent on
the prior existence of Guillaume's work, and so we may
say that Christophersen is both within and beyond the
Guillauraiste tradition.
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of these concern 'continuate* words and plurals, and the
use of the 'definite article'. 'Continuate' is Christ-
ophersen's term for an uncountable noun such as white¬
ness, and the problem here is that whereas French would
use a 'partitive article' with continuates and plurals,
English uses no type of 'article' at all. Since Guil-
laume's theory, as it stands, is concerned only with the
description of French, as we have said, he does not
attempt to explain this fact. With regard to the prob¬
lems caused by the differences between le and the,
Christophersen (1939:69) suggests that theelement of
'familiarity' is a rather more prominent feature of
English than of French usage. 'Familiarity' is explain¬
ed as follows (1939:72):
"Let us for the sake of convenience take a
singular unit-word. The article the brings
it about that to the potential meaning (the
idea) of the word is attached a certain
association with previously acquired know¬
ledge by which it can be inferred that only
one definite individual is meant. That is
what is understood by familiarity."
Christophersen ascribes the non-occurrence of a
with continuates to the 'unital' characteristics of the
'indefinite article', that is, to its individualising
function, in terms of Kruisinga (1932a). Taking into
account the fact that the has a certain primacy over a -
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where for some reason both might be expected to occur
only the in fact does, compare here the remarks of
Perlmutter (1970:240-46) and see too our own remarks in
Chapter 11 - Christophersen is able to portray his








Now we are able to see that the criticisms which
were made above concerning Guillaume's theories had to
be, as they were, somewhat tempered by the fact that his
theory did lead the way to a more systematic account of
the •articles'. For there can be no doubt that Christ¬
ophersen has given a reasonable description of some of
the major aspects of English 'article' usage in notion¬
alist terms, without greatly deviating from what Guil-
laume proposed. Nevertheless, it is still necessary to
make a number of critical remarks. The emphasis is
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entirely on semantic theory,4 and the syntactic consid¬
erations which might both clarify the semantics and
enable the 'articles* to be fitted into a more complete
determiner system are almost wholly ignored. There can
be no doubt that semantic facts are vital to linguistic
studies, cf. again note 4, nor can there be any doubt
that notionalist studies such as that by Christophersen
often illuminate very fine distinctions in meaning; but
the lack of formalism and any coherent syntactic theory
are significant weaknesses. In their place is a reli¬
ance on rather vague psychologisms and philosophical
posits which are unacceptable as a priori statments. A
further example of this same tendency is seen in Chris-
ophersen's explanation of why proper names generally
lack accompanying 'articles' (1939:65):
"A common name is only an idea with potential
realisations; the idea itself is abstract,
the realisations are concrete. A proper
Indeed, Toussaint (1967:95) says that Guillaume's
aim was to "r6duire la syntaxe a la s6mantique". This,
of course, is comparable to the aims expressed by Lakoff
(1971c:267ff.), with much of which we are in sympathy.
Our criticism here, therefore, is only that too little
attention is paid to syntactic facts such as distrib¬
utional regularities, and thus is not directed against
the claim that it is semantics which is of primary
importance.
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name has no idea; It denotes only one defin¬
ite individual and is therefore always con¬
crete. Now, if we accept Guillaume' a theory
of the article as the connecting link
between abstract and concrete, it is clear
that proper names need no article."
We are entitled to ask what the linguistic significance
of such a statement is, since it is far from obvious;
yet in the theories of the Guillauraiste tradition no
such clarification is, or can be, given.
In principle, Jespersen (1949)^ follows Christoph-
ersen's proposals, but he makes one interesting theoret¬
ical modification: this is, that he elevates the prin¬
ciple of 'familiarity' to a rather higher status, using
it to explain, for example, why proper names, kinship
terms, etc. do not normally collocate with the 'definite
article'. Jespersen claims that the is used to mark a
particular noun as 'familiar', and therefore he can say
Unfortunately this part of Jespersen's work had to
be completed, by N. Haislund, after Jespersen's death,
and so it would be dangerous to assign all the views
expressed in it to Jespersen. Nevertheless, there is
good evidence to show that, in principle, these views
can be taken as the ones that Jespersen hinself would
have expressed, cf. the preface to Jespersen (1949) and
Bodelsen (1949).
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(1949:417-18) that it is because the 'familiarity' of,
for example, kinship terms, is:
"so complete that no article (determinative)
is needed."
If we refer back to the notion of deixis, with which the
is certainly associated, then we can see that it is at
least plausible that terms such as kinship terras will be
so familiar to the hearer (or will be assumed to be so
familiar) that they will need no kind of deictic, if
that is what the is, to point out the referent. However,
as will be seen later, Jespersen's explanation is on
less secure foundations when dealing with proper nouns
as opposed to kinship terms, although it is undoubtedly
more acceptable than the explanation which we quoted
from Christophersen (1939:65) above. Even so, it is
difficult to see how this explanation might be formal¬
ised. With regard to proper nouns, the problem is that
it is difficult to explain the lack of 'article' in,
say, (1) as due to 'familiarity', even as defined by
Christophersen:^
(2.1) Henry Kissinger is the power behind
the throne
Further, it would certainly seem to be the case that
'familiarity' is not the reason for the lack of the with
References to examples within the same chapter omit
the chapter number; references to examples from another
chapter include the relevant chapter number.
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vocatives, as Jespersen (1949:418) maintains; the reason
is rather different, cf. Thorne (1966) for its explan¬
ation, Despite these criticisms, we can agree that
Jespersen has made significant modifications to the
original Guillaumiste theory.
In the discussion of a in Jespersen (1949) the most
important point to note is that here is yet another
linguist who rejects the term 'indefinite' (1949:420):
"The term 'indefinite article' is not very
felicitous, as this article actually refers
to a definite item, even if it is not made
known which member of the class is mentioned.
The indefinite article is thus different
from any, which does not refer to a definite
item (known or unknown), but to some one
among all items within its class, no matter
which."
To exemplify, in:
(2.2) I bought a car yesterday
car is nothing if not definite, for I, the speaker, know,
perhaps because this is an action in the past, cf. §2.3,
exactly which car I bought. You, the hearer, will not
know this, or are assumed (by me) not to know this, but
that is hardly a reasonable criterion for lack of
'definiteness'. To say that the car is 'indefinite' is
to make a mockery of that ill-used term. At the very
least we must make some revision of our terminology, in
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order to give a more felicitous description of the
linguistic evidence. Further evidence of the inapprop-
riateness of 'definite* is seen in opaque contexts, cf.
Quine (1960:141-56). In, for example:
(2.3) John wants to marry the girl with the
most money
it is quite probable that neither the speaker nor the
hearer will yet be in a position to point out the refer¬
ent of girl. The only indicates that it will eventually
be possible, in theory, for both of them to do so.
Apart from these matters, the main interest in
Jespersen for us must lie not in his treatment of quant¬
ifiers, cf. (1949:620-22), but in his discussion of
number. In Jespersen (1914) there is both a long and an
illuminating discussion and an exemplification of the
syntactic features of count and mass nouns, of how mass
nouns may change both their meaning and their count-
ability simultaneously, e.g., noncount paper in (4),
count paper in (5):
(2.4) All the essays were written on poor
quality paper
(2.5) Bill wrote six papers on Old Persian
last year
In this discussion there is also mention of the 'dummy'
words which, following Ianucci (1952), we shall term
counters. The function of counters is solely to make a
noncount noun countable, without in any way necessarily
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adding to the semantic content of the sentence. Thus,
while:
(2.6) The victim had had pneumonia
is grammatical, (7) is not:
(2.7) *The victim had had several pneumonia
The reason for this is that several cooccurs only with
count nouns, and, of course, pneumonia is an uncountable
mass noun. Therefore the 'dummy' counter, attack, plus
of. is introduced into the object noun phrase in order
to provide an acceptable alternative to (7), without
altering the semantic content of the sentence:
(2.8) The victim had had several attacks of
pneumonia
We shall return to this topic, and attempt a more formal
solution of it, in §6.3.
In his reviews of Christophersen (1939) and Jesper-
sen (1949), Bodelsen (1939, 1949) suggests that the
concept of 'familiarity and substance' (the latter is
equivalent to Hjelmslev's'concretisation') is insuffici¬
ent to provide an adequate description of the use of
the. Also needed, suggests Bodelsen, is the concept of
'quantitative existence'. Bodelsen gives the following
explanation of this concept (1939:235-36):
"When we say gold la heavy, we are, of course,
speaking about something material, but, as
Christophersen himself points out, we are
not thinking of gold as something quantitative,
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but as something qualitative, and this is
the reason why we have the zero-article
here. If, on the other hand, we say the
gold that is stored in banks, then we con¬
ceive the gold as something that exists
quantitatively."
But of course, if it is accepted, as has been suggested
above, that the has a strong deictic element, then
naturally there will be a necessity for 'quantitative
existence', a need, in other words, for something to
point to. Further, it should be made clear that Bodel-
sen is not entirely fair to Christophersen, as can be
seen from the following quotation (Christophersen, 1939:
71):
"The has as its special function the marking
of familiarity, while a is purely the mark
of unity. This theory can tell us why
generic continuate words and plurals have no
article. Their very generality and the
vagueness of their quantitative delimitation
precludes familiarity, or to put it conver¬
sely: familiarity presupposes sharp and
precise limits ..."
In conclusion, it is interesting to consider fur¬
ther some of the remarks quoted above from Bodelsen
(1939). There it can be observed that he considers the
contrast between (9) and (10):
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(2.9) Gold is heavy
(2.10) The gold that is stored in hanks is
heavy
is basically that in (9) gold is thought of qualitative¬
ly, in (10) quantitatively. The point that the is in
some way performing the task of a quantifier is an
interesting one, and one which we shall inspect more
closely in Chapter 12, but it is difficult to accept
Bodelsen's remarks concerning (9). By far the simplest
explanation of why (9) has neither the nor a is that
gold is an uncountable noun, and thus can never colloc¬
ate with a; further, the is, in one sense, optional, but
see our remarks in §9.3* This syntactic explanation of
the grammaticality of (9) as opposed to (11) and along¬
side (12):
(2.11) *Horse has four legs
(2.12) A horse has four legs
seems quite sufficient, and there is surely no necessity
for unverifiable psychologisras. They may be thought of
as relics from the original Guillaumiste theory, which
hide the fact that the whole tradition, although spring¬
ing from what appeared to be barren ground, has develop¬
ed a semantic theory of the 'articles' which is of more
than transient interest. Nevertheless, it cannot be
denied that the lack of interest in criteria which are
purely syntactic detracts from the value of the theory,
as does the lack of interest which is apparent with
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regard to the 'non-article', more purely quantifier,
members of the determiner systems.
2.3 Other notionalists
Of the notionalist works outside the Guillaumiste
tradition, perhaps the most notable is the study by
Collinson (1937), which, as we might expect from the
quotation from Jespersen (1924), above, is specifically
concerned with the underlying structures of language.
The most important of his remarks are those concerning
the behaviour of a and any in English. Just as Kruis-
inga (1932a) claimed that there are two functions of the
•article1 a, so too does Collinson; these functions
Collinson calls 'alternative* and 'instantive' (1937:
35). 'Alternative' is the equivalent of Kruisinga's
'classifying', 'instantive' is similar to 'individual¬
ising'. To adapt Collinson's own examples, (13) shows
the 'alternative' use of a, whereas (14) shows the
'instantive' use:
(2.13) The chimney is filthy; we need a sweep
(2.14) As dusk fell, the travellers reached
a village
In (13) no particular sweep is thought of, whereas in
(14) there is a particular referent, although one which
is unknown to the reader or (perhaps) hearer.
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In an attempt to give an explanation of this dif¬
ference, it is constructive to compare (2). From this
it is clear that the tense of the verb is important, or,
perhaps, the need in (13) is related to raodals referring
to the future, cf. Anderson (1971d). The 'alternative'
use of a, therefore, must he syntactically restricted,
and, at the very least, is dependent upon the structure
of the verb phrase. The ambiguity of a, which other
writers have also noticed, cf. Robbins (1968:101-2),
Zandvoort (1957:125) and below, suggests that while it
may be correct to think of a as the proclitic form of
one, as does Perlmutter (1970), there are still diffic¬
ulties to be overcome. On the other hand, we must ask
whether the ambiguity resides in a, or in the noun
phrases, a sweep, a village, etc., as a whole. An
attempt to determine the place of ambiguity will be part
of the function of Chapter 11.
From the discussion of a, it is useful to move on
to consider Collinson's remarks about any. Collinson
claims that any is highly restricted in its cooccurrence
with past tense forms (1937:91):
"We ... say 'There was not anyone who smiled'
emphasizing the idea that one could pick on
anyone one liked and not find a smiler. We
do not, however, say either 'Anyone refrain¬
ed from smiling' or 'Anyone did not smile'
but this is due to the fact that we dis-
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countenance the use of any as the subject of
a definite occurrence in the past."
In fact, Collinson does not portray the state of affairs
as exactly as he might, for there is an exception to the
statement that any does not occur with past tense forms
unless it is preceded by an interrogative or negative
n
element. The exception is that any may occur if there
is a restrictive relative clause dependent upon it, or
there is a qualifying adjective which, in transform¬
ational terms, is derived from such a relative clause.
This does not hold for nonrestrictive relative clauses:
(2.15) a Any pupil who knew the answer was
thrashed by McCoakumchild
b Any promising pupil was instructed
in the principles of Utilitarianism
c *Any pupil, who knew the answer, was
thrashed by McCoakumchild
Where any is preceded by a negative element, as in:
(2.16) I didnft read any books
then it may be possible to explain the quantifier as
We must also note the acceptability of any in
sentences such as:
(i) Any indiscipline was instantly punished
But to state this as an exception quite different from
that named below might be a loss of generalisation.
See, however, the discussion in §10.2.
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"being in some sense derivable from, or parallel to, not
+ some, cf. Klima (1964:279) and §3.3. However, the
other occurrences of any seem to be rather more diffi¬
cult to explain, especially those such as (15a) which
involve a relative clause. There seems at present to be
no way to derive them from some in these instances.
However, see the further discussions in §3.3 and, especi¬
ally, §10.2, for a resolution of the difficulties.
One essential point which is often ignored is
emphasised by Mcintosh (1968); for the to be used ap-
/ —
propriately the referent of the noun in question must be
known to both speaker and hearer, or the speaker must
assume that this is so. Where the assumption is mis¬
taken, then there can be a breakdown in communication,
cf. §4.1. Although this point may seem elementary, it
is one which is not always properly understood; thus
Jespersen (1949:479) writes:
"The definite article plus a substantive in
the singular denotes one individual (suppos¬
ed to be) more or less familiar to the
speaker or writer: some image or notion of
the thing or person denoted by the substant¬
ive is (supposed to be) already found in the
consciousness of the speaker or writer
before he makes the statement."
Jespersen ignores the problem of the hearer in this
quotation, and Mcintosh is correct in insisting (1968:7)
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that use of the implies that "you (as well as I) know
which one(s)", for this clearly demonstrates that the
shows that both speaker and hearer are understood to
have full knowledge of the referent of the cooccurrent
noun.
Finally, the following is also crucial for an
understanding of the uses of the and a. Mcintosh (1968:
17) notes that to the question:
(2.17) Have you ever seen an axotol?
one may well reply:
(2.18) I have only once seen an axotol
On the other hand, it would be incorrect to reply:
(2.19) I have only once seen the axotol
although in other contexts that sentence is completely
grammatical. The reason for this would appear to be
that in (17) an is 'classifying* (or 'alternative'), and
that this precludes an immediately consequent use of the
with the same noun.< On the other hand, the an in (18)
is 'individualising' (or 'instantive') and therefore one
may, in fact must, use the at the next occurrence of
axotol with the same referent, as in, for example:
(2.20) I have only once seen an axotol;
the axotol was very beautiful
Mcintosh's argument on this point strongly rein¬
forces the earlier point that it will be very difficult
to account for all instances of a as merely proclitic
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variants of one, see above. The reason for this dif¬
ficulty is, of course, that there are clear semantic and
syntactic differences between an axotol in (17) and the
apparently identical noun phrase in (18). Jackendoff
(1969:233) has made an attempt to get round this prob¬
lem, but see §6.5 for some critical discussion of his
solution. We shall eventually see that it will be
necessary to introduce a semi-logical concept of 'scope'
if this problem is to be solved; how far, however, a
transformational theory restricted to the sentence level
can cope with this is a matter for some doubt.
When we discussed the Guillaumiste tradition in
§2.2, we observed that one inadequacy of the proposals
stemming from that tradition was that the grammarians
concerned were almost exclusively interested in some
contrast between the and a. In this latter part of the
chapter, however, we have discussed two papers which
deal with the ambiguity of a (if that is indeed where
the ambiguity lies) and which lead towards a discussion
of the quantifiers in general. They are interesting
because they suggest that a, at least, is in some ways
much more like a quantifier than an 'article'; in part¬
icular, some elements of the so-called 'indefinite
article' are also associated with the behaviour of any.
The consequences which this has for any analysis of the
determiner and quantifier systems of English will be
more extensively discussed in Part IV. But at present
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we shall now turn our attention to some analyses of
determiners and quantifiers which are totally different





By structuralist models of the determiner and
-/are quantifier systems is-1'meant those studies which have
as their basis the attempt at a classificatory descrip¬
tion of the elements present in the surface structure of
a given language, although the work may extend much
further. In this the influence of Leonard Bloomfield is
preeminent, for it was he who, with his assumption that
science was necessarily behaviouristic, determined that
such a taxonoraic approach was essential. Therefore, in
marked contrast to the works discussed in the previous
chapters, we shall find here little resort to meaning
and certainly no attempts at a psychological evaluation
of the functions of the various members of these systems.
We are now at the opposite pole of the mentalist -
behaviourist axis to Guillaume.
But this chapter makes one theoretical claim which
is not commonly observed and will seem surprising; it
will therefore be necessary to state that claim now and
then attempt some immediate justification of it. This
claim is that no major theoretical break occurs between
the structuralist theories associated with Bloomfield
and the so-called *Bloomfieldians' on the one hand and
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the transformationalist theories outlined in Chomsky
(1957) on the other. Rather, the break is claimed to
occur between these two together as opposed to the
various types of transformational grammar which stem
from such works as Katz and Postal (1964) and Chomsky
(1965). In other words, the chronological placement of
the break is here placed at about one decade later than
is most often assumed.
Our assumption can be criticised on several grounds,
of which we shall discuss three. The first, but the
weakest, is that this underestimates the theoretical
contributions of Noam Chomsky. Now whilst it would be
totally misleading not to recognise Chomsky's contribu¬
tions as major, to divide linguistic work into compart¬
ments on the basis of who wrote such-and-such is an
unacceptable personalisation of the issues. It is both
more principled and more just to the scholars concerned
to evaluate their work on quite impersonal grounds, for
then we can see the true diversity of the work of each
writer. Bloomfield is far from being the most rigid
Bloomfieldian and Chomsky is not the most dogmatic of
Chomskyians,
The second ground for criticism is that the divi¬
sion suggested above ignores the key concepts of deep
and surface structure: structuralist grammarians, it is
claimed, are interested only in surface structure; on
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the other hand, transformationalists extend their inter¬
ests to deep structure. Although this is to a large
extent correct, it is not entirely so, for non- (indeed,
anti-) transformationalists such as Hall (1964) have
been quite happy to use the concept. While deep struc¬
ture may be, or may originally have been, a necessary
concept in transformational theory, it is neither suf¬
ficient nor exclusive. Furthermore, there is the empir¬
ical fact that in early transformational work the deep
structures proposed for determiners and quantifiers are
not significantly different from the surface structures.
Probably this is in part due to the relative lack of
attention paid to such items until the middle 1960's,
but it can also be seen as due in part to the still-
strong influence of surface-based structuralism.
The final point concerns the underlying contrast
between mentalism and behaviourism. Transformational
grammar has been, from the beginning, mentalistic, while
structuralist grammar has always been associated with
behaviourist theories. Should not such a distinct
conflict be reflected in our theoretical divisions? The
answer is that of course it should be, if that conflict
is directly reflected in the works and analyses which we
shall discuss. But that condition is hardly fulfilled,
for in the questions with which we are concerned there
can be no great theoretical divisions apparent when the
kinds of solution offered are broadly similar, as is the
case.
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We have already remarked that in Bloomfieldian
theory there is a strong distinction between syntax and
semantics, and that this is a defining characteristic of
the approach. Now what is important to note here is
that for early transformational grammar exactly the same
is true. Consider, for example, the following remarks
from Chomsky (1957:101):
"It seems clear, then, that undeniable, though
only imperfect correspondences hold between
formal and semantic features in language.
The fact that the correspondences are so in¬
exact suggests that meaning will be relative¬
ly useless as a basis for grammatical des¬
cription. "
This statement has far more in common with the standard
structuralist position than it has with the position
adopted by Chomsky (1965:77):
"It goes without saying ... that purely seman¬
tic or purely syntactic considerations may
not provide the answer in some particular
case. In fact, it should not be taken for
granted, necessarily, that syntactic and
semantic considerations can be sharply dis¬
tinguished. "
The reason for such a change of heart may have been
purely practical, as claimed by Katz and Postal (1964:
2-4), or it may be significant of a deeper change
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affecting fundamental theoretical disposition, but for
our purposes a decision between the two is hardly neces¬
sary, Although Chomsky (1957) did propose a great many
striking theoretical changes, the immediate effect of
that work on actual descriptions of determiners and
quantifiers was, for the reasons we have described
above, minimal. To put the matter in a crude chrono¬
logical fashion, a transformational description of
determiners written in 1960 looks (and is) a lot more
like its structuralist counterpart of 1950 than its
transformationalist counterpart of 1970. It is precise¬
ly that kind of 'brute fact' which must determine our
divisions,
3.2 Bloomfield and others
Although Bloomfield (1935) does use the term deter¬
miner, his use of it is not precisely equivalent to the
one which we have used here. Much closer to the present
use of determiner is Bloomfield's term 'limiting adjec¬
tive'. These adjectives he divides into two classes,
'determiners' and 'numeratives'. The former includes
all that we here regard as determiners or quantifiers,
with the exclusion of all, both, many, such, few, very
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and the numerals, which are classed as 'numeratives'.1
The reasoning behind Bloomfield's division would appear
to be based upon the fact that singular count nouns
obligatorily cooccur with a determiner, cf. Bloomfield
(1935:203); however, on consideration such reasoning
must be judged to be inappropriate.
If we look at Bloomfield's definitions more care¬
fully, it will be noted that the only defining charac¬
teristic of the 'numeratives' is that they all require a
collocating plural or mass noun, with the exception of
one, which, of course, can only collocate with singular
count nouns. Now this is an extremely crude reason for
the separation into two classes. Consider, for example,
all, every and each. Since the latter two would appear,
at first sight, to collocate with singular count nouns
only, they are classed as 'determiners', in contrast to
the'numerative' all. But in fact there is good reason
to suppose that it is the distributive force of each and
every which makes the collocating noun singular. If one
were allowed, against all Bloomfieldian principles, a
The status of some of these items, e.g., such, is
obscure, for questions apart from the grammar of deter¬
miners may be involved. In other words, it is not
necessarily the case that every one of Bloomfield's
'numeratives' is a determiner within the context of the
present study.
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level of underlying structure, it would appear most
probable that in all cases of each/every + noun that the
noun would be originally plural and only change to
singular for the surface structure realisation (and such
late transformations as that for concord). Evidence for
this can be found in the fact that each can occur fol¬
lowing a plural noun, and that that is semantically very
similar to each preceding a singular noun:
(3.1) The students each had their own copy
of Aspects
(3.2) Each student had his own copy of Aspects
Even given the absence of the in (2) as opposed to (1),
it is clear that an adequate description of each must
take into account the fact that plural nouns do not
exclude some collocations with each (and with every,
although in that case the situation is more complex),
and this Bloomfield's classification fails to do.
Another problem which we encounter with regard to
Bloomfield's division is connected with the 'class-
cleavage' of one, cf. Bloomfield (1935:206). According
to the remarks there, one may either be a 'numerative',
2
as in (3a), or a 'determiner', as in (3b):
We i^ore here the use of the 'prop-word' one,
which, Bloomfield (1935:204) correctly observes, belongs
to a rather different grammatical category.
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(3.3) a My one book was burned
b One book was burned
The reason for this 'class-cleavage' is that Bloomfield
(1935:203) claims that with certain nouns, primarily
countable nouns such as book, a 'determiner' is always
required, cf. above. Therefore, in (3b) one must be a
•determiner'. But Bloomfield would also seem to believe
that 'determiners' must occur exclusively of one an¬
other. Thus, since in (3a.) is the 'determiner', one
must be something else, namely a 'numerative'. This
implies that two instances of the apparently identical
item, here one, but any numeral and several quantifiers
would fit, both of which have the same meaning and the
same phonological form, must be assigned to different
syntactic classes. This is so clearly an incorrect
conclusion that it is difficult to see how it could have
arisen except as the product of a fundamentally mistaken
taxonomic approach. As we shall see in Chapter 8, it is
indeed the case that quantifiers (including one) which
occur in postdeterminer position, as in (3a), require an
analysis which is somewhat different from that for
quantifiers occurring elsewhere, but the underlying
semantic representation remain constant. This latter
point is quite ignored by the 'class-cleavage' hypo¬
thesis,
The reason why the taxonomy is fundamentally mis¬
taken is one to which we shall have to return several
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times, since it is due to an assumption which is common
to most structuralist grammars. Bloomfield does not
permit recourse either to meaning or to some underlying
structure in order to determine grammatical classific¬
ation, thus completely contrasting with the notionalists
of Chapter 2. Now if one makes such an a priori and
illinguistic decision as that, then one has to accept
that empirical facts may sharply contradict it. This is
precisely what happens in the case of the 'class-cleav¬
age' of one. If we wish to account for all the facets
of the linguistic behaviour of one, we shall have to
include all the linguistic information, including seman¬
tic information, as is pointed out above. To segregate
'limiting adjectives' on the basis of their cooccurrence
with singular count nouns only gives a highly restricted
syntactic tautology.
What would, perhaps, be a much more useful division
would result from distinguishing between those items
which are most closely connected with an underlying
number system, i.e., all Bloorafield's 'numeratives'
together with, in all their occurrences, each, every,
some, etc., and those which are most closely connected
with a deictic system, i.e., the, this, that, possess-
ives, etc. This, of course, approximates to the dis¬
tinction already made between quantifiers and deictics.
It should be observed that this division appeals to the
two criteria which Bloomfield excludes, namely semantics
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and underlying structure. That the division appeals
more strongly to our linguistic intuitions is surely
some empirical evidence against Bloomfield's restric¬
tions on grammatical theory; but whether or not that
precise division is correct or essential we must wait
until a later chapter to decide.
Bloomfield again subdivides his class of 'deter¬
miners', in the following manner (1935:203):
"A number of features subdivides the deter¬
miners into two classes, definite and indef¬
inite . Of these features we shall mention
only one: a definite determiner can be
preceded by the numerative all (as in all
the water) but an indefinite determiner (as
some, in some water) cannot."
This, it seems to me, is a necessary corollary of the
previous division Bloomfield makes, and it is no less
mistaken. Upon examination it will be seen that his
'indefinite determiners' are precisely those 'determin¬
ers' which, together with the 'numeratives', should be.
classed as quantifiers, except for the interrogatives,
which are a different matter again. That these 'indef¬
inites' are quantifiers is, for the moment, an adeqtiate
explanation of why they do not cooccur with all in the
way Bloorafield describes (although there are exceptions,
cf. Chapter 4 and §10.4), and yet it permits all to
occur with deictics other than the, as in:
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(3.4) a All those boys
b All this milk
The introduction of the terms 'definite' and 'indefin¬
ite' for this subclassification function is, therefore,
seen to be superfluous. One's suspicions must be that
these terms were introduced in order to describe the two
'articles', that term being itself one which Bloomfield
retains but for which he provides no justification.
Perhaps not unexpectedly, Bloomfield made the
greatest of contributions to the study of determiners
and quantifiers within a strictly Bloomfieldian frame¬
work, and later works such as those by Fries (1957) and
Hockett (1958) do not add to our knowledge of the syntax
of these items in any significant manner. Even an
extended monograph such as Yotsukura (1970) shows no
important theoretical advance. Indeed, it may be con¬
sidered a regression, since it deals exclusively with
the surface structure occurrences of the 'articles',
including unstressed some (s'm). Concerned as Yotsiikura
mainly is with grammatical collocations of these items
with countable and uncountable nouns, she is open to the
same criticisms as we have applied to Bloomfield above.
Also, of course, Yotsukura has restricted her study to a
grammatical category - the 'articles' - which we have
already shown in Chapters 1 and 2 to be of dubious
value. Therefore if we wish to continue our search for
a development of structuralist, although not necessarily
—82-
Bloomfieldian, theory of determiners, we must cross the
Atlantic so that we can consider the comments of Strang
(1962). In that work we find that determiners are once
again treated as a major category, for the term as used
by Strang is equivalent to Bloomfield's 'limiting adjec¬
tives'. However, there is a subdivision into three
minor categories: (i) 'articles'; (ii) determiner-pro¬
nouns; and (iii) noun-phrase intiators. The second of
these subdivisions is again subdivided, this time into
two groups: variables and invariables (Strang, 1962:1 OS-
IS). In fact, Strang makes a third subdivision of
'determiner-pronouns', which I have, for present pur¬
poses, treated as part of the 'invariable' group; this
subdivision includes numerals, few, little, etc. It
does not seem to me that this abbreviation does undue
violence to her account, but cf. Strang (1962:114-15).
The 'articles' are given their special prominence
because they do not occur alone in a noun phrase; this
is a criterion which we have already discussed and al¬
ready found wanting, cf. the discussion of Maetzner
(1874a) in §1.5. The reasons given there for its rejec¬
tion hold equally for Strang's classification and need
not be dealt with again. Strang notes two uses of the
'definite article', 'particularising' and 'non-partic¬
ularising' , a distinction clearly designed to deal with
generics, which are alone in belonging to the latter
group. Of the various types of 'particularising' the
-83-
which Strang mentions, special note should be made of
'subsequent specification', for this notion is one which
Hill (1966), see below, discusses in detail. However,
it might be pointed out now that the sentence which
Strang uses to explain this notion (1962:109):
(3.5) The passage I have quoted
is not a happy choice, since it is easy enough to pre¬
sent a plausible case for this being an instance of the
'before mentioned' usage, i.e., where there must have
been a previous mention of the passage or of a noun with
a similar meaning and the same referent. Even more
plausibly one might suggest that (5) is an example of
the coming from the situational environment, see below
and Strang (1962:109-10). In such a case one might
claim that there is non-verbal previous mention, and
that the therefore refers to some event which both
speaker and hearer have just witnessed. The extent to
which the linguist ought to be involved in such para-
linguistic matters is highly debatable, and it is a
point which I shall in large measure attempt to avoid as
being of no direct interest at the moment. However see
§12.3 for an attempt at a resolution of the problem as
far as it concerns the.
In Strang's discussion of the 'indefinite article'
there is some obscurity, for it is not at all clear
whether or not she recognises the possible ambiguity of
a, discussed at length above. One could claim that she
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does see this ambiguity, but it is difficult to claim
that she attaches any importance to the fact; this, of
course, may be an eventual advantage. In common with
many other grammarians, cf, Jespersen (1949:403-4),
S^rensen (1958:83) and Yotsukura (1970:50), Strang
recognises a 'zero article'. Whether or not this is
correct will be most extensively discussed in Chapter
11; let us only remark for the moment that the prime
motive behind this postulation would seem to be, in all
cases, an a priori assumption that in English all nouns
must be accompanied by an 'article' or some other deter¬
miner, and that this assumption has not been satisfact¬
orily proven or shown to be desirable.
One innovation which Strang makes in her discussion
of the 'articles' is the use of the term 'negative
article' to describe no (1962:111-12), The reason for
this is that no would appear to form, with the and a,
the third part of a mutually exclusive syntactic system.
However this is unsatisfactory. No has no semantic
relation whatsoever to the, and to assume that it has
can easily lead one into logical fallacies, cf. Geach
(1968:11ff.). A not totally dissimilar situation arises
if one considers no to he merely the negative form of a.
Allowing for the present that a is derivable from one,
what would prevent us from then claiming that no was
derivable from not one, for this appears to be the
import of Strang's classification? It is true that in
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some cases this appears to be desirable, for we find:
(3.6) a Not one mountaineer was lost
b No mountaineer was lost
At first sight the difference between the two sentences
seems to be one of emphasis, and this could be handled
by rules similar to those presented by Perlmutter (1970)
to account for one - a correspondences. But that analy¬
sis escapes the generalisation pointed out by Jespersen
(1940:457) and elaborated upon by Steven Smith (1972),
that in the type of structure exemplified by not one,
the negation simply means "less than". That less than
one eqtials none is a mathematical, not a linguistic,
equation, nor is the linguist responsible for the fact
that mountaineers are counted only in whole integers.
Furthermore, there are instances where no is grammatical
and not one is not:
(3.7) a *Not one milk was spilt
b No milk was spilt
Finally, it may be observed that no one does not mean
the same as no in every case:
(3.8) a No one boy can kill Goliath
b No boy can kill Goliath
It therefore appears misleading to compare no directly
with a, and this strongly suggests that the proposed
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analysis of no is most probably inadequate.' The prob¬
lem could be more easily resolved if the 'article' were
dispensed with as a separate class, for then no and a
may, perhaps, be both analysable as quantifiers and the
relationship between them should then be as easily
classified as should the lack of relation between the
and no.
To turn our attention to possessive pronouns, these
Strang calls 'genitive articles'; again this is unsatis¬
factory, but this time more reasonable. However, within
the limits of a surface structure analysis it is dif¬
ficult to go further and it is only within a discussion
of the underlying properties of possessives that a
classification of their determiner-like functions can be
made. Let us merely note that forms in Italian such as:
(3.9) II niio vestito ("my suit")
may provide clues to their derivation and status, cf.
Bloomfield (1935:203).
The 'variable determiner-pronouns' of Strang (1962)
are the demonstratives, and the 'invariable determiner-
pronouns' are the other determiners and quantifiers with
This is notwithstanding the fact that no is dia-
chronically derivable from Old English nan, a compound
form of ne + an "not" + "one". Cf. the brief remarks in
§6.5 on other parallel word formations.
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the exceptions of 'noun-phrase intiators' and 'articles'.
The criterion for this division is the relationship
between number and determiner, and, as noted above, is
similar to the distinction made here between deictics
and quantifiers, although Strang, I would claim, relies
to a greater extent on merely surface characteristics.
Strang's final category is 'noun-phrase initiator'. The
most important members of this category are all, both
and half, cf. Strang (1962:116), and the criterion for
membership of the class is occurrence immediately before
the. That this is a doubtful, and even unilluminating,
basis for a category distinction we shall attempt to
demonstrate later, cf. Chapter 4. In any event, it
would seem to be a matter of insufficient syntactic
importance to justify a sharp distinction between them
and the 'determiner-pronouns'.
Smith (1963) is primarily a statistical study of
the 'articles', for which compare Yotsukura (1970), and
as such contributes relatively little to the more theor¬
etical aspects of their syntactic description. However,
one point of interest is the use of the terms cataphora
and ecphora to describe reference forward and situation¬
al reference respectively, in addition to the well-
established anaphora, or reference backward, as for
example is the case with the in:
(3.10) I met a man; the man ...
Cataphora is used to describe those instances of the
which Smith considers are due to a restrictive clause or
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adjunct which follows the cooccurrent noun. Two critic¬
isms might be made here. Firstly, the notion of "fol¬
lowing" as used by Smith is purely a surface one. In
underlying structure there is no reason to suppose that
such is the case. Secondly, some of the examples of
cataphora which Smith gives are in themselves unconvin¬
cing, for example (1963:15):
(3.11) "... assume that the vehicles whizzing
by would ..."
for such examples of the usage of the do not appear to
demand as a source the following restrictive adjunct or
clause. The question is an extremely thorny one, cf.
Huddleston (1971:212-15) for just one aspect of this,
and as a result one must be dubious about the worth of
Smith's statistical statements which purport to show
that the cataphoric use of the is the most common in the
text under analysis. See, however, the remarks on
Robbins (1968) in §3.4, where the question is once more
discussed. And even if Smith's examples of cataphora
are not always convincing it may well be the case that
it will be extremely useful, and perhaps even necessary,
to describe (and analyse) certain instances of the as
cataphoric; this is a question to which we shall return
in Chapter 12. It would appear that many cases of the
can only be accounted for in terms of their situational
context. The most well-known of these are references to
the sun, the moon, etc. where the use of the can be
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explained in terras of the 'situational context of the
universe'. Clearly this has some connection with the
notion of 'familiarity' espoused by Christophersen
(1939) and Jespersen (1949), and discussed in Chapter 2,
but for such occurrences of the Smith uses the terra
'ecphora* (1963:17). We thus have a tripartite descrip¬
tion of the, and in our later discussions we shall
consider how syntactically valid this largely semantic
classification may be.
We must now return across the Atlantic to discuss a
paper by Hill (1966). This paper is not easy to place
theoretically, since it partly relies on taxonomic
criteria and partly on transformational theory. It
might be preferable, therefore, to consider it in the
following section (on early transformational grammar),
but, perhaps a little unjustifiably, I shall discuss it
here. The main reason for doing so is that Hill acknow¬
ledges a great debt to Strang (1962), and such an umbil¬
ical cord is best not severed. Hill's paper deals only
with the two 'articles', the and a, and thus has all the
deficiencies which have been noted in other similar
studies. There is, for example, no mention of the
demonstratives or of the relation of a to one.
Hill's study is in two parts: the first is a rapid
historical survey of major contributions to the theory
of the 'articles', which often offers very interesting
comments; much of what he says nmst be agreed with, but
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he does seem to overrate Sweet (1898), which only glances
at the 'articles' and offers, for example, no discussion
of generics. One of the best features of this survey is
Hill's dislike of the way the term 'definite' is cur¬
rently applied. Thus he quotes Roberts (1964:12):
"The gives the noun a definite meaning,
specifying a particular one or a particular
group. A and some do not do this."
Hill comments (1966:222):
"As with earlier descriptions which insist on
definiteness or particularity, I find that a
dog bit me is quite as definite, particular
and singular, as the sentence would be with
the other article."
This is reasonable enough as far as it goes, but since
it deals only with the position of the speaker it does
not go very far. For the hearer there is a semantic
difference which Hill ignores, and this detracts from
the value of his statement.
Hill then goes on to analyse the meaning and status
of the 'articles' for himself. In fact, though, he
barely discusses a, and his remarks of interest are
confined to the. He regards the as having two sources:
(i) second mention; (ii) proximity (Hill, 1966:225, 228-
29). Proximity is equivalent to Smith's ecphora, above,
and while it is a reasonably useful and clear term, it
must be stated that it only defines a problem; in no way
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does it solve one. Hill considers 'second mention' to
be the fundamental source of the, and its status is two¬
fold. Firstly, there is simple anaphora, see example
(10), above; secondly, where there is no such anaphora,
the first mention is presumed to be sited in a defining
(restrictive) relative clause or adjunct, cf. the re¬
marks above on Smith's (1963) use of cataphora. How¬
ever, Hill points out that this situation is not simple,
since either 'article' can appear with such a construc¬
tion, as in:
(3.12) A man who refuses alcohol is a tee¬
totaller
(3.13) The man who refuses alcohol is a tee¬
totaller
But by using the notion of 'second mention' as obliga¬
torily demanding the, Hill accounts for (13) and (14) in
the following manner (1966:226):
"I shall set up the source sentences for the
first example given above as
A man is a teetotaller. The man
refuses alcohol
In the process of embedding the second sen¬
tence into the first, the second mention
form (the man) is replaced by who, and the
first mention form remains. For the second
example I shall set up the hypothetical
source sentence as
-92-
A man refuses alcohol. The man is a
teetotaller
The process of embedding inserts the first
sentence into the second sentence, replacing
a man with who. Thus it is the second men¬
tion form which remains."
The 'second mention' derivation is certainly an ingeni¬
ous device for accounting for large numbers of occur¬
rences of the. However there are several questions to
be asked, notably those concerned with the lack of
evidence for such different derivations. The problem
would seem to be that one type of the, the anaphoric
one, has been elevated to a level where it is unable to
bear the weight of explanation required, and there is a
resultant ad hoc explanation which does not appear to
have any syntactic motivation. Ingenious though it may
be, Hill's account is quite unacceptable.
And there is yet one further point to be made. For
me, at least, (12) and (13) do not appear to be typical
occurrences of a and the, nor to differ in meaning
significantly, since they can both be taken to be gener¬
ic; in fact, that would be the most usual interpretation
of these sentences. The generic quality is removed if
we change to the past tense, but with the following
results:
(3.14) ?A man who refused alcohol was a tee¬
totaller
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(3.15) The man who refused alcohol was a
teetotaller
It does not seem to me that Hill is able to account for
the less acceptable status of (14). It should be noted,
and (14) and (15) provide tests for this, that whereas
(12) is always generic, this is not so with (13), to
which a non-generic interpretation can be assigned. In
such cases the man would appear to be derived not from
'second mention' as a result of the process of embedding
advocated by Hill and described above, but either from
simple anaphora or what Hill calls 'proximity'. If this
is so, then it must be doubtful whether the kind of
'second mention' that we have been discussing is ade¬
quate or even necessary. In any event, it can be seen
that it fails to account for the ambiguity of (13). We
may, then, conclude that there are at least three sources
for the, namely, anaphora, 'proximity' and genericness.
But in this connection see the discussion of Kruisinga
(1932a) in §1.5 above, and of Vendler (1967) and Robbins
(1968) in §3.5 below. Furthermore, there can be no
doubt that relativisation has some bearing upon the use
of the, and perhaps it is this fact which Hill is striv¬
ing toward; that is a subject to which we shall return
more than once.
In concluding this section, we must recognise as
the major fault of Bloomfieldian and neo-Bloomfieldian
linguistics the unwillingness to make any semantic
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pronouncements on determiners and quantifiers. Also,
and this almost certainly has its connections with
semantics, there is the lack of interest in any under¬
lying semantic phenomena which might help to account for
the variations in surface structure. While what appears
on the surface ought not to be ignored, neither should
the underlying structure be ignored, even if it is not
directly observable or testable. It is this latter
omission which is at the root of the unfortunate dis¬
tinctions which all the above grammarians have made, for
example, the counter-intuitively sharp distinction be¬
tween all and every, or Bloomfield's 'class-cleavage* of
one.
3.3 Early transformational theory
The earliest transformationalist studies ai*e, quite
understandably, concerned primarily with providing a
general theoretical exposition and a discussion of
various syntactic phenomena which are easily accessible
to the transformationalist framework. Since determiners
and quantifiers are not, regrettably, to be included
amongst such phenomena, it was natural that these studies
pay very little attention to their syntax. For example,
Chomsky (1957) mentions these items only in the context
of a derivation of the from the node T, which itself is
one of the obligatory constituents of an TP structure.
Similarly, Bach (1964:67, 76), in so far as one can
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judge, would appear to regard the constituent structure
of NP's to be Article + Noun, where Article would in¬
clude (at least) the, a and the possessives. That both
accounts are totally inadequate cannot be denied, biit it
is to be expected when we consider that it was not the
aim of either work to provide a systematic and complete
explanation of the English determiner systems. However,
the suspicion that the first studies in transformational
grammar were often content to give merely a phrase
structure formalisation of previous structuralist ac¬
counts is reinforced when we look at rather more compre¬
hensive discussions in a similar theoretical framework,
cf. Chomsky (1961:135), and the discussion of similar
studies in Jackendoff (1968).
Thus, of the other introductory works which should
be considered here, Roberts (1962) and Thomas (1965)
barely do more than give PS rules which will generate
the types of structures discussed in introductory struc¬
turalist handbooks, e.g., Fries (1957), and these two
authors pay no more attention to transformational rela¬
tions between these structures than do their structural¬
ist rivals. However, a later work by Roberts is more
interesting, since he states in its preface (1964:vii)
that the determiner system and the rules he presents to
generate it were outlined to him by Noam Chomsky. Des¬
pite such a pedigree the account has its shortcomings,











(pre-article) + Art +
(Demon) + (number)










Two of these rules are somewhat misleading. First¬
ly, but less importantly, Def/Nondef is a contrastive
feature used only for pedagogical reasons, Roberts
himself preferring the contrast of specific/nonspecific
(1964:12). But whether even the latter is the correct
contrast is doubtful, since it must be presumed that the
is to be regarded as specific and a as nonspecific, and
if the feature of specificity is to be employed syntac¬
tically surely its usefulness will be rather in separat¬
ing the two different forms of a which we have mentioned
previously and which we can exemplify by:
(3.16) I bought a car yesterday
(3.17) I must buy a car soon
where the latter a might be regarded as nonspecific, the
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forrner one as specific. Indeed, we ought to note that
this is very close to the [ispecific! feature used in
the rather later work of Fillmore (1967). The same
feature, moreover, could equally "be applied to instances
of the, cf. example (2.3).
Secondly, and much more confusingly, the use of the
term "Demon" conjures up the notion of demonstrative, an
unfortunate connection which Roberts first encourages
(1964:30):
"The symbol Demon stands for the word demon¬
strative, as you may have guessed, and you
may know that such words as this and these
are demonstratives."
and then attempts to obliterate:
"However Demon here doesn't stand for this
or these."
Instead, as can be seen, Demon rewrites as "D^" or "Bp",
which have, according to Roberts, the meanings of near¬
ness and remoteness respectively. Now it should be
remembered that Art rewrites as Def or Nondef. Taking
the combinations of Art + Demon we find the following
permutations:
(3.18) Def + D1 : Def + D?
Nondef + D.j : Nondef + Dp
From the first of these permutations Roberts derives, by
'phonological' rules, this; from the second he derives
that. Setting aside the nature of the processes which
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Roberts terms 'phonological', for perhaps 'lexical' is a
better description of them, but that is unimportant,
such an analysis we may consider adequate enough in (the
pedagogical) context, considering the fact that nearness
vs. remoteness is a commonly accepted description of the
contrast between this and that (and not so very far from
the •truth').
Prom the third and fourth permutation in (18)
Roberts derives determiners such as a certain and some,
respectively, so that sentences (19a) and (19b) show the
contrast D1 -
(3.19) a A certain man came in
b Some roan came in
Not surprisingly, Roberts is less than confident about
such derivations. Indeed, he admits (1964:34):
"D.| and Dj in combination with Def clearly
contain the meanings nearness and remoteness;
this and that. In combination with Nondef,
this meaning contrast is not so clear,
though one could perhaps argue that a cer¬
tain is more 'near' than some."
This appears to me to be nothing like a justification of
the derivations proposed. Not only do the semantic
arguments verge on the ludicrous, but there are also
severe syntactic drawbacks. For instance, there is
little plausibility for the creation of such radically
different structures for:
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(3.20) Certain of the men entered
(3.21) A certain man entered
as those produced by Roberts' rules, which may be pre¬











As can be seen, in (22) certain of is a Predeterminer,
but in (23) certain, by itself, is a Demon. This clear¬
ly is a very inadequate classification, in some ways
reminiscent of the 'class-cleavage' problem encountered
in Bloomfield (1935), and it appears to arise for very
similar reasons.
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One other inadequacy in Roberts' rules and which is
worth mentioning is that the transformation which he
gives to change:
(3.24) A man was on the table
into:
(3.25) There was a man on the table
also predicts as grammatical:
(3.26) *ihere was John on the table
This, of course, can be solved, as Roberts says, by ad
hoc-ly assigning the feature 'Def to proper nouns.
But, even so, there still remains a host of unsolved
problems, for example the sentences:
(3.27) a *There were all men on the table
b *There was each man on the table
The question of existential there^ is too complex to be
It is, of course, necessary to distinguish between
two types of there; the one in these examples may be
taken as 'existential', perhaps equivalent to the logical
operator "3". The other there is locative and can be
found in sentences similar to (26) but with a different
intonation pattern: the main stress is on there, not
John, and there is a pause after John:
(i) There was John, on the table
This suggests a different syntactic structure and that
locative there is not derived by the transformation
under discussion. In this connection see Allan (1971,
1972), Sampson (1972) and the discussion in §7.4 below.
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solvable "by the kind of simple there-transformatlon
which Roberts suggests. At the least, and this is a
question to which we shall have to return, it necessar¬
ily involves an analysis of the internal syntax of
quantifiers, at which Roberts makes no serious attempt.
If we now turn our attention away from such intro¬
ductory studies to those which are more exclusively
concerned with the analysis of determiners and quant¬
ifiers, but which still adhere to a theoretical frame¬
work closely allied to that found in the works discussed
above, we find a number of papers which are concerned
with the observably close relationship between the
syntax of determiners and the syntax of relative clauses
and adjuncts; of such works the most interesting are
those by Lees (1961) and Smith (1964). The hypothesis
behind both these articles is that the way relative
clauses are embedded into higher sentences is determined
by the kind of determiner which is contained in the NP
upon which the clause is embedded. For Lees it is a
question of the contrast between 'definite* and 'indef¬
inite' 'articles' determining the structure. Thus, for
(28) Lees presents the PS marker given in (29), (1961;
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164):5




the Cm Cp man
the whom you see tall man
On the other hand, for (30) the underlying phrase marker
(31) is suggested by Lees (1961:165):
(3.30) A tall man whom you see
Abbreviations are as follows: Norn - nominal; Sb -
substantive; Td - definite article; 0^ - nominal comple¬
ment; Cm - modifier complement (i.e., postnominal); Op -
property complement (prenoun adjective); Tn - non-defin¬
ite article (i.e., indefinite and generic articles).
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(3.31) Nom
Even to the linguistically-naive observer it might
seem strange that there should be such a marked differ¬
ence in the structure of two such apparently similar
sentences. And when we consider the matter carefully,
it becomes even more worrying that relative clauses which
are apparently of the same type, i.e., restrictive - but
note the comments below about the status of the various
relative adjuncts - should be derived from two different
points in structure, namely as a rewrite of T in (29)
and of Sb in (30). Although there is a faint syntactic
justification for the analysis outlined above, in which
respect see Smith (1961), it is surely insufficient to
make the kind of structure postulated by Lees acceptable
as part of any sophisticated transformational grammar.
Our objections to Lees' proposals may be stated quite
simply: the different underlying sources by which he
proposes to explain the two different sentence types
(28) and (30) are only justifiable in terms of those two
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different sentence types, and there is no independent
motivation for them; given that, the analysis is vici¬
ously circular and incapable of giving an adequate
explanation of the syntactic problem. In this respect
Lees' proposal is not very different from that of Hill
(1966), discussed in §3.2.
The main important of Smith's (1964) argument is
that there are selectional restrictions, cf. Chomsky
(1965:95ff.), operating between determiners and relative
clauses. Involved at the very basis of her argument is
a distinction between restrictive and nonrestrictive or
appositive relative clauses (henceforth in discussing
Smith (1964) these will be called R and A relative
clauses). But this is in itself a not totally accept¬
able distinction. Certainly many of the traditional
grammarians do make it, for example Poutsma (1904:420ff.),
Curme (1931:223ff.) and Kruisinga (1932b:375ff.), but it
is questionable whether such traditional formulations
are correct. Thus, for instance, Sopher (1969:257)
argues that the distinction is not at all clear and he
dispenses with the classification:
"It is not practicable to classify relative
clauses as restrictive (i.e., notionally
defining or limiting) and non-restrictive
(i.e., notionally continuative or non-defin¬
ing), since many relative clauses appear to
fit into either category without any
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significant change, or, if there is a change
of meaning, it is not relevant in the con¬
text . "
A very similar point is made by Huddleston (1971:212-
17), although he accepts that there may be occasions
where the distinction is both plausible and necessary.
However, one may reasonably argue against Sopher
and Huddleston, and also Morris (1969) and Zandvoort
(1957:212-13), where again similar points are made, that
their grounds for rejecting the classification described
above are false, in that they fail to take account of
certain relevant syntactic phenomena. Certainly, the
distinction must be made between the R clause in (32)
and the A clause in (33):
(3.32) The John Smith whom I know well
cannot be the thief
(3.33) John Smith, whom I know well, cannot
be the thief
Nevertheless, what must be said is that Smith does not
offer explanations of R and A clauses except in terms of
their relation to determiners and that in turn deter¬
miners are defined only by their relation to R and A
clauses. The argument is thus circular, since she
accepts the classification without external justific¬
ation; it may well be that there is one, but it is not
given.
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Smith's argument then continues as follows: given
that the R/A distinction is acceptable, which we shall,
despite the above comments, assume for present purposes,
although for even further critical discussion see Thomp¬
son (1971), it is possible to relate these two types of
relative clauses to three types of determiners, which
are, according to Smith (1964:248-49):
"... those accepting only A relatives, those
accepting both A and R relatives, and those
accepting only R relatives. These classes
correspond to an intuitive classification of
determiners as to definiteness; definiteness
is associated with A relative clauses,
indefiniteness with R relative clauses. The
three classes are named Unique, Specified
and Unspecified, to indicate that they are
distinct from the traditional definite and
indefinite determiners: with R relatives,
Unspecified determiners occur: any, all,
etc.; with R and A relatives, Specified: a,
the, 0; with A relatives only, Unique: 0
(proper names)."
There then follows, Smith (1964:249), a set of PS rules
which generate determiners and relative clauses which
fulfil these conditions. These PS rules make use of the
def/nondef contrast to separate the various Specified
determiners.
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There are several perhaps non-fundamental objec¬
tions which must be made to Smith's account. Firstly,
it would be quite erroneous to reach out for the aid of
intuition if it claims, rather misleadingly, that indef-
initeness is associated with R clauses and definiteness
with A clauses; the reverse is surely much nearer the
truth. Secondly, since Unique appears only to apply to
0 with proper names, how can Smith describe the common
type of Unique which is the plus noun, as in:
(3.34) The sun; the moon
Is the considered as merely Specified in such occur¬
rences? There is at least a case to be made that there
it is much closer to the notion of Unique. Thirdly,
although Smith notes the use of a 'sero article' (if we
are willing to accept the existence of such a grammatic¬
al entity), she in no way explains it, nor, trivially,
do her PS rules generate Specified 0, despite her claims
to its existence, quoted above. What ought to have been
pointed out is that, in the context of Smith's study,
Specified 0 occurs only with noncount nouns and the
plural of count nouns, as in:^
(3.35) Milk which comes from goats is
nourishing
(3.36) Milk, which comes from goats, is
nourishing
The following discussion concerns only noncount
nouns, but analogous arguments apply to plural nouns.
-108-
Speculation regarding the reason for this omission
on Smith's part leads us to the fundamental objection to
her account, for is it not the desire to consider the
determiners as defined by their relation to relative
clauses, and by that relation only, which leads to the
omission? If, instead, there were an analysis of the
semantic content of the determiners, would there not be
more adequate ways of accounting for such matters as the
occurrences of 'zero articles' in (35) and (36)? For
example, ought we not to explain the presence of Spec¬
ified 0, or, preferably, the absence of the 'indefinite
article', in collocations with mass nouns such as milk
by one of the following two claims: either that a is a
$j;.
weakened form of the numeral one which can only occur
with countable nouns (the claim of Perlmutter, 1970); or
that a is in some way a realisation of the feature
[♦count], or [^singular], which, of course, is not to be
found with mass nouns? For a discussion of these com¬
peting solutions see Chapter 11. We need only note at
present that both at least move towards a more adequate
solution of the problem than any statement in Smith's
paper. Similarly, one might claim that the fact that
Unspecified a is the type in (37) and that Specified a
is the type in (38) can be discovered not by an analysis
of relative clauses, but by a consideration of the
relationship existing between a and any, and the syntac¬
tic status of the latter:
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(3.37) A man could do the job in five minutes
(3.38) A man did the job in five minutes
Further, the syntactic status of any is more clearly
seen in the light of its relation to negatives and other
similar syntactic elements rather than to relative
clauses. This is a point which we have already discus¬
sed, especially in §2.3, and we shall return to it in
our discussion of Klima (1964), below, and more fully in
§10.2.
One unfortunate aspect of Smith's paper is that her
claim that no Unspecified determiner can take an A
relative, while very possibly true for her idiolect, is
not true for mine, nor, apparently, for many other
speakers of British English, where, at the very least,
the restrictions are not so clear-cut. Thus for me the
following sentences show differing degrees of accept¬
ability, but none are completely unacceptable:
(3.39) Some dodos, who could not fly, were
extant in the 15th century
(3.40) ?A11 men, who constitute the most vicious
species on earth, are bipeds
(3.41) ??Many students, who had failed the exams,
were sent down
Admittedly, many more examples are completely ungram-
matical, for example:
(3.42) *Any book, which is about linguistics,
is interesting
-110-
(3.43) *No man, who came to the party, wore
a toga
But in (42) we may well be dealing with a rather differ¬
ent type of quantifier - relative clause relationship,
and in (43) the problem is one of the inapplicability of
coreference conditions, due to the negative. Touching
upon this latter point, Smith (1964:258-59) claims that
negation and question elements interrelate with A rela¬
tive clauses and determiners to make the sentences (44)
- (47) ungrammatical. But I find only (46) ungrammat-
ical:
(3.44) He didn't eat the mango, which I
bought for him yesterday
• +■
(3.45) He didn't eat the mango, which was
overripe
(3.46) *He didn't write a novel, which was
published by McGraw-Hill
(3.47) He did not use the air mattress,
which belongs to the Halls
A similar conflict arises with questions,"for Smith
(1964:259) claims that all of the following are ungram¬
matical :
(3.48) *Did he paint a mural, which hangs in
the Hotel Prado?
(3.49) Did John, who is a journalist, write
a novel?
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(5.50) Who ate the mango, which Eleanor
bought yesterday?
(3.51) *Who wrote a novel, which was pub¬
lished by McGraw-Hill?
Any evaluation of Smith's analysis of these sen¬
tences, therefore, is bound to be complicated by the
differing judgments of grammaticality. In the case of
examples (44) - (51), nevertheless, it can be observed
that the crucial distinction may be one of sentence
negation (or questioning) versus negation (questioning)
of a constituent of the sentence. For speakers such as
myself, we may find that only constituent negation
(questioning), which does not affect (include in its
scope) the relevant HP, is present, and this may be the
reason for the conflicting assignments of acceptability.
It might also be noted that the sentences which are
ungrammatical for me all involve an antecedent which, in
the terminology of Fillmore (1968), is in the Result-
ative case.
The final section of Smith's paper is concerned
with generic determiners, and in it is found the rather
surprising belief that the is the only generic deter¬
miner. Thus she writes (1964:259):
"The following discussion is concerned with
sentences that are said to be generic, or to
have a generic determiner ... The deter¬
miner in question is the with singular affix."
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What, then, of:
(3.52) A lion is a dangerous animal
Is there no generic determiner here? This would appear
to he the position which Smith is obliged to hold. But
surely most linguists would agree that at least the
first a in (52) displays generic characteristics, al¬
though, of course, we might rather wish to claim that it
is the NT a lion as a whole which is generic; however
this distinction is not important at present. Perhaps
(53) is an even more convincing example:
(3.53) During the winter a dormouse hiber¬
nates
There would seem to be only one reason for the kind of
interpretation which Smith gives. It is that a in (52),
(53) and similar sentences would be accounted for simply
in terms of the contrast between Specified and Unspec¬
ified a. But as has been said above, the latter type of
a is related to any, and that relation cannot be carried
over to generic a without some modification, for that
would suggest that:
(3.54) ?Any lion is a dangerous animal
(3.55) ??During the winter any dormouse hiber¬
nates
would be rather more acceptable than they appear to be.
For a discussion of what the relationship of any to
generic a might be, see Perlmutter (1970). It is a
subject to which we shall have to return at some length
in §11.4.
Let us now assume, in contradiction of the facts,
that the plus singular affix is the only generic deter¬
miner, and consider the adequacy of Smith's analysis of
it in vacuo. Smith asserts that the status of generic
the is not to be regarded as a matter of grammar but as
a matter of the interpretation of a grammar. 'Phis
appears to be the first step towards a theory of inter¬
pretive semantics, which is extensively applied to the
grammar of quantifiers in Jackendoff (1969, 1972b) and
more generally advocated in Chomsky (1972b). Jackend-
off's theory will be examined in Chapter 6, but some
remarks specifically about Smith's position are in order
here. The main justification for her position is that
generic the occurs with relative clauses under the same
syntactic conditions as does the nongeneric variant
(Smith, 1964:260). But consider the following sentences
(3.56) The elephant which lives in Africa
has big ears
(3.57) The elephant which lived in Africa
has big ears
A3 Smith's claims predict, (56) may be interpreted
either generically or nongenerically. On the other
hand, because of the past - present contrast between the
verb of the relative clause and the verb of the matrix
clause in (57), that sentence has only a nongeneric
meaning. This is inexplicable in terms of the interpre¬
tive rule given by Smith (1964:263):
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"(a) the determiner the may be interpreted as
either anaphoric or generic if there is no
grammatical previous mention, or if the
sentence in question has no framing adverb¬
ial; (b) if there is a grammatical previous
mention and the sentence in question has no
framing adverbial, the determiner the must
be interpreted as anaphoric."
Perhaps the most significant omission here is the fact
that Smith does not (indeed, given the structure of her
theory she may not be able to) take account of cata-
phora, which process would appear to be operating in
(57) at least. Therefore, even leaving aside the gener¬
al status of interpretive rules, we must conclude that
Smith's proposal is inadequate as an account of generic
the, and because of its restriction to that item only,
as an account of generics as a whole.
In Smith (1964), as we have noted, there is a cer¬
tain amount of attention paid to the interaction of
negation and question elements with quantifiers, but by
far the most extensive study of such matters within
early transformational theory is to be found in JQima
(1964). Since Klima is concerned primarily with aspects
of negation in English, rather than with the precise
structure of determiners and quantifiers in noun phrases,
he offers no detailed analysis of the underlying struc¬
ture of these items except where it is relevant to
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negation and similar syntactic relations. We shall
therefore consider only those aspects of determiners and
quantifiers in which Klima is most interested, and dis¬
regard his proposals for the constituent structure of
NP's where these are irrelevant to his main interests.
Klima (I964:esp. 276-84) notes that the 'indefinite
quantifiers', of which the most important ia any, have a
peculiar syntactic distribution, in that they are un-
grammatical if the sentence in which one of them occurs
is declarative and positive and the verb is in the past
tense or is aspectually perfect; thus we have:
(3.58) *1 saw any Russians with snow on
their boots
However, if such a sentence contains a negative element,
then any is acceptable:
(3.59) I didn't see any Russians with snow
on their boots
Of course, such observations have been made previously,
most notably in the study by Collinson (1937), which was
discussed in §2.3. What is especially interesting about
Klima's work is his attempt to explain these observ¬
ations within the framework of transformational grammar.
The way in which he approaches such an explanation is to
posit certain transformational rules, see Kliraa (1964:
279-80), which introduce into the structure of the
sentence a negative element which, according to its
position in structure, changes either the verbal or the
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quantifier element. (59) is an example of the negative
being incorporated into the verbal element and so per¬
mitting the quantifier to be 'indefinite *, in this case
any. The quantifier no, as in:
(3.60) I saw no Russians with snow on their
boots
is also generated by Kliraa's rules. In this instance
the negative is incorporated in the quantifier rather
than in the verbal element. When the negator is incor¬
porated into both elements, which is a violation of
Kliraa's rules, we then find the substandard form:
(3.61) *1 didn't see no Russians with snow
on their boots
Kliraa's account appears to be correct with respect
to the phenomena which he discusses, but in fact the
correspondences between any and some (replace any by
some in (58) and the sentence is acceptable) or, indeed,
between 'indefinite' quantifiers in general and the
other quantifiers, is open to even wider general!sation.
It must be made clear that Klima is aware of this, and
he notes (1964:311-15) that a number of other elements -
questions, only and adversatives, e.g., stupid, reluct¬
ant, which he classes together with the negator as
'Affectives* - also permit grammatical occurrences of
the 'indefinite' quantifiers.
However, any-usage is of an even wider range than
is discussed by Klima, and this is clearly demonstrated
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by Bolinger (1960:383-84), where examples similar to:
(3.62) He stole anything he needed
help to substantiate the claim that any may be used
grammatically if there is a certain type of dependent
7
restrictive relative clause present. Example (62) may
be crudely paraphrased as:
(3.63) If he needed something he stole it
On the other hand:
(3.64) He stole something he needed
may be paraphrased as follows, in which there is no
conditional:
(3.65) He stole an object; he needed that
object
The question of how far the conditional present in (63)
contributes to the graramaticality of any in (62) is a
difficult one, but that it is a vital factor seems to me
to be provable. To show this we have to consider the
difference between (62) and the very similar (66):
(3.66) He stole everything he needed
Now, note that it is not the case that (62) implies
That there is more than one type of restrictive
relative clause, or, rather, that there may be more than
one underlying source for the various structures which
appear on the surface as restrictive adjuncts, further
weakens the usefulness of the approach taken by Smith
(1964). This is apart from the criticism offered by
Sopher (1969) and others, mentioned above.
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(66), which would be the case if the sentences were
synonymous. (62) describes the criterion according to
which things were stolen by him, whereas (66) describes
the way in which he acquired all the things which he
needed. We can thus observe that (62) sets up the
condition for stealing, whereas (66) states what and how
much was stolen. Thus the notion of a conditional is
O
inherent in (62). And we may further observe that if
is in fact similar to Klima's affectives, in that it
permits the grammatical occurrence of any, as can be
seen by comparing (67) and (68):^
(3.67) If he stole anything, that was wrong
(3.68) *He stole anything
These factors would seem to be good evidence for postul¬
ating an underlying conditional to explain the grammat-
icality of any in (62).
For further remarks on this point, cf. §3.4, where
some relevant proposals by Vendler (1967) are discussed.
In $10.2 an analysis of setences like (62) will be sug¬
gested which largely accords with our statements here.
There is a grammatical interpretation of (68) which
is ignored here. Such interpretations may be explicable
in terras of a deleted conditional, but I shall not pur¬
sue the point here. We might also note that if (68) is
given that interpretation then anything would probably
be heavily stressed.
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Even for some of Bolinger's most difficult exam¬
ples. along the lines of, for instance:
(3.69) This acid consumes any rust
I believe that it is possible to suggest that they too
can be explained by the presence of an underlying con¬
ditional, as in:
(3.70) If there is rust, this acid consumes it
The difference betwen (69) and the parallel sentence
with every is akin to that between (62) and (66). In
(69) the claim is not simply made about rusts which
exist, but also about rusts which are not (yet) known
(to the speaker). They too will be consumed by the
acid, the speaker asserts. Indeed, as Vendler (1967)
points out, cf. note 8, in cases such as (69) there is
the possibility of nonreferential usage. But in the
parallel sentence with every the claim is only being
made with respect to known and existing rusts, and is
not available for a bona fide extension to unknown and
non-existent rusts. This distinction arises because it
is only in (69) that the condition that something be a
rust is stated. In the case of every rust there is no
such condition, only a statement of asserted fact.
Given that sentences such as (62) and (69) appear to be
good candidates for an underlying conditional source,
which I believe that the above discussion has shown to
be true, the question remains of what the exact source
must be. This is a most complex and difficult matter to
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which we shall return in Part III, especially §10.2,
where its consideration will be more appropriate.
Some later transformationalist accounts of the
some - any relationship have acknowledged that such
elements as conditionals must be taken into consider¬
ation, see especially Seuren (1969), but most attention
has been paid to a more obvious weak point in Klima's
account. This point is that it is not clear in Klima
(1964) what the exact grammatical status of any is. So,
is any in all cases a suppletive form of some, trans¬
formationally derived, where it occurs, from some, or
has it, as it were, a linguistic life of its own? One
key piece of evidence is that there are sentences where
both some and any, apparently, are grammatical, although
there is a meaning distinction, which may often be
rather subtle. Compare the pairs below:
(3.71) a If you have some bananas, I'll buy
them
b If you have any bananas, I'll buy
them
(3.72) a Do you want some whisky?
b Do you want any whisky?
In such cases Kliraa's rule is apparently meaning-chang¬
ing, and after Katz and Postal's (1964) claim that
transformations should not change meaning, the 'some-any
mile', as Klima's 'Indef-incorporation' rule came to be
known, was regarded with suspicion, since it was an
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iraportant counter-example to Katz and Postal's claim.
Thus Jackendoff (1969) suggests that the some-any vari¬
ation he handled by an interpretive rule (again meaning-
changing, but within a theory which accepts such rules,
contra Katz and Postal); on the other hand, R. Lakoff
(1969a) suggests that the variation cannot be handled by
one syntactic rule, but that reference to presuppos¬
itions is necessary. We shall discuss Jackendoff's
position in §6.5 and Lakoff's in §10.2. For a fuller
discussion of the meaning-changing controversy see
Partee (1971).
The question of whether or not transformations ever
change meaning is significant of a number of other
issues which were entering discussions of transformat¬
ional theory around the mid-1960's. It is not our
business to provide here an historical summary of such
changes, which are extensively discussed in Katz and
Postal (1964), Chomsky (1965) and Lakoff (1970b) (the
latter actually being written in 1965). Rather, we need
only note that the results as far as our own studies are
concerned were fairly radical. With the proper intro¬
duction of semantics into the realm of transformational
grammar, and with a more highly developed formal appar¬
atus becoming available, the analysis of determiners and
quantifiers became less influenced by structuralist
theory, and it quickly became established that it was
far from adequate merely to write a number of PS rules,
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with perhaps a simple transformation or two, if one
wished to account for the "behaviour of these items. The
kinds of analysis proposed, therefore, are sufficiently
distinct from those suggested by early transformational¬
ist accounts to deserve completely separate consider¬
ation. Some of this we shall do in Part II, but we must
first conclude the present Part I by looking at another
group of transforraationalist works which belong to a
tradition slightly different from that which we have
discussed above.
3.4 Nongenerative transformational theory
In this section we shall be considering work on our
subject which has been carried out within the theoretic¬
al framework developed by Zeilig Harris and others at
the University of Pennsylvania. Although in its earli¬
est stages this theory was not to be differentiated from
the theories developed by Noam Chomsky, who was himself
a pupil of Harris, there was an early divergence in
methods, and the two branches can now be said to have
only a minimum amount of theory in common. Here it
would be out of place to do any more than sketch in the
very barest outline the differences between the two
theories, for further discussion cf. Robbins (1968:58-
83). Harris' theory is most like that presented in
Chomsky (1957), in that he posits a set of kernel struc¬
tures which essentially contain a sequence of word-
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clasaes. By a set of transformational rules non-kernel
sentences may be 'decomposed' into kernel sentences and
transformational constants. A most important distinction
between Harris' grammar and Chomsky's is that the latter
is generative, the former is nongenerative. Also, in
Harris' grammar there are to be found no highly abstract
deep structures as are found in the later versions of
Chomskyian transformational theory, but not, of course,
in the works which we examined in §3.3. Finally, it
should be noted that in Harris' theory elements which
may occur in. kernel sentences are called primitive
elements; those which occur only in non-kernel sentences,
and thus are introduced by the transformational con¬
stants referred to above, are called derived elements.
We shall see that it is proposed that, for example, a is
a primitive element in the grammar of English, whereas
the is a derived element.
The two most important works which attempt a des¬
cription of the 'definite article' within the terms of
Harris' theory are those of Robbins (1968) and Vendler
(1967). There is a distinct difference in aims between
the two, for the former is primarily a grammatical
treatise whereas the latter properly belongs to the
field of linguistic philosophy; furthermore, we should
note that Robbins is mainly concerned with the grammar
of the and exclusively concerned with the grammar of the
'articles'; Vendler's book, on the other hand, is a
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collection of papers, of which only one concerns the,
and elsewhere in the "book he discusses the semantics and
syntax of a number of quantifiers. Nevertheless, both
Robbins and Vendler reach the conclusion that the is
dependent on a restrictive relative clause, cf. Perl-
mutter (1970), in all its occurrences except those which
are generic, as in:
(3.73) The lion is a dangerous animal
Thus Vendler states (1967:46):
"The definite article in front of a noun is
clearly and infallibly the sign of a re¬
strictive adjunct, present or recoverable,
attached to the noun."
And Robbins (1968:54) makes the rather less ambitious
claim that:
"Determinative the is always indicative of
sentence combination: either a noun-sharing
combination of one sentence with a trans¬
formed other sentence, or the inclusion in a
Pred of a sentence nominalized into a defin¬
ite noun phrase ... In this eseay anaphoric
the is treated aa a special kind of occur¬
rence of determinative the."
Naturally, "both claims, if they are correct, support the
theory that the is a derived element.
It would indeed seem to be the case that in certain
nominalisation transformations the is introduced as a
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result of that noniinalisation. However, Perlmutter
(1970:237-38) claims that the, or, rather, some kind of
dwictic, is only obligatory when the resultant nominal-
ised NP is uncountable. He claims that there is a set
of nominalised NP's which are countable and which can
take either the or a, giving the following example:
(3.74) I saw a changing of the guard
which he contrasts with examples such as:
(3.75) a *1 saw a shooting of the hunters
b I saw the shooting of the hunters
No problem would seem to arise with respect to the
syntax of nominalisations such as that in (74), which
can be accommodated within a theory of the 'articles'
which pays no attention to nominalisations. Or at least
that appears to be the case, but it ought to be borne in
mind that even if (74) is not completely ungrammatical,
it is not wholly acceptable either. Further, it should
be observed that there is a difference in meaning between
the two sentences below:
(3.76) a A reading of this book will confirm
your hypothesis
b One reading of this book will confirm
your hypothesis
However, this may only be unhelpful to Perlmutter's
claim that a ought to be derived from unstressed one,
cf. Chapter 11 for further discussion. Nevertheless,
there is yet another objection, which is that Perlmut¬
ter' s claim leaves an unexplained gap in the
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distribution of the so-called 'uncountable' nominalised
NP's, which suggests that the problem is far from being
resolved. This gap is that although we would expect a
sentence parallel to (75a) but without a, no such sen¬
tence exists:
(3.77) *1 saw shooting of the hunters
Why, we must ask, is the obligatory there? There is,
unfortunately, no simple answer to this question, partly
because the status of nominalisations is unclear, cf.
Chomsky (1970) and the references therein, but some
light may be shed upon the question by looking at the
relation between the and restrictive relatives. This we
shall do now, but no answer to the above question can be
expected immediately.
That there is a relation between the and restric¬
tive relatives, and that it is important, cannot be
doubted, not only in the face of the syntactic and
semantic evidence we shall consider below, but also by
virtue of the etymological evidence that 'definite
articles' and relative pronouns are often derivable from
the same root, and in certain languages are even homo¬
nyms, e.g., German der, die» das.>Q In this context the
Kent (1944) has an interesting description of the
situation in Old Persian, where it is apparently vary
difficult to ascertain whether, in certain contexts, a
'definite article' or relative pronoun is being used.
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status of the Greek category arthron, discussed in §1.2,
will be recalled. It is, therefore, extremely tempting
to introduce the, as Robbins does, by means of a rela-
tivisation transformation. Thus she would derive:
(3.78) I stole the flower which you liked
from the two (kernel) sentences:
(3.79) I stole a flower
You liked a flower
Each of the sentences contains the 'shared noun' flower,
which is changed by the transformation process into
which in the second sentence (with consequent change of
word order). The instance of flower in the first sen¬
tence has its 'article' changed from a to the to indic¬
ate noun sharing. As Hill (1966:225-26) pointed out
when he devised a similar transformation, cf. §3.2, the
difficulty of such a solution is that there does exist a
variation on (78) with a instead of the, namely:
(3.80) I stole a flower which you liked
and that also would seem to be derivable from (79).
Hill's solution is, as we have seen, totally unsatis¬
factory, but Robbins does not attempt any comparable
solution, merely regarding the presence of a or the,
i.e., (80) or (78), as due to different optional deriv¬
ations from (79).
Vendler (1967:49-50) also discusses the problem and
he suggests that when the shared noun is 'unique' it is
the which is found. Thus for:
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(3.81) I know the man who killed Kennedy-
he says that the is obligatory, since kill demands a
'unique agent'. It is not, however, wholly correct to
state that kill does demand such an agent, for we find
sentences such as:
(3.82) a John and Bill killed the landlord
b A pair of criminals killed the guard
c The Nazi's killed many millions of
Jews
But notice that paralleling (82a) there is the sentence:
(3.83) I know one of the men who killed
the landlord
On the other hand, (84) is ungrammatical:
(3.84) *1 know a man who killed the landlord
In other words, as with Vendler's example (81) above,
the antecedent must here be 'definite*. It is possible
that a derivation of (82a) involving phrasal conjunction,
cf. iakoff and Peters (1969), will help solve the dif¬
ficulties which that sentence presents, although if this
is extended to (,82b) and (82c) there are then problems
in attempting to provide the kind of justification neces¬
sary for the desired underlying structures.
There is, however, a more serious counter-example
to Vendler's proposals, namely:
(3.85) I know a man who killed his landlord
A comparison of (84) and (85) suggests that the use of
the with an antecedent NP is related to the syntax and
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semantics of the restrictive adjnnct as a whole, rather
than simply to the agent-verh relation. Thus, only if
the relative clause as a whole defines the relativised
NP as unique is the obligatory; if there is no such
definition the is not obligatory. Since, leaving aside
the problems raised by the examples in (82), only one
person can kill a previously defined (animate) referent,
we can perhaps account for the ungrammaticality of (84)
in a manner similar to the explanation which is needed
for hyponyraic referents, as in:
(3.86) Tom was watching a robin, until the
bird flew away
(3.87) When I got on the bus, the conductor
was demolishing the ticket machine
For Buch cases see Jackendoff (1971c:140) and Lyons
(1968:453-56). In contrast, in (85) his landlord is not
a previously defined referent, it is only defined in
terms of the now-mentioned agent. Therefore a with
antecedent NP is grammatical, as in (85). We must note,
however, that (88) is also acceptable:
(3.88) I know the man who killed his landlord
Because Vendler is determined to derive all instances of
the from a restrictive relative clause, his proposals
are of little help here, as he is unable to provide a
justification for distinguishing derivationally between
(85) and (88). The difference between the two sentences
could only be accounted for in his theory by using an
optional transformation to change a to the in (88) but
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not in (85). But as the two sentences have different
meanings this is undesirable, for the existence of
meaning-changing transformations will once again be
asserted.
An alternative method of distinguishing between
these two sentences would be to claim that the in (88)
is anaphoric. Whether or not this is correct, and what
other problems it leads to, we shall discuss in Chapter
12, but for the present we should observe that this
solution, which is intuitively appealing, is not avail¬
able for Vendler. To see why this is so we have to
consider his claim that anaphoric the is also derived
from a restrictive relative clause. In this case the
restrictive clause is identical with the clause or
sentence in which the first use of the noun with the
same referent is found. So for anaphoric the in:
(3.89) I stole a flower. The flower was
pretty
Vendler suggests that the derivation of the second
sentence in (89) would be as follows:
(3.90) A flower was pretty
I stole a flower
There is embedding of the second kernel sentence into
the first, and consequent change of a to the. Vendler
rightly notes that (1967:52-53):
"If our conclusions are correct, then a noun
in the singular already equipped with the
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definite article cannot take another restric¬
tive clause, since such a noun phrase is a
singular terra as much as a proper noun or a
singular pronoun."
Therefore an NP which has anaphoric reference cannot
take a restrictive clause, which is why the alternative
method for deriving the in (87), mentioned above and
containing a restrictive clause, is not open to Vendler.
Sut note that we can now predict, with accuracy, that
the following sequence is nonanaphoric:
(3*91) I stole a flower. The flower which
was red was pretty
It is indisputable that two different flowers are being
referred to in (91). On the other hand, if a nonrestric-
tive clause had been used, only one flower would be
referred to:
(3.92) I stole a flower. The flower, which
was red, was pretty
Despite the predictive power of this analysis,
which is also presented by Robbins (1968:128-61), it is
not wholly satisfactory. The most serious objection is
that the derivations required can be so complex that it
is doubtful whether they can be acceptable. Thus Jack-
endoff (1971c:141) points out that the source sentence
for the anaphoric NP's of:
(3.93) A man asked a girl for a book, but
the girl would not give the man the
book
-132-
must be "of the crushing proportions of":
(3.94) ... but the girl who a man asked for
a book would not give the man who
asked the girl who the man who asked
a girl for a book asked for a book
for a book the book which the man who
asked the girl who the man who asked,
a girl for a book asked for a book
for a book asked the girl who the man
who asked a girl for a book asked for
a book
Jackendoff further points out that Robbins' proposals
run into possibly insoluble problems concerning 'Bach's
Paradox', for which see Kartunnen (1971). Another
objection is the one arising from Vendler's account and
which we have already touched upon, namely that it would
appear to be the case that TCP's can only have one depen¬
dent restrictive relative clause, for otherwise the
seeming ungrammaticality of restrictive relatives depen¬
dent upon anaphoric NP's, but cf. example (88), is not
explicable. However we find examples such as:
(3.95) The girl whom I know who wears a red
hat is called Hannah
(3.96) The girl in the miniskirt on the motor¬
bike is going to Glasgow tomorrow
But it is possible to avoid this objection by conjoining
the two clauses or adjuncts before relativisation takes
place; then only one embedding transformation, with the
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accompanying production of the, will "be involved, and
this would satisfy Vendler's restrictions. There is
considerable controversy over whether a conjunction
analysis, as suggested here, or a 'stacking1 analysis is
preferable for such multiple relatives. For some dis¬
cussion of this see §12.2 and Stockwell et al (1972:
442-47).
Although we have observed that there are a number
of objections which can be raised against the proposals
offered by Robbins and Vendler, it is undeniable that
there is a relationship between occurrences of the and
restrictive relatives. One further piece of evidence is
favour of their accounts is the fact noted by Perlmutter
(1970:241-42) that certain instances of the + N, more
precisely those where N is a proper noun, can only occur
if a restrictive adjunct is present, for example:
(3.97) a The Paris that I love
b The Paris of the 19th century
For the moment, therefore, we may safely conclude that
the presence of the is often associated with a restric¬
tive adjunct; but we cannot yet provide an adequate
formalisation of this association, since it is highly
complex. In Chapter 12, however, we shall see that
there is some independent motivation, arising from our
analysis of quantifiers, which will help to explain the
nature of the relationship. But whether or not the
difficulties we have observed can be entirely resolved
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is another matter.
As we have mentioned above, elsewhere in Vendler
(1967) there is a discussion of some quantifiers, and it
is to this discussion that we shall now turn our atten¬
tion. Vendler (1967:70-96) looks at four quantifiers:
each, every, any and all. These are to some extent
ordinary language equivalents of the universal quant¬
ifier in logic, although, as Jackendoff (1972a) points
out, this may not always be the case with any. Vendler's
aim is to show that the logical analysis of these quant¬
ifiers is inadequate, cf. our remarks in §5.5, for it
obscures syntactic regularities which may be peculiar to
each one of them. He claims that we have to analyse
these words more deeply in order to discover the true
facts about them, and he comes to the conclusion (1967:
74) that although they all in some way express totality:
"The reference appropriate to all is collect¬
ive, and the reference appropriate to each
or every is distributive."
He further comes to the conclusion (1967:76-78) that
each is strongly distributive whereas every is weakly
so. Later on Vendler notes that any and all often per¬
form a similar task, i.e., they can both be nonrefer-
ential (1967:93). Vendler also concludes that sometimes
all performs tasks similar to those of every, sometimes
similar to those of any.
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I believe that in his conclusion that there are two
contrasting sets, one composed of each and every and the
other of any, with all schizophrenically split between
the two, Vendler provides a most useful appreciation of
the behaviour of these quantifiers, and in support of
this belief I would like now to present a number of
arguments which are complementary to, and in support of,
those given by Vendler. Consider firstly the following:
(3.98) All professors who break the bank
are banned from the casino
(3.99) *A11 professors who broke the bank
are banned from the casino
(3.100) All the professors who broke the bank
are banned from the casino
1 1
The unacceptability of (99) can be accounted for if we
11 Some speakers find (99) marginally acceptable. This
may be due to the fact that for them it is possible to
interpret all professors as if it were, in my speech,
all the professors. Whatever the explanation may be, it
is interesting to note that the Dutch sentence:
(i) Ik heb alle jongens gezien
must be translated into English as:
(ii) I have seen all the boys
The sentence:
(iii) Ik heb al de jongens gezien
is rather more emphatic, rather like:
(iv) I have seen all the boys, every single one
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accept that all when not followed by (of) the is generic,
for that sentence, because of the tense-switching
between the verbs, cannot be generic. Similarly, (100)
is acceptable, precisely because all the is not generic;
and, of course, (98) is acceptable because there is no
tense-switching and therefore generic reference, as in
all professors, is possible. If we resort to an anal¬
ysis of the meaning of these sentences we can see that
(98) refers to the class of professorial bank-breakers
being banned, and that all has primarily an emphatic
purpose. On the other hand, (100) states that of the
professors who broke the bank in the past, all are now
banned. (98) states a logical implication:
(3*101) If a professor breaks the bank, then
he is banned from the casino
whereas (100) is purely descriptive of a certain state
of affairs:
(3.102) Some professors broke the bank.
All those professors are banned
from the casino
An alternative description of the contrast between
(98) and (100) is to say that in the latter case there
is reference to a non-null set (which, in fact, must not
be smaller than three, see Chapter 4). On the other
hand, in (98) reference may be to a null set, for even
if no professor has broken the bank the statement Is
still logically valid. The only way in which it can be
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falsified is to show that some professor has broken the
bank and has not been banned from the casino. Now, as
Vendler (1967:93) points out, this nonreferential use of
all is exactly like the nonreferential use of any, and
therefore it is instructive to ndte how close a para¬
phrase of (98) is (103):
(3.103) Any professor who breaks the bank
is banned from the casino
A further parallel between any and all is to be found in
the fact that all has a restricted grammatical distribu¬
tion. This is a point which has received remarkably
little attention from linguists, perhaps because the
distribution is not identical to that of any, but the
1 2
following comparison is surely worthy of note:
(3.104) a *1 saw any boys
b *1 saw all boys
(3.105) a Any latecomers are to report to
the office
b All latecomers are to report to
the office
Of course, the parallelism does not always hold, as has
been remarked above:
There is a marginally acceptable interpretation of
(104b) in which all is equivalent to only, as in:
(i) John went to an all-boys school
This usage does not provide immediate counter-examples,
although it is far from easy to explain.
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(3.106) a I didn't see any boys
b *1 didn't see all boys
Nevertheless, the restricted occurrence of all bears
enough resemblance to that of any to suggest that a
detailed comparative study of their behaviour is essen¬
tial.
The facts above may also help to explain Vendler's
observation noted above that all sometimes relates to
any, sometimes to each or every. Sub specie aeternit-
atis it might be considered unfortunate that English
sentences such as (104b) or (106b) are ungrammatical,
for it might be predicted that there ought to be a gram¬
matical form in such contexts for a 'universal' quant¬
ifier collocating with an 'indefinite' NP. Therefore
what we have to look for is a possible suppletion form,
and this seems to be there in:
(3.107) a I saw every boy
b I didn't see every boy
The main objection to the claim that every is a supplet-
ive form of all in such sentences must be that the
collocating noun is singular; but the validity of this
objection can easily be disproved. It is surely the
case that in underlying structure the NP is plural, for
the following reasons. Firstly, the reference of every
boy is to more than one (indeed, more than two) objects.
Therefore the NP is notionally plural. Secondly, the
grammar must be able to account for the fact that every
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does not collocate with noncount nouns, for example:
(3.108) *Every milk was spilt
The clearest way to account for this is to claim that it
collocates with plural nouns only. Thirdly, in partit¬
ive constructions, which admittedly are not strictly
relevant here, the noun in the partitive construction
must be plural:
(3.109) a Every one of the boys was late
b *Every one of the boy was late
Presumably the reason for the number switch with every,
which must be handled transformationally, is what Vend-
ler (1967:74) calls the distributive reference appropri¬
ate to every (and each). But at present the reason for
the switch is not as important as the fact that it is
needed; it is a point to which we shall return in §6,4,
and for a more general study of the relations between
each, every and all see Chapter 9. We have already seen,
however, that there is considerable evidence in favour
of Vendler's observations about the status of all and
that it is possible to give some explanation of why the
facts are as they are. It has long been accepted that
any is a particularly difficult quantifier to analyse,
but the truth is that the other quantifiers discussed
above are no less difficult. We must be grateful that
Yendler has pointed the way towards a solution.
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3»5 Conclusion
In Part I of this thesis we have examined the
development of grammatical theory with respect to deter¬
miners and quantifiers from the earliest sources within
the Western grammatical tradition up to work written
only a few years ago. In Chapter 1 we looked at what
was called the 'classical tradition', to which we assign¬
ed not only Greek and Latin grammars, but also more
recent work which still held to a 'parts of speech'
theory. We concluded that that theory, which has its
origins in the writings of Aristotle, the Stoics and
Thrax, was inadequate as a linguistic theory. The main
reason for this, as far as we were concerned, was that
the formalism imposed by that theory was unable to give
a natural classification of determiners. This was not
necessarily the case with the earliest works in the
tradition, which often gave insightful descriptions of
determiner systems in Greek, and to a lesser extent in
Latin, and to these writers we owe such important con¬
cepts as anaphora. We noted that these analyses often
showed a surprising correspondence with recent non-
classical proposals, but it is difficult to ascertain
to what extent this is merely a matter of coincidence
and to what extent they show a significant identity of
analysis.
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Later scholars within the classical tradition,
especially medieval grammarians and the early vernacular
grammarians, all too often showed a tendency to accept
classical theory as dogma, and we observed that in
several cases rather ludicrous results occurred because
of an attempt to fit English into the structural pattern
of Latin and Greek on purely surface structure criteria.
Nevertheless, some of these grammarians displayed remark¬
able insights, especially when they refused to be over¬
awed by dogma. One such whom we might mention here was
James Harris, and it is perhaps worthy of note that the
kind of theoretical framework within which he operated
was closer to the earliest Greek grammarians than to the
work of slightly later writers such as Thrax. The most
recent scholars in the classical tradition are perhaps
somewhat removed from the 'parts of speech' theory and
they can often be associated with those whom we have
called 'notionalists'. To the extent that this is true
they represent an undoubted advance, but the retrograde
influence of strict classical theory is still observable
in their work. We may conclude that the theory of the
classical tradition was often incorrect, but that within
that theory the foundations for our study had neverthe¬
less been laid.
Despite the difficulty encountered at the beginning
of Chapter 2 in defining the terra 'notionalist', once
a definition had been established it was clear that
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one could distinguish between a Guillaumiste 'school*
and other notionalists who were not at all influenced by
the work of Guillaume. Our major criticisms of Guil-
laume's work were that his theory had insufficient
empirical support and that it was restricted, as far as
determiners and quantifiers are concerned, to an anal¬
ysis of the 'articles'. Although Guillaume's work,
therefore, held little immediate interest, it was notice¬
able that those whose work was based to some extent on
his pioneering efforts had rather more to contribute.
Yet there was still a tendency to envelop conclusions in
a mist of psychologisms which were singularly unhelpful.
On the other hand, other notionalists, especially, per¬
haps, Collinson, made many acute observations which have
not yet been fully explained. If we are able to formal¬
ise such observations it is probable that we shall have
made an important step towards an adequate linguistic
analysis of determiners and quantifiers.
In Chapter 3 our attention was primarily directed
towards an examination of structuralist models of the
determiner and quantifier systems, and we considered
firstly several analyses which were broadly speaking
Bloomfieldian in outlook. Such analyses were seen as a
regression from those we had examined earlier, most
especially in their separation of semantics from syntax,
but also, in comparison with the notionalist descrip¬
tions, in the lack of interest in possible underlying
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structures. Most of the analyses discussed were consid¬
ered to be fundamentally mistaken, and it was difficult
to see how they could have been improved, given the
basic theoretical assumptions. It is questionable
whether the earliest transformationalist works, which
were discussed next, showed a measurable improvement in
adequacy, although we must draw attention in this regard
to the impressive work of Edward Klima, which was seen
to be an extension and forraalisation of some of the
points which Collinson had discussed some twenty-five
years earlier. Finally, we looked at the proposals made
within the particular version of transformational theory
originated by Z^tlig Harris, and we noted that both
Robbins and Vendler had most interesting remarks to make
about the objects of our investigation, especially the
and all. Because of their emphasis on semantics, both
these works may not have belonged to this chapter proper,
since they often share the assumptions of the notional¬
ists of the previous chapter. It is significant that
these two scholars, who were seen to pay the most atten¬
tion in this chapter to the integration of syntax and
semantics, also provided the most useful insights of
this chapter into the determiner systems.
Having completed our historical survey, we must now
attempt to evaluate contemporary analyses of the deter¬
miner and quantifier systems in Contemporary English,
and then provide, where possible and necessary,
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alternative solutions. In attempting this task we shall
make the distinction outlined in the Introduction
"between quantifiers and other determiners, "but this is
done solely in order to make the material more amenable
to analysis and should not be considered as necessarily
a decision of grammatical importance. Therefore in Part
II we shall first see how adequate present theory is in
practice, by attempting an analysis of a quantifier
which has been little discussed in recent literature,
namely both. Then we shall analyse the merits and
demerits of present theory before presenting, in Part
III, our own proposals. The discussion of the 'articles'
and deictics (such as this and that) will be delayed
until Part IV, by which time it ought to be observable
that their status is not always independent of the
status of the quantifiers, although in some respects,







A grammar for 'both'*
4.1 The semantics of 'both'
Most students of English grammar have assumed that
both, at least in positions where it is a surface struc¬
ture quantifier, differs from all only in that the
latter indicates that the reference of the MP in which
it occurs is to more than two objects (unless the assoc¬
iated noun is uncountable, which case we may ignore at
present), whereas the former indicates that such refer¬
ence is to two and only two objects. Thus Strang (1962:
116) states:
"All collocates with either plural or uncount¬
able head-words; ... Both can only have dual
function, that is, its head must be two
singulars ('Both Mary and John') or a plural
with referents two in number ('Both the
crumbling, gnarled old trees')."
And Jespersen (1914:197), in his discussion of "words
referring to two", writes:
"First we have the word both as in both my
sons, indicating that I have two, while all
A slightly modified version of this chapter appears
as Hogg (1973a).
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my sons would imply that I have more than two."
Such claims are supported hy many pairs of sentences,
for example:
(4.1) a All the children like cream
b Both the children like cream
(4.2) a All their trees are to be chopped down
b Both their trees are to be chopped down
(4.3) a Peter knows all the women who were at
the party
b Peter knows both the women who were
at the party
Apparently the only difference between the (a) and (b)
members of each pad r is that in the (a) cases, where all
is used, reference is to at least three children, trees,
women, but in the (b) cases, where both is the quant¬
ifier, just two children, trees, women are referred to.
If, therefore, as certainly seems to be the case,
the only difference between all and both is that the
latter demands dual reference (i.e., reference to two
and only two objects), the former nondual reference,
then it would appear probable that we can derive both
from the same source as all, as long as there is some
means of marking duality. Perhaps this could best be
handled by a feature [±dual], which might be added to
the feature complex of a deep structure quantifier ALL,
from which the surface forms both and all would both be
derived. It should be noted that the introduction of
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such a feature would not be incompatible with the fact
that all can collocate with both count and noncount
nouns, while both can only appear with the former, Non-
count nouns may not be [+plural] semantically (although
they may be so syntactically) and [+duall will be a
rewrite of 1+plurall. Therefore (4a) will be marked
ungrammatical because beer is not [+duall, but (4b) is
grammatical and will be marked so for exactly the same
reasons as (4a) is not:
(4.4) a *Both my beer is flat
b All my beer is flat
Let us accept, pro tempore, the analysis for quant¬
ifiers commonly known as the 'Lakoff-Carden hypothesis',
for despite the inadequacies pointed out by, for exam¬
ple, Lakoff (1970d), it is quite adequate for our argu¬
ment at present,1 We can now, if we incorporate the
There may well be even more serious inadequacies,
cf. the criticisms regarding semantic inadequacy in
Jackendoff (1971b), and several of the syntactic argu¬
ments supporting Lakoff and Garden are also rather weak.
On both points see Chapter 5 for further discussion. It
should become clear, as the argument develops, that
alternative analyses, such as those in Jackendoff (1968)
and Vetter (1968), are even less adequate, but Jacken¬
doff 's proposals will be considered more fully in Chap¬
ter 6.
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proposal made above regarding the underlying structure
of both, provide an analysis of:
(4.5) Both children like cream
along the approximate lines of:
Two transformations operate on this phrase marker: the
first is the rule of quantifier-lowering (or "Q-magic",
cf. Garden (1968)), which wipes out 3Q and lowers the
quantifier into ; the second will convert the lowered
quantifier into both; the resultant surface structure is
that for (5).
But notice now that a structure such as (6) does
not necessarily point to a source for (1b). There are
two reasons for this: the first of these is that it may
be the case that quantifier-lowering applies only when
an 'indefinite' NP fills the subject node, as in (6).
'"hat this is the case is suggested by the partial agree¬
ment of Lakoff (1970d:391) with the statement by Partee
(1970:156) that:
"Quantifiers occur as predicates only with
indefinite noun phrases as subjects; quant¬
ifiers have some other source with definite
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noun phrases."
But Lakoff's remarks are so vague that it is difficult
to put any interpretation on them, and the situation is
further confused by the fact that Garden (1968) ignores
any difference between Quant of the N and Quant N
sequences with respect to the operation of quantifier-
lowering. Let us assume, therefore, that the first
reason is non-existent in fact, and that the difference
in underlying structure between (1b) and (5) is solely
that where we find only children in (5) we find the
children in (1b).
And this leads us to the second reason for suspec¬
ting any proposed relation between (1b) and (6): it is
not convincing to claim that the difference in meaning
between (1b) and (5) ought to be represented in under¬
lying structure only by the contrast between presence
and absence of the. Consider the further examples:
(4.7) a John likes both books
b John likes both the books
(4.8) a John likes books
b John likes the books
Whatever the difference in meaning between (7a) and (7b)
may be, it can hardly be claimed that it is the same as,
or even as great as, that between (8a.) and (8b). Yet if
we agree that the presence or absence of the is all that
matters in underlying structure in order to distinguish
between the two sentences of (7), and that is what we
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have just said might be a plausible analysis, then we
shall be distinguishing between (7a) and (7b) precisely
and only in the same way as we distinguish between (8a)
and (8b). And this is exactly what we must not do.
This argument is further reinforced by the fact
that:
(4.9) All children like cream
which we might think ought to be derived from a struc¬
ture identical to (6) except that ALL would be [-dual],
is quite clearly different from (1a) semantically. And
the difference is that whereas (1a) is definitely non-
generic, (9) is definitely generic, at least if we
restrict the notion of generic which is being used here
to cases where no existential reference is implied.
The obscurities of generic sentences are great, but even
so the difference between (1a) and (9) can be accounted
for if we accept the claim made by Jespersen (1924:204)
that plural nouns accompanied by the 'definite article'
cannot have generic reference, but that plural nouns
Dwight Bolinger (personal communication) has pointed
out that the claim in Jespersen (1924) stated below is
invalidated by examples such as:
(i) The stars emit intrinsic light whereas
the planets emit reflected light
The qualification made here is intended to avoid such
counter-examples.
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unaccompanied by the 'definite article' may do so (of
course, this must be restricted to nonexistential gener¬
ics, as is pointed out in note 2, above). Thus in (10)
the (a) sentence is nongeneric but the (b) sentence is
generic:
(4.10) a ^he children like cream
b Children like cream
From the above it should be quite clear that all the
children in (1a.) cannot have generic reference, whereas
all children in (9) may, and so (1a) is nongeneric, (9)
is generic.
Returning now to (1b) and (5), it can be observed
that, whatever slight differences in meaning and syntax
there may be between the two sentences, it is not the
case that there is an opposition between nongeneric (1b)
and generic (5); both are indisputably nongeneric. But
this involves us in two difficulties. Firstly, if the
only difference in underlying structure between (5) and
(9) is [tduall, how can it be predicted that the former
is nongeneric, the latter generic? Secondly, if (5) can
only have a nongeneric interpretation, as is undoubtedly
the case, then that would appear to contradict the well-
established principle that plural nouns unaccompanied by
the can have generic reference. These problems obvious¬
ly have to be resolved. But apparently the only way to
solve the first of them is to assume that there is a
special constraint which blocks duals from appearing in
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generic sentences, and such a solution is not particu¬
larly revealing, for even if it is the case that duals
do not appear in such sentences, no explanation of why
that is so will have been given, especially not one
which relates to any of the known facts about generics
in English.
However, there does seem to be a solution to the
second difficulty. Comparing (1b) and (5), it is clear
that the only surface structure difference is the pres¬
ence or absence of the, and we shall see that it is this
(deictic) element which is crucial. "'he purpose of a
deictic element (and this applies to demonstratives and
pronouns no less than to the 'definite article') is, in
the first instance, to show that the reference of the
relevant NP is to a given (already known to the hearer
or presumed by the speaker to be so known) subset of the
full set of potential referents of that HP, although
this should not obscure the other coexisting functions
of deixis, cf. note 3, below, and the references therein.
Therefore, if no deictic element is present, the object
or objects which are being referred to are only known,
or presumed to be known, to the hearer in terms of the
full set of potential referents. ^hus, when someone
hears:
(4.11) Some children like cream
all that he knows, in theory, is that the referents of
the subject NP are at least two but no more than n-2
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members of the full set of potential referents of child¬
ren, where that set has n members. Of course, the
existence of the related quantifiers many, a few and few
allow the hearer to guess that the answer is near the
middle range of possible answers, but the important
point to note is that that is only a reasonable guess on
the part of a reasonable hearer; for the absence of a
deictic element indicates that there is no given subset
to which the hearer should refer. Now, in (1a) the
referents are all the members of a given subset (of
children), but in (9), where no deictic element is
present, the referents are all the members of the full
potential set. In other words, the presence of a deictic
element indicates reference in terms of a given subset,
the absence of such an element indicates reference in
terms of the full set.
On the other hand, when we consider the correspond¬
ing cases with both, i.e., (1b) and (5), it would appear
that in each case, the latter as well as the former,
reference is in terms of a given subset, containing two
and only two members, of the full potential set of
referents, and this despite the seeming absence in (5)
of any deictic element. To confirm this assertion, let
us consider what happens when a speaker refers in terms
of a subset - i.e., uses a deictic element with the
relevant NP - of which the hearer has no knowledge. Let
us suppose the speaker says:
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(4.12) ^he children like cream
To this, if he does not yet have sufficient information
about the relevant subset, the hearer is entitled to
say, somewhat querulously even:
(4.13) What children are these? You
haven't told me about them ,
But, if the speaker says:
(4.14) Many children like cream
where reference is made in terms of the full set rather
than a subset (and the fact that (14) has a generic
interpretation confirms this), then the only type of
legitimate question for the hearer with respect to set
composition is one which asks if it is possible to define
a subset, as in:
(4.15) Do you happen to know which
particular children?
He cannot complain, by way of (13), that a necessary
subset has not been given. Now, with both (1b) and (5)
the ignorant hearer is entitled to ask (13), and (15) is
as inappropriate for them as it is for (12). In other
words, both (1b) and (5) presuppose a given subset,
acting as if a deictic element were present, although,
apparently, none is present in the surface structure of
the latter. Such a claim can always be checked by the
relevance of questions (13) and (15); the former is
relevant only if reference is in terms of a subset not
known to the hearer, the latter only if reference is in
terms of the full potential set. And so our claim is
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confirmed. It might also be noted that the examples in
(7) equally show that the presence or absence of the in
surface structure is irrelevant in so far as this does
not affect the terms in which reference is made.
If we now return to the analysis of quantifiers
proposed by Lakoff and Garden, one solution which ap¬
pears attractive is that which adds a further feature





but the disadvantages of this solution should be clear.
Firstly, it seems highly unlikely that a feature such a
[+deictic] can be added to the specification of quant¬
ifiers, especially if they are deep structure VP's or
predicates. It seems a reasonable assumption that the
kind of deictic element which introduces, for example,
'definite article', does not appear in the analysis of
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predicates, which do not refer. Secondly, this further
feature specification seems in any case to he ad hoc; it
offers no explanation hut rather a quick exit from a
still unresolved difficulty,
4.2 'Both' as a deep structure coordinator
Before attempting to reach a more adequate solution
in terms of the Lakoff-Carden hypothesis, it may be
useful to discuss an alternative solution to the problem
of both which has been proposed in Garden (1970a).
Garden suggests that both be derived from a deep struc¬
ture sentence conjunction. T'hus:
(4.17) Both boys left
is to be derived from:
(4.18)
S and S
boy^ left boy^ left
A rule of "Both-Formation" (BF), which is a variant of
This does not exclude the presence of every type of
deixis from VP's, for deixis may be associated with
verbs such as come and go, cf. Fillmore (1966a,). But in
this context Anderson (1971b:122-23) argues plausibly
that even then the deixis is contained within an N.
-158-
the well-known Conjunction Reduction rule, cf. Chomsky
(1957:36), Garden (1970a:181), is then used to derive
(17). Although it is almost certainly the case, as is
argued by Lakoff and Peters (1969), that both is closely
associated with sentence conjunction, it is not so
certain that all instances of both can be derived in the
fashion proposed by Carden, since the BP transformation
does not account for the constant definiteness of the
surface quantifier both, whether or not it is followed
by the. Let ..us modify the BF rule so that it has the
schematic form:^
(4.19) <the> N1 and <the> N2 >
both <the> 2)
Thus (17) would be derived not from (18) but from:
(4.20) S
S and
the boy.j left the boy2 left
and (18) would be the deep structure of:
(4.21) Both boys left
This appears to be at least a slight improvement on the
BF rule proposed by Carden (1970a:185), which latter
assumes that in the deep structure no 'definite article'
is present, but that after the operation of BF the
The angled brackets follow the conventions in
generative phonology, cf. Harms (1968:66).
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C
'definite article' will always show up. So, although
there is an explanation available of the syntactic
difference between (17) and (21) there is still no
explanation of the semantic difference, which, as we
have pointed out, is not a 'definite' vs. 'indefinite'
opposition. For an account of the status of rules which
perhaps analyse the syntax but fail to analyse the
semantics, see Lakoff (1971c:283) on "arbitrary syntax".
But perhaps Garden can account for (21) by optionally
deleting the 'definite article' in (17), rather than by
a derivation from (18); yet this assumes that the two
sentences are paraphrases of one another, a claim which
we have not made and in fact would not make, and to
which Carden makes no reference.
The modified BF rule is therefore unsatisfactory in
so far as it does not clarify the basic semantic distinc¬
tions between (17) and (21), and the situation is made
even more difficult by the fact that in sentence conjunc¬
tion positions both does not have any deictic properties
As originally proposed, Carden's BF rule includes
'definite articles' in the relevant structural descrip¬
tion, but in his examples there are none at this point,
cf. Carden (1970a:181, 183-85). therefore it is extreme¬
ly difficult to ascertain what status he would assign to
the 'definite article', and I apologise for any misinter¬
pretations which might confuse or mislead the reader.
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associated with it: there is deictic reference in (22)
but not in (23):
(4.22) Both the men and the horses ere
desperately needed
(4.23) Both men and horses are desperately
needed
Notice that as long as it is associated with sentence
conjunction and is not a surface quantifier (which is
the interpretation of (23) with which we are concerned),
both can appear in sentences where the NP's have generic
reference:
(4.24) Both teachers and children look
forward to holidays
and thus supplying further evidence that there is no
element of 'definiteness' in such sentences. Interest¬
ingly, Carden's BF rule, combined with the possibility
that that type of both which is involved in sentence
conjunction may also apoear in generic sentences, leads
to the totally incorrect prediction that:
(4.25) Both boys have long hair
may be generic. There appears, therefore, to be good
reason for assuming that Carden's hypothesis that in all
surface structure positions both is derived from deep
structure sentence conjunction is quite mistaken,
especially as it fails to account for some of the most
troublesome features of both.
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4.3 A derivation for 'both N'
Having, I hope, shown that the derivation proposed
by Garden fails to explain the deictic characteristics
°f both, let us now return to the earlier analysis
suggested above, which proposed that both be derived
from an underlying ALL with the feature specification
[+dua.l, + deictic!. We have already demonstrated that
such a solution is both implaubsible and ad hoc, and it
would therefore appear to be the case that it is extreme¬
ly difficult to derive both from an underlying structure
which treats quantifiers as higher predicates. Hut the
arguments proposed by, amongst others, Anderson (1968),
Lakoff (1968) and McCawley (1968), in favour of a theory
of 'generative semantics', suggest that sweeping modif¬
ications of the base component which will dispense with
such feature specification as used above may provide us
with fruitful possibilities for our argument. This
theory claims that quite 'simple' (in surface structure)
lexical items must often be derived from comparatively
complex (or, at the least, radically different) under¬
lying configurations. In this respect compare the
arguments of Anderson (1968) for deriving travel on foot
into walk, or those of Lakoff (1968) for deriving kill
from cause to die, and there are more extensive discus¬
sions of the whole theory in Anderson (1971b), Lakoff
(1971c), Postal (1970) and, from a much more sceptical
point of view, Bolinger (1971).
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Consider the sentences:
(4.26) *A11 of the two children like cream
(4.27) All of the six children like cream
Notice that the former is ungrammatical, the latter is
grammatical. Yet although (26) is ungrammatical, it is
also a paraphrase of (5), and the two facts of ungrammat-
icality and the paraphrase relation to (6) allow us to
construct a simple hypothesis, namely that "both in (5)
is derived by obligatory transformations upon an under¬
lying structure which corresponds closely to something
like (26). This seems reasonable, in as much as the
surface difference between (26) and (9) is the phrase of
the two: the is clearly a realisation of the feature we
have called [+deictic1, as in (16), since the 'definite
article' is most probably the unmarked member of the
class of deictics; two is obviously a realisation of
the feature in (16) [+dual]; only of remains to be
explained, and for the moment we may rest content with a
description of it as the marker of partitive relation,
which necessarily holds between a quantifier in pre¬
determiner position and its associated 'definite' NT,
cf. Jackendoff (1968:428-29) and §10.3. In other words,
the above hypothesis is able, given the assumption about
the presence of of, to explain the following facts:
Other, more marked, members of this class include
the demonstratives this and that and the possessive
pronouns. For further discussion see Chapter 12.
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(i) (26) is ungrammatical, which (27) is not; (ii)
although (26) is ungrammatical it is a paraphrase of the
grammatical (5); (iii) the difference (semantically)
between (26) and (9) is exactly the same as the differ¬
ence between (5) and (9).
In order to capture the generalisations which flow
from an analysis of (26), let us assume that we can
derive quantifiers from a higher predicate even when
there is a 'definite' NP collocating, perhaps in con¬
trast to the unclear statement of Lakoff (I970d), but
apparently in line with Garden (1968), see above. We
must further assume that two has to be derived from a.
nonrestrictive relative clause when it occurs in the
postdeterminer position exemplified in (26); for the
argument behind this assumption see Garden (1970c) and
compare Chapter 8, together with the reservations of
note 1, above. Granted these assumptions, we can con¬
struct the following underlying phrase marker for (5):
(4.28) S0
the children wh children are two
— 1 64 —
Thep, by the rules of Wh-be deletion and adjective pro¬
posing, cf. Smith (1964:251-4) and Lakoff (1970d:391),
we obtain the following intermediate structure:
the two children the two children like cream
By the rule of quantifier-lowering, which in this case




all of the two children like cream
We propose that there then should be an obligatory
Dual Copy transformation, which has the effect of map¬
ping of the two onto all, giving a resultant both as the
'lexical formative', cf. Anderson (1968:308). This Dual
Of course, with all and both no of need be inserted
before the. But to state that of is introduced between
every quantifier and a 'definite article' and that it
may then be deleted optionally after all or both seems
to be the wider generalisation. Cf. §10.3 for further
discussion.
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Copy transformation may be more strictly defined as:
(4.31) all - X - Y - two > both
where X and Y may be zero; the reason for this will
become clearer in the discussion below, and if we were
to discuss the syntax of other quantifiers, for example
either, a more precise formulation of it would be neces¬
sary, since Dual Copy has rather wider powers than are
accounted for by (31). It might be noted, however, that
this transformations performs the same functions as does
subjunction within a dependency framework, which, for
example, allows one to relate (32a) and (32b), cf.
Anderson (1971c):
(4.32) a John gave me his help
b John helped me
The Dual Copy transformation will thus convert (30) to:
(4.33) S
Det N like cream
i i
both children
4.4 A derivation for 'both the N'
It will have been observed, however, that we have
not yet provided an analysis for (1b), where the 'defin¬
ite article' appears after both (of). One possible
solution would be to claim that (1b) and (9) are
-166-
paraphrases of one another. We could then have an
optional variant of the Dual Copy transformation which
would permit retention of the (=Y in (31)). "But there
are strong arguments against this. Firstly there is the
simple point that we shall have to add a condition to
rule (31), and that this is a (admittedly slight) com¬
plication of the grammar. Ouite obviously, if we can
derive (1b) without any modification of the Duel Copy
rule, that would be preferable. Secondly, as we noted
in the discussion of Garden (1970a) in §4.7, it is not
at all clear that the paraphrase relation we have des¬
cribed above actually exists. One's doubts seem to
centre on the fact that whereas both in (3) appears to
fulfil two purposes - being both deictic and emphasising
the 'twoness' or duality of the MP - in (1b) both seems
to fulfil only the latter purpose; in other words it
carries no deictic reference (which is in fact, and
quite naturally, carried by the 'definite article'), but
only emphasises that two and not just one of the two
children like cream.
as opposed to the negative evidence of the preced¬
ing paragraph, there does appear to be a certain amount
of positive evidence in English grammar to suggest that
a mechanism whereby the is optionally retained is inade¬
quate as an explanation. Consider firstly:
(4.34) All six of the children like cream
I would suggest that the purpose of all in this sentence
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is to emphasise that six and not just five (or four or
three, etc.) of the children like cream, and that,
further, all has no deictic function here. This claim
about the purpose of all in (34) is perhaps not accept¬
able when stated as baldly as this; but a more adequate
characterisation of the quantifiers than is possible
within the confines of the Lakoff-Carden theory will
surely reveal that all does have a primary function of
emphasis here, cf. Chapter 9. Now, it is possible that
one might wish to derive (34) from (77), or vice versa,
and thus, as we shall see, further claim that (5) and
(1b) have the same underlying structure, which is essen¬
tially the negation of the argument presented here. But
we might note the following two objections: firstly, the
non-existence of a paraphrase relation which would
permit a meaning-preserving transformation; secondly,
the acceptance of an additional transformation entails
an undesirable complication of the grammar. And so such
a proposal cannot be admitted.
But now note that (35) might be expected to show
exactly those features represented in (34):
(4.35) *A11 two of the children like cream
and that is the case, but it also happens to be the case
that (35) is ungrammatical. However, a comparison of
(34) and (35) with (26) and (27) reveals that the un¬
grammatically of both (35) and (26) can be accounted
for by the same fact, namely that all ... two is not a
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permissible surface structure sequence. Further, our
previous arguments point to the fact that (35) is iden¬
tical in meaning to:
(4.36) Both of the children like cream
Therefore we should be able to state a transformational
relationship between the two sentences; and indeed this
can be accomplished with the transformational apparatus
at hand. An intermediate structure for (35), which
regrettably fudges a decision about the precise source
j, , 8of two, is:
(4.37) S
By the rule of quantifier-lowering we obtain:
all two of the children like cream
If we now apply the Dual Copy transformation as stated
'^he fudge is perhaps necessary, since it is very
difficult, if not impossible, to determine a plausible
source for two here within the Lakoff-Carden theory.
This is one (minor) reason for the critical remarks of
note 1 .
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in (31), all two (with X and Y both zero) will he copied
as both, which results in the surface structure of (36).
Thus the combination of quantifier-lowering and Dual
Copy, both preexisting rules, will derive (36) without
any additional rules being needed, and, further, will
account for the ungrammaticality of (35). We can there¬
fore state that the difference between (5) and (36) is
expressed exactly by the difference between (96) and
(35). There still remains one problem about (1b),
namely of, but for the moment we shall follow note 7 and
assume that of may be optionally deleted in those cases
where it remains after the Dual Copy rule immediately
following all or both, i.e., underlying all.
There does appear to be some ftirther slight evi¬
dence for the derivations proposed above, which rests on
the admittedly tenuous fact that whereas (39) is per¬
fectly acceptable, (40) is only marginally so, if at all:
(4.39) Roth the children who came to the
party like cream
(4.40) ??Both children who came to the party
like cream
To explain this contrast we have to enquire further into
the circumstances in which both is used as a quantifier
without following (of) the. Let us use for our enquiry
sentence (5). As is obvious from the 'definiteness' of
both children, and from our proposed derivational his¬
tory (?H) - (30), (33), both is employed in such
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situations when, as has been said, the exact composition
of the particular subset of children being referred to
is presumed by the speaker to be known to the hearer.
Now since such a presupposition is unwarranted by (5)
itself, it must be warranted by previous reference
either to the particular subset of children being refer¬
red to or to some object(s) which define(s) that subset
uniquely. T'hus the type of reference which both has in
(5) is anaphoric, where we define anaphoric reference to
be reference either to the referent of an expression
which has occurred previously or to a referent which has
been uniquely defined by a previous expression, cf.
§12.3. In this respect it might be noted that it would
seem unfortunate to restrict anaphora, to the case of
reference within one sentence, as does Dougherty (1969:
488) when he claims that a pronoun has anaphoric refer¬
ence only when:
"it can be understood as being coreferential
with some|other noun phrase in the sentence."
Again, compare our remarks in §12.3.
What I want to suggest now is that in that variant
of the Dual Copy transformation which involves deletion
of the, only anaphorically-derived the may be present;
this entails that the underlying the in both children
is anaphoric, but has no implications for underlying the
i.n both the children. Now, as Vendler (1967:32-53) has
most persuasively argued, of. §3.4, any Hi' containing a
-171-
'definite article' which is anaphorically-derived (what¬
ever mechanism is necessary for such a derivation, cf.
Chapter 12) cannot have dependent upon it a restrictive
relative clause. Therefore, if the restriction which we
have placed upon the Dual Copy transformation is cor¬
rect, (40) should he ungra.mmatical, and that of course
is the case. But it may be that we do not even need
such a restriction, for it is possible that the differ¬
ent derivational histories of anaphoric and non-anaphor¬
ic the are sufficient to account for the facts which we
discuss here; this point will be taken up again and
elaborated upon in §12.3." Furthermore, note that it
will not be the case that (39) will be predicted to be
ungrammatical, for the underlying the in (39) is not
deleted transformationally, and so that instance of the
'definite article' may be either anaphoric or non-ana¬
phoric. In (39) it is in fact the latter, as opposed to
that in (40), for the subset signified by the is defined
by the restrictive relative clause who came to the party
(and is hence cataphoric). Only if we accept that two
alternative structural analyses undergo Dual Copy, and
that one of these involves the-deletion while the other
The marginal status of (40) may perhaps be due to
its close resemblance in surface (and, indeed, phono¬
logical) structure to (39). I feel quite certain that
such resemblance is the prime reason for any possible
margin of acceptability which (40) has.
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does not, can we account for these facts. And so we may
conclude that there is a certain amount of syntactic
evidence within English grammar to justify the different
derivations for both N and both the N.
4.5 Some additional arguments
We have seen above that both is not a simple quant¬
ifier, in the general sense that we might use to des¬
cribe all or some. Rather, it is a complex of various
elements: a quantifier of totality, a quantifier of
duality and a deictic element. Nevertheless, it has been
possible to provide derivations for both which involve
only one addition to the transformational apparatus at
hand, namely the Dual Copy rule. Further, we have been
able to demonstrate that it is necessary to derive both
N and both the N from different underlying structures,
yet at the same time no further addition to the trans¬
formational apparatus is needed. ^here is therefore
some justification for confidence in at least the funda¬
mental characteristics of the analyses proposed.
Since the above hypothesis, however, may be of some
wider interest, in that it favours a grammar in which
lexical items may be derived from considerably more
complex underlying structures, it would be useful to
discover further facts which might confirm or disconfirm
the hypothesis. Below are listed some four points which
-1 73-
are worthy of consideration, although they are not
necessarily of equal weight. But they all have in
common the fact that they support one or other part of
the above proposals.
Firstly, it is quite obviously the case that the
derivation of both from a structure including underlying
all will help us to account quite simply for the close
parallels of distribution between the two quantifiers;
for we shall be able to state such regularities as the
optional (at least in British English) deletion of _of to
give both the, all the, in terms of a transformation
upon one underlying quantifier rather than on two dis¬
tinct (possibly unrelated) quantifiers. transformations
which operate on two quantifiers in their attempt to
account for such distributions, as, for example, that in
Jackendoff (1968:429), are essentially ad hoc, since
they fail to express the correct generalisation.
If we look more closely at the distribution of the
two quantifiers, however, we find an interesting asym¬
metry of pattern, as exemplified in:
(4.41) a. The boys all have long hair
b The boys both have long hair
(4.42) a Boys all have long hair
b *Boys both have long hair
The problem is: why is (42b) ungrammatical, in contrast
to the grammaticality of both (41b) and (42a)? If both
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and all were different but somehow related quantifiers,
as in .Tackendof f ' s system, there could be no non-ad hoc
solution. But within the terms of the hypothesis pre¬
sented here, there does appear to be an explanation.
This is that the is not permitted to move to the right
of its noun, and. it must be left behind when both is
shifted as in (41b), despite Dual Copy. Now this ap¬
pears to be equally ad hoc, but consider the following;
Dutch sentences (admittedly somewhat archaic):
(4.43) a Beide jongens hebben ...
("Both boys have ...")
b De beide jongens hebben ...
("The two boys have ...")
c *Jongens hebben beide ...
(*"Boys both have ...")
d De jongens hebben beide ...
("The boys both have ...
What is crucial here is that the semantics of .'Dutch
point quite clearly to (43d) being related to (43a)
rather than to (43b). It therefore appears that when
beide is postposed, then the 'definite article' must be
left prenominally. Otherwise, the paradigm of (43) can
hardly be accounted for. But this account of Dutch
beide (with its implicit consequences for the analysis
of the English sentences (41b) and (42b)) is only pos¬
sible if it is accepted that our hypothesis, that both
and its Dutch equivalent involve an underlying the, is
correct.
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The comparison with Dutch leads to our second
subsidiary argument. It cannot be expected that every
language must have a lexical item identical in meaning
to both; but if a language does not have such an item
then we might suggest that in many cases this might
simply be because there is no version of the Dual Copy
rule in that language. It is therefore instructive to
consider the French translation of both, namely tous les
deux, i.e., the structure proposed here for English
before the operation of Dual Copy. If it can be shown
that there are a number of languages like French rather
than English in this respect, this would be strong
evidence in favour of this chapter's hypothesis in
general and Dual Copy in particular.
The third piece of evidence stems from the fact
that there are in English two other dual quantifiers
like both, that is to say, quantifiers whose presence in
an 'IP shows that the reference of that 7P must be to two
and only two objects; these items are either and neither,
low it is quite simple to demonstrate that if these
quantifiers are derived in exactly the same way as both
except that all is replaced by any for either and by
neg + any for neither, then we can account for their
distribution. Thus we find:
(4.-14) a *Any boy passed the exam
b *Kither boy passed the exam
c Did you pass any boy?
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d Did you pass either boy':
e do boy passed the exam
f Neither boy passed the exam
Further support for this thesis is found in the obser¬
vation of Kirwin (1968) that either is used for any in
the Newfoundland dialect of Canadian English. The
probability that Dual Copy and the accompanying under¬
lying structures can be generalised over a class of
lexical items rather than being confined to one item
only further strengthens the hypothesis presented here.
rfhe fourth and final point concerns the contrast
between anaphoric and non-anaphoric the, and the claim
made above that the former is present in the underlying
structures of both N, but need not underlie both the N,
which is derivable from non-anaphoric the. Consider the
10
following sentences:
(4.45) Both (of) the Irish delegates are
here already
(4.46) Both Irish delegates are here already
It seems to be the case that the conditions under which
(45) is appropriate are different from those for (46).
Sentences (45) and (46), and the remarks below
concerning their contextual aporopriateness, are due to
Dwight Bolinger (letter of 13/6/72), but the conclusions
drawn are the present writer's responsibility and all
blame should be attached to him.
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Thus, if two people come into an assembly room and they
are previously unacquainted, after one of them has look¬
ed around the room he may say to the other, in an attempt
to break the ice, sentence (45). But (46) could hardly
be used in the same context, unless there were an inton¬
ation rise on already. But in that case it would have
to be assumed that both speaker and hearer knew certain
facts about the Irish delegates, or Irish delegates in
general, and the speaker knew that that was the case, or
was attempting a particular type of joke. Both these
instances are surely irrelevant here. What we should
note is that only at a later stage in the conversation,
perhaps after the Irish delegates have been mentioned,
would a both N construction, as in (46), be appropriate.
What conclusion may we draw from the facts that
both of the M is more appropriate for the first speech-
occasion and that both N only really comes into its own
on further speech-occasions? If (46) .involves an under¬
lying anaphoric the, as we have argued above, it is
quite simple to see why it is inappropriate on the first
speech-occasion: there is nothing in the context of
situation, let alone discourse, to provide an anaphoric
reference. On the other hand, the in (45) is not neces¬
sarily anaphoric, and therefore (45) is acceptable on
the first speech-occasion. Later in the conversation,
when anaphoric reference has been established, both TT is
acceptable. rnhe possibility of the above explanation
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only comes with the contrast in underlying structures
which our hypothesis proposes, and therefore it is en
additional justification of that hypothesis.
These four additional arguments all confirm the
initial hypothesis, and, presumably, whatever wider
conclusions may be drawn for the theory of grammar from
the hypothesis. Therefore we may claim to have demon¬
strated that our statement that we have given an ade¬
quate description of both, stated at the conclusion of
§4.4, is indeed by and large correct. Rut one major
problem remains: not only have we nowhere .justified the
rule of quantifier-lowering and hence the general prin¬
ciple that quantifiers are underlying higher predicates,
but we have even displayed a considerable degree of
scepticism regarding its correctness. This hypothesis,
which we have named the Lakoff-Carden analysis, must




5.1 The Lakoff-Garden analysis
1
The Lakoff-Carden analysis of quantifiers claims
that, depending upon their surface structure status,
quantifiers are in underlying structure predicates in
one of the following structures: (i) higher sentences;
(ii) restrictive relative clauses; (iii) nonrestrictive
relative clauses. But not all these structures have
equal status in the theory. Thus the claim that quant¬
ifiers derive from predicates in restrictive relative
clauses, which first appeared in Lakoff (I970h), was
subsequently rejected in Lakoff (1970d) following
What is referred to here as the "Lakoff-Garden
analysis" has been advanced in a large number of papers
whose chronology is obscured by publication dates. Prom
internal and external evidence, however, it is possible
to suggest the following order of chronological priority
for the more important of these papers: Lakoff (1970b),
Carden (1968), Lakoff (1970d), Carden (1970b), Carden
(1970c), Lakoff (1971c). Lakoff (1970b) was written in
1965, Carden (1968) is a revised version of Carden
(1967), to which latter I have not had access, and
Lakoff (1971c) is in part a revision of Lakoff (1969).
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criticisms made by Partee (1970). The rejection is as
follows (Lakoff, 1970d:400):
"In my dissertation I claimed that
(23) Did many inmates escape?
was ambiguous. In one sense it is presumed
that some inmates escaped, and it is asked
whether the number was large. In the second
sense, no escape is presumed. It is only
presumed that the speaker is discixssing many
inmates and asking whether they escaped ...
A sober post-dissertation look at the
sentence shows that I simply had the facts
wrong. So far as I can tell, the second
sense simply does not exist. I also agree
with Partee's critique of the mechanism I
had set up to account for that sense of (23),
namely, deriving the quantifier from a
restrictive relative clause on an indef¬
inite NP ..."
Since that particular claim is incorrect, and has
been acknowledged as incorrect by Lakoff himself, there
is no need to discuss it further. The claim that quant¬
ifiers appear as predicates in higher sentences, i.e.,
as VPq in (4.28) was made in the earliest papers, namely
Lakoff (1970b:175) and Carden (1968:2), and has remained
present in all the variants of the Lakoff-Carden theory
(although Lakoff (1971c:239) presents a variant which,
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it is claimed, is "closer to reality", whatever that may
mean, cf. below and note 12). That quantifiers may have
their source as predicates in nonrestrictive relative
clauses is first made in Lakoff (1970d:400-2) and Carden
(1970c:416). This claim is best considered as a re¬
placement of the one that quantifiers have one source in
restrictive clauses. Carden (1970c) demonstrates that
there is a good deal of evidence that only postdeter-
miner quantifiers, i.e., those in the position of X in
the X boys, are so derived. An example of such an
underlying source is the position of are two in (4.28),
see above.
This brief summary should make it clear that the
analysis of quantifiers as predicates has undergone some
modification since its original appearance. But even
so, I think that it is also the case that the argument¬
ation for such an analysis has not been sufficiently
closely and exhaustively examined, and it is such a
thorough examination which it is hoped to present here.
Apparently there are three questions to be asked: (i) do
quantifiers appear as predicates in underlying struc¬
tures? (ii) have quantifiers a source in a higher S?
(iii) have quantifiers a source in a nonrestrictive
relative clause? Further, we might ask whether it is
it is the case that (ii) and (iii) can only be valid
questions if the answer to (i) is affirmative. That
there is to some extent such an internal ordering
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relationship cannot "be doubted. To clarify this abrupt
statement, consider the remarks of Carden (1968:5), who,
after arguing that quantifiers are derived from higher
sentences, states:
"This doesn't show that it [the quantifier:
RMHl is the verb of that S; but, within the
present theory, what else could it be? The
S must have an NP and a VP, and the NP is
needed to identify the NP the quantifier
modifies in the embedded S."
In other words, if we are to accept that quantifiers are
derived from higher S's, then they must be predicates,
for there is no other point in underlying structure at
which they might be placed.
In this respect it might be mentioned that the
structures footnoted in Lakoff (1971c:239) do not appear
to correspond to this theory, for here, although quant¬
ifiers are in a higher S, they are directly dominated by
"Q" and appear to be neither 'predicates' nor 'argu¬
ments'. Thus, for the interpretation of:
(5.1) Many men read few books
which is paraphrasable by:
(5.2) Many are the men who read few books
Lakoff suggests that the following representation most




MANY i Q S
FEW j PREDICATE ARGUMENT ARGUMENT
READ i
Without any explanation of this structure on Lakoff's
part it is extremely difficult to discuss it, and it is
perhaps wisest to assume that in principle it assigns a
status to the quantifiers not radically different from
that in earlier works "by Lakoff. Only one comment seems
possible at the moment: if many, etc. are to be domin¬
ated in underlying representations by "0", then presum¬
ably we are to deny any possibility of explaining the
behaviour of quantifiers in terms of any generalisations
which may be possible with reference to the predicates
or arguments, which seems unfortunate. But even so, (3)
may not be the 'deepest' structure, and in that case
this criticism is misplaced, and Lakoff has simply been
misleading. Even if it is assumed that (3) is some kind
of variant of the notation of symbolic logic, it is not
possible to define the status of "Q" unambiguously.
This is because Lakoff fails to relate clearly (3) to
any extended rule mechanism. However, see below, §5.5.
To return to the context of the original Lakoff-
Carden proposals, we can see there that if quantifiers
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have their source in a higher S, then they must be
predicates. The position with regard to the nonrestric-
tive relative clause source is rather different, parti¬
ally because of the restricted set of quantifiers which
may appear in such contexts, but one's conclusions must
be broadly similar: the relevant quantifiers must be
part (at least) of a predicate at some stage in the
derivation of the sentence, but see below, §5.3, for a
fuller discussion of quantifiers in postdeterminer
position within this theory. However, we must conclude
at the moment that the primary hypothesis is that quant¬
ifiers are underlying predicates, and that the hypothesis
that quantifiers are derived from a higher S source is
secondary.
It is necessary to emphasise this distinction for
it is easily confused. For example, the arguments of
Garden (1968), reproduced in part above, do appear to
claim that quantifiers are predicates because they are
derived from higher S's. On the other hand, Lakoff
(1970b:175) makes use of comparisons with the behaviour
of 'true' adjectives, which are unarguably derived from
predicates, cf. Lakoff (1970b:115-33), to siiggest that
quantifiers are predicates too, and only then does he
suggest that quantifiers are derived from higher S's.
Undoubtedly the position taken by Lakoff is preferable
to that taken by Carden, and the reason for this is
quite simple. Carden's argument may be condensed as:
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since quantifiers must be derived from higher S's, then
they must be predicates; Lakoff's argument can be para¬
phrased as: since quantifiers are underlying predicates,
they may be derived from a higher S source. In Carder's
case there is a formal claim made about quantifiers, but
in Lakoff's case there is an empirical claim which has
possible formal consequences. The hypothesis which
subordinates formal claims to empirically-verifiable
facts, in this case Lakoff's hypothesis, is indisputably
superior to that which does not do so, i.e., Carden's.
Having established that question (i) - are quant¬
ifiers predicates? - is the primary question, we are now
faced with the unfortunate fact that this question is in
itself two questions rolled into one; for, in order to
make the claim that quantifiers are predicates, it is
firstly necessary to determine that they are not at all
stages of derivation constituents of the HP which, to
use a traditional term, they modify in surface structure.
Each argument in favour of the predicate status of
quantifiers will therefore have to be examined with this
in mind. The reasons why there are two questions and
not one should be quite clear: it is only if quantifiers
For discussion of the multiply ambiguous use of
'formal' in linguistic writings see Lyons (1968:135-37).
It is used here in the sense which Lyons contrasts with
'substantive'.
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cannot be considered as constituents of the modified NP
at all stages that they must be considered as something
else at one stage or another. However, what that "some¬
thing else" must be is still at that point a matter for
debate. There are at least four possibilities: (a)
sentences; (b) nouns; (c) verbs (predicates); (d) quant¬
ifiers, where that would be a special category, perhaps
like the "Q" of (3) above, or like that suggested,
perhaps not seriously, by Force (1968), who includes the
and the partitive £f amongst the elements dominated by a
Q node. To my knowledge no one has suggested alter¬
native (a). Jackendoff (1968) suggests that some quant¬
ifiers are nouns but that others are 'articles'. This
is slightly reminiscent of Force (1968), since 'articles'
appear to be roughly equivalent to items dominated by 0,
and it is also the case that both Force and Jackendoff
work within an interpretivist framework. But it would
be foolish to push the comparison too far. Alternative
(c), of course, is the Lakoff-0arden analysis.
There appear to be four major arguments which have
been exlicitly formulated in favour of the Lakoff-Carden
proposals, and these may be termed "Equi-NP Deletion",
"'Archaic' constructions", "Negatives and quantifiers",
and "Logic and linguistics". At least the first three
of these have been discussed fully in the literature,
cf. especially Lakoff (1970b and d), Carden (1968),
Jackendoff (1971b) and Partee (1970). There are a
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nuraber of other arguments, but strictly speaking they
are dependent upon one or other of the above, and there¬
fore need only be considered if the above arguments are
correct. We shall now consider each of the above argu¬
ments separately, commencing with Equi-NP Deletion.
5.2 Equi-NP Deletion
The clearest presentation of the argument from
Equi-NP Deletion is to be found in Carden (1968:5-7),
where it is demonstrated that since:
(5.4) All optimists expect to be President
(5.5) All optimists expect all optimists
to be President
are not paraphrases of one another, the generative
semantics theory of grammar demands that they have
different underlying structures, the one for (4) permit¬
ting Equi-NP, the one for (5) not doing so. (6) and (7)
are such underlying structures, for if we accept auant-
ifier-lowering as ordered after Equi-NP then the approp¬
riate NP in (7) will not be equi-deleted because of its
failure to meet the required identity condition, cf.
Carden (1968:7), Jackendoff (1971b:285):^
^ The earliest published description of Equi-NP
Deletion is to be found in Rosenbaum (1967:6), where it
is called Identity Erasure.
the optimists NP
the optimists V




But, as Jackendoff (1971b:286-87) points out, there is
the difficulty that noun phrases which are in surface
structure quantifier-less also display the same semantic
differences as exist between (4) and (5):
(5.8) a Senators from New England expect to
be treated with respect
b Senators from New England expect sena¬
tors from New England to be treated
with respect
(5.9) a Obnoxious people generally want to be
rejected from society
b Obnoxious people generally want
obnoxious people to be rejected from
society
This problem was noted by Carden (1968:44-45), where he
proposes the solution that sentences such as (8) and (9)
have "disappearing quantifiers in their deep structures".
This is slightly modified in Carden (1970b:287), where
the "disappearing quantifier" is claimed to be a gener¬
ic, and we may, at least for the moment, follow Jacken¬
doff (1971b:287) when he suggests that this solution is
quite inadequate in the light of the rather different
syntactic behaviour of generics and quantifiers.
However, it is very probably the case that neither
Carden's arguments for nor Jackendoff's arguments against
the use of higher predicates to solve the Equi-NP prob¬
lem are logically impeccable. Consider the following
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argument: (i) there are independently-motivated reasons
for assuming that quantifiers are higher predicates in
underlying structure; (ii) if there are these other
reasons for deriving quantifiers from higher predicates,
there is then a mechanism to avoid the semantic neutral¬
isation "between (4) and (5) which the rule of Equi-NP
Deletion would otherwise engender, assuming that trans¬
formations do not change meaning (for the history of
this assumption see Katz and Postal (1964:32) and Partee
(1971:4-8); (iii) given the mechanism of the second
stage of this argument, then it is preferable to assume
that there is a "disappearing quantifier" in (8) and
(9), for then the lack of neutralisation in those sen¬
tences can be explained by an already existing device,
Jackendoff (1971b) attacks the first and third
stages of this argument, but since his attack on the
third stage is apparently intended to be valid indepen¬
dently of whether his attack on the first stage (which
is almost a little less than muted) is right, it is only
the attack on the third stage which I wish to discuss.
If stages (i) and (ii) are correct, then it is quite
indisputable that this is strong evidence for the cor¬
rectness of stage (iii), since it is clear that they
provide evidence about the possible existence of "dis¬
appearing quantifiers". It may be true that the evi¬
dence which they provide is to some degree in conflict
with other semantic and syntactic evidence which
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involves the behaviour of the verbal auxiliary system,
but even if that conflict is inevitable if only one
generic quantifier - which conveniently "disappears" at
the right moment - is used, it may yet be possible to
find another quantifier-type source for the cases invol¬
ving quantifier-less NP's. It could be, for example,
that there is an appropriate adverbial source, and if we
follow Lakoff (1971a and b) then this source would also
be a higher predicate in underlying structure. Indeed,
we could go further: given that adverbs are connected
with the verbal auxiliary system and that adverbs are at
least sometimes derived from higher sentences, just like
quantifiers, the suggestion by Carden that quantifiers
and generics are related categories is not as absurd as
Jackendoff claims. If adverbs and quantifiers are
higher verbs, then it is by no means clear that it is
correct for Jackendoff (1971b:287) to state that:
"... the theory of GENERIC as a higher verb
entails an apparent LOSS of generality."
The claims of Lakoff and Carden, if they are correct, go
a long way to showing that only an analysis of 'generic'
aa a higher verb avoids a loss of generality, no matter
how difficult the syntactic problems which will be
encountered may be.
But even if Jackendoff's arguments do not neces¬
sarily show that the three-stage argument constructed
above is incorrect, they undoubtedly have considerably
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more force against Garden's arguments, because these
latter do not correspond to the argument constructed
above. More precisely, it is not at all clear that
there are any independently-motivated reasons for assum¬
ing that quantifiers are derived from higher predicates.
Garden (1968:4) states:
"There are three pieces of evidence showing
that quantifiers come from higher sentences:
Kuno's hypothetical verb EXIST which must be
postulated in order to explain certain
sentences with two "some's"; the "Everyone
expects to die" sentences; and the Not-
Transportation rule."
Carden only discusses the latter two, and I have been
unable to uncover any more illuminating reference to
Kuno's unpublished paper. However, we might remark that
if the hypothesis that quantifiers are derived from
higher predicates is to be justified by reference to a
hypothetical verb, then first the latter has to be
justified; thus the derivation of quantifiers as pro¬
posed by Lakoff and Carden will be only a remotely
testable hypothesis. On the other hand, there also
appears to be a cerbain amount of evidence which Garden
fails to mention above, but this can await a discussion
below in §5.3, when we shall see that it is far from
conclusive.
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There are, therefore, only two decidable arguments
in Garden's paper which favour the theory that quant¬
ifiers are underlying higher predicates: Equi-Dp Dele¬
tion and Neg Transportation. This, of course, is a
reversal of the position we originally assumed, and
implies that we have indeed, as Jackendoff claims, to
inquire whether the mechanism of Equi-NP is correct on
independent grounds. But, perhaps more importantly,
there is the question of whether Equi-\TP demands that
quantifiers are higher predicates. Now what is inter¬
esting about this question is the fact that the demand
has not been proved, but only assumed; Carden (1969:5)
says:
"We conclude that the Quantifier must not be
inside its NP at this time. Presumably [my
italics:RP-THl then, it is in a higher S."
In other words, this quotation demonstrates only that
the argument from Equi-MP shows that the Quantifier must
not be within the relevant DP at the time of its dele¬
tion, and it does not show that quantifiers are higher
predicates. In this respect, it is interesting to
compare the remarks of Lakoff (1971c:238):
"The main point at issue is whether quant¬
ifiers in underlying semantic representations
are in a higher clause than the NP's they
quantify (as in predicate calculus) or
whether they are part of the DP's they
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qualify (as they are in surface structure)."
Even if the first of these alternatives is correct, it
is an assumption to then claim that quantifiers are
higher predicates. We may therefore conclude that Equi-
NP is not an argument in favour of the Lakoff-Carden
analysis, except in so far as, if quantifiers are higher
predicates, then Equi-NP does not contradict this,
ceteris paribus. Therefore the three-stage construction
of our argument is correct and since Carden's arguments
in relation to Equi-NP do not correspond to that, they
are incorrect.
Notwithstanding the above, it is perhaps still
necessary to examine Carden's solution to Equi-NP to see
whether or not it is correct, leaving aside the above
remarks. There appear to be three arguments against his
solution: (a) it is seraantically inadequate; (b) it
demands "disappearing quantifiers", cf. above; (c) Equi-
NP is itself dubious. The first of these arguments is
succinctly stated by Jackendoff (1971b:286):^
"One trouble with this [Carden's:RMHl solution
is that the difference between the underlying
structures of Figures (6) and (7) does not
adequately characterise the semantic
In the following quotation I have altered Jacken¬
doff 's original numbering to conform with the numbering
for this chapter.
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differences between (4) and (5). In partic¬
ular, (4) means that each optimist individu¬
ally expects himself to win a prize, but he
does not necessarily have any expectations
about the fate of the other optimists.
Figure (6) gives no more indication than
Figure (7) that each optimist is concerned
only with himself. Thus, while the proposed
underlying structure for all does produce
the correct strings 4-5, it still fails to
account for the semantic differences between
them."
Jackendoff's argument seems to be both correct and in
no need of further elucidation.
With regard to the second argument, we are here
dealing with the correspondence between Garden's analy¬
sis and stage (iii) of our argument above. It would
seem quite natural to allow "disappearing quantifiers"
if the nature of quantifiers were independently such
that it provides a. solution to Equi-NP, but of course
that position is the reverse of the case. What we
actually have is a situation where Equi-NP both provides
an argument in favour of quantifiers as higher predic¬
ates and an argument against that. The need to postu¬
late "disappearing quantifiers" is the argument against,
for this involves the introduction into the grammar of
categories and rules which might otherwise be unnecessary.
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In other words, although it is possible that the analysis
of quantifiers presented by Carden may simplify in one
respect the (semantically inadequate) grammar, in an¬
other respect it complicates it. This suggests that
Equi-NP is at least (for Carden) an inconclusive argu¬
ment .
The question of whether Equi-NP is dubiously formu¬
lated, or perhaps whether there should be that kind of
transformation, follows from the first two arguments.
The semantic distinction between (4) and (5) is undoubt¬
edly that which Jackendoff has stated, and the intro¬
duction of higher quantifiers which 'disappear' under
unspecified conditions is the solution proposed by
Carden. But as Jackendoff (1971b:286) points out, the
problem is at least one of coreferentiality. This can
be seen if we consider:
(5.10) The masochists whipped themselves
which is clearly ambiguous: either each masochist whip¬
ped only himself, or each masochist whipped himself and
all the other masochists. This implies that the mechan¬
ism for Equi-NP is extended to pronominalisation. That
may not be all that unfortunate, since pronominalisation
is not crucially dissimilar from Equi-NP Deletion; but
since it is a rather later transformation than Equi-NP,
cf. Carden (1968:45), Lakoff and Ross (1968), it must be
ensured that quantifier-lowering does not intervene.
What is a good deal worse, however, is that the same
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ambiguity applies in many sentences which are not sub¬
ject to Kqui-RP or pronominalisation, but merely have
the form [NPpl - V - NPp]_] » as in:
(5.11) a The boys kissed the girls
b The sadists whipped the masochists
c The mice frightened the elephants
Each of the sentences in (11) is ambiguous; thus (11a)
means either that each of the boys kissed one of the
c
girls or that each of the boys kissed all of the girls.
Furthermore, there appears to be a sliding scale of
preference: in (11a.) the preferred reading seems to be
the first; in (11b) each reading seems to be about
equally preferable; and in (11c) the latter reading is
preferable.
This complication, together with the facts mentioned
in footnote 5, suggest that it is basically wrong to
This statement is over-crude, for in fact there
appear to be several, perhaps even many, other inter¬
pretations, which interact in a manner not dissimilar to,
but rather more complicated than, the interpretations
of:
(i) All but one of the boys danced with all
but one of the girls
cf. Karttunen (1971:172-73). For the conclusions which
must be drawn from this, see the further discussion
below.
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attempt to sort out the ambiguity by differences in
underlying structure, and that, moreover, Equi-TP and
pronominalisation are only special instances of this
state of affairs, in their case coreference being invol¬
ved as well. The only possible method of handling the
ambiguities of (11) appears to be to assume that only a
two-way ambiguity exists and that thence there are only
two possible underlying structures. But the assumption
is unwarranted, as has been noted, and at least one of
the underlying structures is unwieldly - furthermore,
both are unjustifiable, given the methods open to trans¬
formationalists. That the assumption is unwarranted is
sufficient criticism, but it is worth noting that the
underlying structure for the first of the interpretations
above would have to look either like:
(5.12) S
kissed one of the girls
which is unsatisfactory in that (amongst other reasons)
it fails to express the fact that all the girls were
kissed, or take the form of an indefinite conjunction.
The required structure is grossly simplified here,
but even that does not help a protagonist of such a
solution.
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Although some grammarians have hinted at the possibility
of relating quantifiers to coordinations, cf. McCawley
(1970:297) and, of course, Carden (1970a), see §4.2, the
stumbling block of indefinitely large phrase markers is
always reached.
In any case, different underlying structures appear
to be beside the point. What really seems to be happen¬
ing is that in certain cases, e.g., (11a), reference is
being made to a number of individual, but possibly
simultaneously performed, acts. Now although this does
not affect our concept of the subject-verb relation, it
does affect our concept of the verb-object relation. We
appear to be faced with a 'tolerable ambiguity' in
English (and, we may suppose, most other languages). In
other words, all sentences of the type - V -
are potentially ambiguous in the manner of (11), and
this ambiguity is primarily dependent on the semantic
relationship between the subject/verb complex and the
7
object. Thus, where the most probable interpretation
"Subject" and "object" are, of course, rather vague
terms, and it might be preferable to relate the facts
stated here to underlying functional or case relations,
cf. Anderson (1971b). But it is uncertain how this could
be accomplished, for it is very difficult to see at what
level of structure the ambiguity is determined. This
strengthens the case against attempting different deriv¬
ations .
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is that a number of individuals ere separately affected
by the action of the subject which the verb represents,
then the first interpretation is preferred, as in (11a),
but where the semantics prefers a collective interpre¬
tation of the subject - verb - object relationship,
there the second interpretation is preferred, as with
(11c). A very obvious case is:
(5.13) The girls picked the flowers
Although there is a possible ambiguity here it is toler¬
ated. I would suggest that there are two reasons for
this: firstly, the ambiguity is not crucial for compre¬
hension, i.e., it is acceptable 'noise'; secondly, the
ambiguity resides not in any differences of underlying
structure, but in the inherent nature of the relation¬
ship of plural object NT's to verbs with plural subject
NP's.
We are faced with what might be termed a systematic
referential ambiguity in language, and the result is
that we are forced into an impasse, for, as we shall
see, this ambiguity needs to be brought into the syntac¬
tic description, and there is no context into which it
can fit. The truth of this latter statement can be
observed by the fact that the ambiguity is multivalent
and depends upon an infinitely variable expression of
the functional relationships under discussion. But, I
would suggest, it is needed precisely to express the
occurrence of (4) - (5) and (8) - (10) under Equi-NP and
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pronominalisation. What we need is a mechanism by which,
when the second interpretation of (11a) is taken, Equi-
NP and pronominalisation are blocked. This, of course,
is to return to the proposals of Carden (1968), for he
attaches a higher quantifier to the Mr which would
otherwise undergo the relevant transformation.
But it is precisely those sentences such as in
(11), which do not undergo Equi-NP Deletion or pronomin¬
alisation, that show that that solution is false. ^he
difference between (4) and (5), in relation to the
structure of the constituent MP's, is exactly the same
as that between (11a) and (14):
(5.14) All the boys kissed all the girls
but whereas there is no reading in common between (4)
and (5), the only reading of (1<*) is identical, except
for the here irrelevant matter of emphasis, to one of
the many possible readings of (11a), or, for those
readers who find (14) ambiguous, it is so in exactly the
same way as (11a). Given the first of these cases for
Q
(14), it therefore has to be assumed that the under¬
lying structure of (14) is identical to one of the
underlying structures for (11a), but that the nuant-
ifiers are freely (?) deletable in the latter. But that
has two consequences: (i) we have to permit massive
Since the consequences follow in either case, I
have merely taken the simpler of the alterna \i s.
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deletion of quantifiers under very loose conditions;
(ii) we have to permit (11a) and all sentences of a
similar form to have a possibly indefinite number of
underlying structures. Since neither of these conse¬
quences is acceptable, we are obliged to state that (7)
is not an adequate underlying structure for (5), and
hence that Equi-IP must be formulated differently.
Our final argument against Equi-NP Deletion is not
radically different from that above. Consider the
sentence:
(5.15) All the optimists expect the optimists
The underlying structure of this sentence is presumably:
to win a prize
(5.16) S0
0
NP 1 s 1 all
the op+"i <=+Q VP
the optimists
expect
the optimists win a prize
But since EP^ and NP^ are identical when required to be
so, Equi-EP will operate freely, and the resulting
-P03-
surface structure from (16) will not be (15) but:
(5.17) All the optimists expect to win a prize
Thus (1b) cannot, if Equi-NP operates as has been sug¬
gested, be the underlying structure of (15). The solu¬
tion would seem to be that there will be three distinct
underlying structures, each of which will correspond to
one of the surface structures for (15), (17) and the
equivalent of (5), where all the optimists has not been
deleted. For (17) the structure will be that of (16),
but the structures of both (15) and the equivalent of
(5) must have a higher quantifier occupying the VP2
position in (7). In the latter case it will be all, but
what will it be in the case of (15) - the "disappearing"
generic of Carden (1968)? Given the nongeneric status
of the sentence that seems implausible. And further, in
the case of a modification of (15) where there is no
initial quantifier in surface structure, how do we
determine whether or not there is still a quantifier in
VPq position? That auestion, unfortunately for Garden,
seems to require the answer that there is no possible
way to so determine. However, let us not pursue that
point and. instead accept the notion of a generic quant¬
ifier as a filler for VP2» But once again this is a
fudge. The reason why there is no Equi-HP Deletion in
(15) is that the reference of HP^ is different from that
of HP2, and thus is unrelated to quantifier syntax.
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In order to clarify the latter statement it is
useful to consider the following sentences:
(5.18) a All the Liberals expect all the
Liberals to merge with Labour
b All the Liberals expect the Liberals
to merge with Labour
c All the Liberals expect to merge
with labour
Even without discussing the grammaticality of these
three sentences, it should be clear that (18a) is alone
in not having a reading which states that what is expec¬
ted is that the Liberal party will merge with the Labour
party. (18b) seems to have only that reading and (18c)
is potentially ambiguous: like (18b) it may have that
reading, but it could also have a reading analogous to
that of (4). In other words, the reference of the
subject MP of S2 in each sentence of (18) has a differ¬
ent potential force. Mow what this fact about these
sentences shows is that it is extremely difficult for
the Lakoff-Carden proposals to give an adequate account
of the consequential facts, ^he verb merge demands that
its subject and object be semantically alike in certain
respects, and that which concerns us here is that since
Labour is [+abstract, -animate!, the subject must have
the same features. therefore, only the first reading
which we have discussed above is fully grammatical, and
so (18a) is ungrammatical. It is impossible to relate
this to the syntax of quantifiers in the way that the
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proposed solution for Equi-NP, by a manipulation of
quantifiers, would suggest was correct to get the neces¬
sary descriptions for the sentences of (18). In fact,
the whole problem seems to have very little to do with
the syntax of quantifiers. And so another solution for
Equi-NP, which does not place so much reliance on higher
quantifiers, will have to be found if we are to explain
the facts of Equi-NP and (18) in the same way, as we
ought to do. Finally, we might note that Anderson
(1974) suggests a structure for sentences s\ich as (15)
which do not appear to run into the identity problems of
Equi-NP which confront (16). However since this relies
on an analysis of all about which there must be grave
suspicion, cf. Chapter 9, especially §9.2, it cannot be
regarded as crucial evidence. Nor is it clear that it
provides an adeq\iate solution to the problems surround¬
ing (18). In any case, Anderson's solution does not
support the theories of Lakoff and Garden, since Ander¬
son does not consider quantifiers to be higher predic¬
ates.
In the light of the above arguments we are clearly
obliged to conclude that the evidence of Equi-NP Dele¬
tion in no way contributes support to the hypothesis
that quantifiers should be derived from higher predic¬
ates. Moreover, we can state with confidence that even
if such a hypothesis were independently justified, there
is very little evidence that this would help towards a
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solution of the Equi-UP problem. For if it were so,
then we would be committed to the claim that all plural
TCP's have higher quantifiers, a claim that cannot be
justified in as much as it does not shed light on the
problems of reference which are at the heart of the
question. If we are to find evidence that quantifiers
are higher predicates, then we shall have to look else¬
where .
5.3 'Archaic' constructions
An argument first presented in Lakoff (1970b:175),
but later expanded in Lakoff (1970d:395-99), purports to
give further evidence that quantifiers are predicates in
underlying structure. The evidence is that in 'archaic'
English there are constructions of the type:
(5.19) a ?The men.are few
b ?The men are many
c ??The men are five
Unfortunately, Lakoff gives no evidence to suggest that
such constructions are archaic, and indeed it may be
doubted that this is the correct description. Presum¬
ably, although he does not say so, he is relying on the
OED entry for many, but not that for few. The point is
that although such constructions did occur at earlier
stages in the history of English, there is no reason to
assume that they have ever had more than the highly
restricted currency which they have in the present-day
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language. Some of Lakoff's remarks about the history of
English, therefore, should be treated with a -pinch of
salt.
The quantifiers which occur in this position are
called 'absolute' quantifiers, for reasons irrelevant
here; those quantifiers which can never occur in predic¬
ate position, such as all, some, every, are called
'relative' quantifiers. Lakoff's argument then runs as
follows (1970d:398):9
"Now in a grammar of that [archaic:RMHl dia¬
lect (and at an earlier stage of English),
the quantifiers in (19) would have to be set
up as predicates. In order to relate quant¬
ifiers in predicate position with the cor¬
responding pre-nominal quantifiers, as one
would have to do in such a dialect, one
would have to set up a rule of quantifier-
lowering. Thus, such a rule would be inde¬
pendently motivated for quantifiers of
absolute size, and would apply optionally
for such quantifiers ... Now if all
The original numbering of the quotation is retain¬
ed. (19) refers to examples similar to (19) in this
paper; (1) and (2) are irrelevant to the present discus¬
sion but can be found in Lakoff (1970d:390) and Partee
(1970:153)♦
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quantifiers are generated in predicate
position and if the rule of quantifier-
lowering is generalized to operate on quant¬
ifiers of relative size (it would he obliga¬
tory for relative quantifiers, optional for
absolutes), then one can account for the
fact that relative quantifiers like some
work like few in sentences like (1) and (2)."
Before we discuss this argument in detail, we must
consider the fact that only those quantifiers which can
function 'archaically' as predicates can also occur in
postdeterminer position, as noted by Partee (1970:157).
This point is discussed by Carden (1970c): his solution
is that if we mark the 'relative' quantifiers as obliga¬
torily undergoing quantifier-lowering, an extension of
Lakoff's suggestion above, then exactly that set of
quantifiers will be blocked from appearing in postdeter-
rainer position, since no rule of quantifier-lowering
is involved in such derivations. The blocking results
from the fact that 'relative' Quantifiers will, with
respect to quantifier-lowering, belong to the "positive
absolute exception" type discussed by Lakoff (1970b:49-
56), however that has to be reformulated, cf. Lakoff
(1970b:ix-x).
The facts stated by Lakoff and Carden are in prin¬
ciple correct: 'absolute' quantifiers can appear 'archa¬
ically' in predicate position, and only those quantifiers
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that can appear in predicate position can appear as
postdeterminer quantifiers. Therefore, the question
which is at issue is whether or not the mechanism of
quantifier-lowering adequately explains the surface
structure patterning. Lakoff's argument in favour of
quantifier-lowering, and thus considering quantifiers as
underlying higher predicates can, like the argument
discussed in §5.2, relating to Equi-NP, be analysed into
three stages: (i) 'archaic' dialects of English show us
that some quantifiers have to be considered as under¬
lying predicates; (ii) if all quantifiers are considered
as predicates we have made a valid generalisation from
stage (i); (iii) there is a further generalisation
available in that the correct set of postdeterminer
quantifiers can be generated most economically by postu¬
lating positive exceptions to the quantifier-lowering
rule.
But each stage of the argument is false. While it
is true that 'absolute' quantifiers may occasionally turn
up in surface structure as predicates, we can only
deduce from that that the relevant part of the under¬
lying structure involves a predication, and there is no
justification for claiming that it is nothing but a
predication. Once again, we can observe that Lakoff and
Carden have made assumptions beyond the point that the
evidence will take them. If there is an alternative
solution which makes the least assumption empirically
-210-
justifiable, and as we shall see in Chapter 8 that there
is, then that solution will be preferable, especially if
it can be generalised to explain why 'relative' quant¬
ifiers do not turn up as predicates.
One additional reason for this conclusion is that
the generalisation at the heart of stage (ii) of the
argument is only apparent. ^o confirm this, we need
only consider the function of quantifier-lowering.
Certainly, one purpose of the transformation is to get
the quantifier into the right sentence, but that is not
what concerns us here. What is far more important is
that the quantifier which is originally dominated by VP,
and hence a predicate, is lowered into an NP-dominated
position, where it is a determiner of sorts. That this
is so seems to be denied by Carden (1968:10-11), where
the relevant fragment of the derived phrase-marker is:
But it is extremely difficult to defend such a position
as far as surface structure is concerned, for a quant¬
ifier in the position of all in (20) hardly acts like a
predicate. We might note that Lakoff (1970b:176) apnears
( 5.20)
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to suggest that after quantifiers are lowered they are
dominated by a determiner node, but there is no explan¬
ation of this probably more correct position. Garden
(1970b:287) also goes a long way to accepting this.
Therefore, we may state, despite the tree of (20), that
quantifier-lowering alters the status of quantifiers
from underlying predicates to surface non-predicates.
Now consider the case of a 'relative' quantifier such as
some. If we accept the Lakoff-Carden proposals it is
necessary to consider it a predicate in underlying
structure. But then it is obligatorily lowered. But
this has the effect of deleting all trace of predicate
status. What has been done, in fact, is to assign to
some a predicate status for which there is no empirical
evidence, and as a consequence we have then to obliga¬
torily remove all trace of that status before surface
structure is reached. In other words, we can only make
the generalisation that all quantifiers are predicates
if we construct a mechanism for wiping out that general¬
isation when, as in many cases, there is no evidence to
support it.
The fact that 'relative' quantifiers cannot appear
in postdeterminer position involves lakoff and Garden in
an even greater deviation from simplicity. As we have
seen, they can only explain this failure to appear in
postdeterminer position by stating that 'relatives'
obligatorily and 'absolutes' optionally undergo quantifier-
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loweri.ng (more precisely, meet the structural descrip¬
tion for quantifier-lowering). This explains the fail¬
ure, because at no point in the derivation of a post-
determiner quantifier is the structural description for
quantifier-lowering met. But that a solution such as
this should be necessary is extremely strange. After
all, if all quantifiers are underlying predicates, why
shouldn't they all appear in postdeterminer position9
There are two alternative answers to this auestion: the
first is that suggested by Lakoff and Harden and discus¬
sed above; the second is that the correct analysis of
quantifiers shows that not all quantifiers are under¬
lying predicates, or, more precisely, that not all
quantifiers are involved in an underlying predication.
As we have already said, the first of these answers
leads to the postulation of a set of items which must
meet a certain structural description, and thus a costly
formalism will have to be provided in the grammar to
state this case, cf. lakoff (1970b:49-56). The cost is
not simply to be measured in terms of the insertion of a
metarule to handle such 'absolute exceptions', which is
in fact fairly inexpensive; rather, there is the fact,
inherent in such cases, that there is no generalisation
possible to predict which items will have to be marked
as exceptions. On the other hand, the second answer
above has quite simple consequences, for if a Quant¬
ifier involves no predication, then there is no necessity
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to have rules "beyond those that already exist to explain
why it does not appear in postdeterminer position.
Moreover, the fact that some quantifiers are involved in
underlying predication will provide us with an indepen¬
dently justifiable explanation of why that and only that
set of quantifiers appears in postdeterminer position.
Finally, we shall have dispensed, in this context, with
the notion of absolute exceptions, which Lakoff himself
(1970b:ix-x) clearly suspects.
What conclusions may we draw from this discussion?
Firstly, it must be accepted that the argument from
'archaism' and postdeterminer quantifiers does indeed
support a hypothesis that a number of quantifiers, those
called 'absolutes', are involved in an underlying pred¬
ication. However, it would be departing too far from
the evidence at hand to claim that these quantifiers are
underlying predicates. Secondly, there is no evidence
whatsoever from the above constructions to substantiate
the claim that the 'relative' quantifiers are underlying
predicates. If we accept the assumption of Lakoff and
Garden that quantifiers should have one primary under¬
lying source, e.g., (but not i.e.) as predicates, the
necessary conclusion must be that quantifiers are not
higher predicates as Lakoff and Carden claim, but some¬
thing else, which may, however, in the case of 'absolute'
quantifier, involve a predication. In Chapters 6 and 7,
especially, we shall see that there is substantial
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evidence to suggest what other status quantifiers may-
have, hut for the moment we need only conclude that the
argument from 'archaic' constructions in no way supoorts
the specific claims made by Lakoff and Garden.
5.4 Negatives and quantifiers
In this section let us firstly consider the rule of
Neg(ative) Transportation (also called Not Transport¬
ation) . This is a minor rule, cf. Lakoff (1970b:30-48),
which moves a neg particle from the highest embedded
sentence into the matrix sentence, thus relating pairs
such as:
(5.21) a John thinks that he hasn't won the
prize
b John doesn't think that he has won
the prize
This rule is extensively discussed in the literature, cf.
R. Lakoff (1969h), Lindholm (1969) and Horn (1971) for
references. As a minor rule it applies only if one of a
restricted set of verbs is dominated by the Y node in
the matrix sentence; for example, Horn (1971:120) lists
twelve verbs, including think, want and seem. The
relevance of Neg Transportation to the hypothesis that
quantifiers are higher predicates is embodied in the
following claim by Carden (1968:8-9):
"When we apply Not-Transportation to embedded
S's containing quantifiers, the meanings we
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get confirm the analysis proposed in 2.1.1
[that quantifiers are higher verbs:RMHl and
incidentally prove that riot-Transportation
precedes 0-.*lagic [ auantif ier-lowering: RMHl
9) a John doesn't expect all the
boys to run
b John expects that not all the
boys will run
c John expects that none of the
boys will run
(9a) can only be synonymous with (9b), never
with (9c). It follows that the embedded S
of (9a) was '(not all) the boys run', and
could not have been 'all the boys (don't
run)'. ^hat is, the 'not' must have been on
the 'all' at the time Mot-Transportation
applied. But the Not-Transportation rule
takes the 'not' from the topmost embedded S,
which must therefore contain "not all' but
not 'not run'."
If this claim is correct, then there is good evi¬
dence to suggest that quantifiers are higher predicates.
However, Jackendoff (1971b:287-96) has shown quite
conclusively both that Garden's argument is correct only
if none has the source all ... not and that Neg Trans¬
portation is in any case a doubtful rule. One most
interesting argument concerning Meg Transportation is
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that the rule was originally proposed, by Fillmore
(1963) and Klima (1964), on semantic grounds, cf. R.
Lakoff (1969b:140). But as reported by R. Lakoff (1969b:
140-41), Dwight Bolinger has correctly pointed out that
Neg Transportation is a meaning-changing rule. There¬
fore, the original justification for Neg Transportation
has been shown to be incorrect. Indeed, in the theory
of generative semantics, to which R. Lakoff subscribes,
transformations may not change meaning, cf. Partee
(1971) and §5.2, above. Therefore it is self-contra¬
dictory for R. Lakoff both to accept the theory of
generative semantics and to claim that Neg Transport¬
ation is a valid rule of the grammar. Furthermore, since
the hypothesis that quantifiers are higher predicates is
a basic tenet of generative semantics only, the rule of
Neg Transportation cannot be used to support that hypo¬
thesis. A further discussion of the meaning-changing
status of Neg transportation is to be found in Lakoff
(1970c:158-62), where it is suggested that the rule
might be obligatory but sensitive to semantic inform¬
ation. If it is possible to formulate such a rule then
our objections here would be nullified, but Lakoff's own
remarks underline the difficulties involved. The kind
of solution which Lakoff is clearly aiming towards would
involve a global rule, and the status of global rules in
general will be discussed, with rather sceptical con¬
clusions, in §8.4, see too Lakoff (1970a). Therefore
there seems no reason at present to accept Neg
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Transportation into the transformational component of
the grammar.
Of course, as he himself points out, Jaclcendoff is
not committed to the contradictory position sketched out
above, since he makes no claim that all transformations
preserve meaning. His rejection of Neg transportation
is on purely syntactic grounds. Here we take the posi¬
tion that the syntactic inadequacies of the rule and its
probable meaning-changing property combine, in present
circumstancers, to justify its rejection. And despite
Jackendoff's acceptance of meaning-changing rules, it is
possible to accept in large measure his alternative
analysis (1971b:288-89) of the sentences quoted from
Carden above, because at no crucial point is a meaning-
changing rule involved. It might appear that we ought
to make one distinction between Jackendoff's formulation
10
and our own, for he accepts a. rule which derives any
from some - the Indef Incorporation rule of Klima (1964:
319). But this rule may be meaning-changing; therefore
should we not reject it, cf. §3.3? If that were true,
we should indeed do so, but in §10.2 we shall attempt to
show that the some-any rule, which allows a wide general¬
isation to be made and is therefore prima facie a strong
case for retention, is indeed meaning-preserving.
It should be noted that in Jackendoff (1971b:288)
figures (8a) and (8b) appear to have been transposed.
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Therefore no such distinction needs to be made at pres¬
ent, although that is rather beside the point just now.
What i3 important is that we accept Jackendoff's crit¬
ique of the argument which uses Neg Transportation to
support the hypothesis that quantifiers are higher
predicates, and therefore reject Carden's claim.
Before we leave the area of negation and quant¬
ifiers, it is necessary to discuss one further matter.
Carden (1970b:282) claims that the following sentence:
(5.22) All the boys didn't leave
is, subject to great dialect variation, ambiguous.
There is one interpretation of (22) which has the read¬
ing of (23), where the negative is originally on the
quantifier, i.e., the neg-Q reading; another interpre¬
tation which has the reading of (24), where the negative
is on the verb, i.e., the neg-v reading:
(5.23) neg all the boys left
(5.24) All the boys neg left
This is claimed to be confirmation of the Neg Transport¬
ation rule and also the theory that quantifier are
underlying higher predicates for the following reason.
If (23) and (24) are true readings of (22), then neg¬
ation on either the quantifier or the verb is possible.
But only in the case of negation of the Quantifier is
the neg on the highest embedded sentence when we have:
(5.25) I think all the boys didn't leave
Neg Transportation only operates if the neg is in such a
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position. therefore, if Neg Transportation operates on
(?5), we shall find that the resultant surface structure
has a reading synonymous with the neg-Q reading of (25),
but not with the neg-V reading. This is the case with:
(5.26) I don't think that all the boys left
We therefore have further evidence of the plausibility
of Neg transportation and the claim that quantifiers are
higher predicates, according to Garden. However, we
have already noted that Neg Transportation apnears to be
a meaning-changing rule, which makes nonsense of Carden's
claims about synonymity here. What is worse is that, as
has been pointed out already, Garden explicitly rejects
meaning-changing rules on a priori grounds, cf. Garden
(1970b:281). Therefore this further argument from Neg
Transportation is also invalid.
Nevertheless, (22) is an important and interesting
sentence, and there are two points that are worth dis¬
cussing with regard to it, both of which suggest that
the situation is by no means as simple as it appears.
The first of these points applies only to those speakers
who interpret (22) as I do, but we must follow Garden
(1970b:281) in his emphasis on idiolect variation, and
since the point for discussion does cast doubt on cer¬
tain key notions it would be remiss to ignore it. In my
own speech, spoken forms of (22) are unambiguous, for
the neg-Q reading (25) is possible only if all is heav¬
ily stressed. Otherwise, only the neg-V interpretation
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represented by (24) is possible. Now with the neg-Q
reading neg must command all in underlying structure.11
In the surface structure of (22) neg and all command
each other. Therefore, if Lakoff (1971c: 244-45) is
correct in his account of command relations, to get the
required neg-Q. reading either neg must precede all,
which is a correct prediction of (23), or the neg ele¬
ment in (22) must have heavy stress. But, in order for
(22) to have a grammatical neg-Q interpretation in my
speech, it is essential that all, rather than the neg
element, be heavily stressed. We have, therefore, a
situation where in order to obtain a neg-Q interpre¬
tation it is necessary to stress exactly that element
which Lakoff predicts should not be stressed. On the
other hand, the neg-V interpretation of (22) is correct¬
ly predicted by Lakoff in his account of those command
relations involving quantifiers and negatives. ^here-
fore we are faced with an uncomfortable choice: either
Lakoff's account of command relations is incorrect, or
Garden's hypothesis about the neg-Q interpretation of
(22) is incorrect. The evidence we have would suggest
that the latter is the case, but since that in itself
would cast doubt upon Lakoff's account of many command
relations, we shall postpone any discussion until §8.4,
when it will become more relevant.
For a discussion and definition of the command
relation see Langacker (1969).
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The second point for discussion arises out of a
comparison of (22) with:
(5.27) Many of the hoys didn't leave
The problem is that not only is (27) unambiguous, having
only a neg-V reading, but it can be quite simply demon¬
strated that this is the case and that:
(5.28) Not many of the boys left
has a different meaning. The sentence:
(5.29) Many of the boys didn't leave, but
many of them did
is both grammatical and non-contradictory. This latter
follows from the fact that the subset indicated by many
of the boys may be smaller than the subset indicated by
half of the boys, given, of course, the same set of
boys. In other words, (30) is valid:
(5.30) [many of the boysi < [half of the boysl
On the other hand, (31) is contradictory:
(5.31) *Not many of the boys left, but many
of them did
This follows from the possibility of (30) being valid.
"But if (28) is a possible reading of (27), as (23) is a
possible reading of (22), then there should be a reading
of (29) which is contradictory in exactly the same way
as (31) is. But there is not, and so (28) is not a.
possible reading of (27); therefore a neg-Q reading of
(27) is impossible. But if we follow Carden there must
be such a reading, since he derives many from an under¬
lying structure identical in relevant aspects to that
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for a11« This may be difficult to believe, but nowhere
does Carden suggest that it might be otherwise (the same
appears to be true of Lakoff). Indeed, there is ample
evidence that the position outlined here is a correct
description of both Carden's and Lakoff's approach. ?or
confirmation of this see Lakoff (1970d:175-83; 1971c:
239-42) and Carden (1970c:425). This latter reference
shows that some distinctions are drawn between all and
many, but no conclusions are reached which would be
relevant to the point discussed here.
mhe best that can be stated for the quantifier-
lowering hypothesis, therefore, is that it is in need of
considerable reformulation in order to account for the
discrepancies mentioned here. Nevertheless, any alter¬
native hypothesis will have to account for such facts in
a more consistent and well-motivated manner than even a.
modified quantifier-lowering hypothesis will be able to
do. As we shall see, this is far from simple, and
negation is perhaps the trickiest problem to be faced.
In §8.4 we shall attempt to provide at least an outline
of a solution to the difficulties, see too Hogg (1974).
But as the criticisms in Johansson (1974) show, the
question is far from being resolved.
3.5 Logic and linguistics
In §5.1 we noted that Lakoff (1971c:839) suggested
(3) as an underlying structure for (2) - repeated here
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for convenience:
(5.2) Many men read few hooks
READ i j
Although Lakoff (1971c) makes no attempt to justify (3)
1 ?
nor to explain the status of the constituents, there
are much clearer hints to be found elsewhere, notably in
Lakoff (1971a and b), that trees such as (3) are inten¬
ded to be notational variants, or nearly so, of repre¬
sentations in the canonical notation of symbolic logic,
cf. Quine (1960). For example, Lakoff (1971b:10) gives
representations both in tree form, as in (3), and in
logical notation, and there is a claim that the repre¬
sentations are equivalent. This claim, although only
implicit, is obviously true. To take an example pair
from Lakoff (1971b:10), there is no explicit difference
between (32) and (33) in terms of their explanatory
The only claim made by Lakoff (1971c) is that (3)
is "somewhat closer to reality", cf. §5.1, above. As it
stands, this claim is meaningless, and it has linguistic









(5.33) [(x) (willing (y, sacrifice (x,y)))l (a)
In other words, what Lakoff has done is shown that
the notation of symbolic logic can be converted into the
notation of transformational grammar without any loss of
adequacy; or at least that would appear to be the case.
But in fact it is not so, for what lakoff has done is
not a conversion of the notation of symbolic logic into
a transformational underlying structure of English, but
merely a conversion of that logical notation into tree-
branching phrase structure markers, which is a simple
mathematical operation, cf. Chomsky (1957:26-33). The
real issue then is whether or not the underlying struc¬
tures of language are as described by symbolic logic;
Lakoff's particular notational variant is interesting
only in so far as it presents a clearer (to linguists)
view of the descriptions of symbolic logic than does
canonical notation. To attempt to find the answer to
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this issue perhaps two questions are relevant.
The first of these is: why should the notation of
symbolic logic be thought apnropriate for the underlying
representation in a grammar? The answer to this is
fairly simple. Logic, it is claimed, is the analysis of
the 'laws of thought' as they are rationally reconstruc¬
ted in natural language (Reichenbach, 1947:2). Thus,
logic is an attempt to obtain semantic representations
for natural languages. Now grammarians such as Lakoff,
i.e., generative semanticists, belive that the under¬
lying representations of a grammar ought to be semantic
representations. There would therefore appear to be an
affinity of purpose between logicians and grammarians,
and it cannot be denied that if the claims of the gener¬
ative semanticists are correct this is to some extent
true.
But there are differences: for example, linguistics
is an empirical science, it depends upon the construc¬
tion of a rule device which generates actual sentences
of an actual natural language. On the other hand,
philosophy, and hence logic, is a theoretical science.
As Strawson (1970:14) says, the student of philosophy
"... will be prepared from the start to use a
vocabulary which is overtly semantic, or, in
a broad sense, logical, for the classific¬
ation of elements abstractly conceived ...
[He] may finally relate these theoretical
-226-
models of language to what is actually found
in empirically given languages."
Furthermore, as Strawson (1970) also points out, propon¬
ents of symbolic logic do not claim to be attempting a
complete analysis of any natural language. As Quine
(1960:160) states:
"On the whole the canonical systems of logic¬
al notation are best seen not as complete
notations for discourse on special subjects,
but as partial notations for discourse on
all subjects."
It therefore seems reasonable to conclude that symbolic
logic may provide linguists with much aid in the solu¬
tion of many semantic problems, but that nevertheless
the empirical constraints on grammars and the restricted
aims of logic must mean that there will be many differ¬
ences between the representations of the linguist and
those of the philosopher.
The above, of course, is a theoretical conclusion,
and it is only when we answer the second question - how
adequate is the notation of symbolic logic as an under¬
lying semantic representation of natural language9 -
that we can reach a proper empirical conclusion. As
Lakoff (1971b) shows, the use of canonical notation in
the construction of underlying representations can
clarify certain problems such as opaque reference,
although even here we ought to note the criticisms of
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Lakoff's analysis which have "been made by Heny (1573:
esp. 238-44). But that such a clarification may be
possible is hardly surprising, since onacity has been
one of the basic concerns of logicians. A fair summary
of Lakoff (1971b) would seem to be that it has demon¬
strated that the fruits of logic can be transplanted
onto the trees of transformational grammar, but, because
of the close mathematical relation between the two
notations, this is hardly a major advance. The problem
with which we must be concerned is whether or not it is
possible to account for certain linguistic facts which
have not otherwise been accounted for within such nota¬
tion.
Within the realm of quantifier syntax there is the
following problem: the three sentences:
(5.34) All men have two legs
(5.35) Every man has two legs
(5.36) Men have two legs
are all convertible into the following logical form:
(5.37) (x) (m (x) d h (x))
where m = man and h = has two legs. This is logically
adequate, since only the structure necessary to deter¬
mine the truth values of (34) - (36) is required, cf.
Quine's "maxim of shallow analysis" (1960:160). But
grammarians have further tasks, siich as explaining the
linguistic difference (of emphasis?) between (34) and
(36) and the singular concord of (35). Also, grammarians
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must explain the ungrammaticality of:
(5.38) The man has two legs
(5.39) Man has two legs
in an interpretation equivalent to (37). In other
words, the problem is that the universal quantifier of
symbolic logic has many equivalents in natural language
but that these equivalents are not semantically and
1 3
syntactically, as opposed to logically, equivalent. -
With respect to the existential quantifier, as we shall
see in later chapters, in many cases there is no equi¬
valent in natural language.
The conclusion that we must come to, therefore, is
regrettably indecisive. There is evidence both in
favour of the use of canonical notation in underlying
structures and evidence against its use. Therefore, in
those areas where symbolic logic has proven itself to be
of use, as, perhaps, in matters of referential opacity,
there is no reason why we should not make use of it.
But this should not commit us irrevocably to the
For further discussion see Jackendoff (1972a).
There is no doubt that logicians have available tecb-
miques which permit them to distinguish between differ¬
ent expressions of the universal quantifier in English,
cf. Quine (1961), Reichenbach (1947:99-101). But it is
surely a matter for dispute as to whether grammarians
should adopt such descriptions.
-2?9-
hypothesis that symbolic logic presents us with the
correct underlying representation in every case. More
precisely, with reference to the grammar of quantifiers
the theoretical fact that logical notation suggests that
quantifiers may be underlying higher predicates is of no
greater importance than the empirical fact that English
does not provide us with much decisive evidence in
favour of such a hypothesis.
5.6 Gonclusion
In Chapter 5 we have considered the history and
adequacy of the hypothesis that quantifiers should be
represented as higher predicates in underlying struc¬
tures. We have observed that the original proponents of
this thesis, George Lakoff and Guy Carden, have, to some
extent and with the passage of time, changed their
opinions on the justification for this hypothesis, but
that the essential justifications have remained consist¬
ent; therefore we have examined the most important four
of them. The first of these is Equi-NP Deletion. It
was claimed that this transformation could only operate
satisfactorily if quantifiers were derived from higher
predicates. But we saw that in fact the problems sur¬
rounding Equi-NP are present even when there is no overt
quantifier in surface structure and, further, that these
problems were also to be found in other parts of the
grammar, indeed wherever questions of referential
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properties were involved. Although the hypothesis of a
'higher-Q' analysis might have been able to solve these
problems mechanically, the disadvantage was that it
disguised the fact that the essential problem was one of
reference. In other words, arbitrary syntax swept the
semantics under the carpet.
The second justification was that derived from so-
called 'archaic' constructions. We saw that this argu¬
ment appeared to have some force in connection with a
limited subset of quantifiers, but that when it was
extended to other quantifiers, that was done at the cost
of distorting the syntax and semantics of those items,
and so it could in no way be considered to be a correct
justification. The argument started from the correct
analysis that some quantifiers have some predicate-type
features and thence proceeded to the quite invalid
conclusion that all quantifiers are basically predicates.
The third justification revolved round Meg Trans¬
portation and the relation of quantifiers to negatives.
The first argument in this context failed, we observed,
simply because under the assumptions of generative
semantics it is not possible for Meg Transportation to
be a rule of the grammar. But that is not to say that
we must always reject meaning-changing rules. The point
is, if such rules are accepted then the arguments which
have been brought forward in favour of a higher pred¬
icate source for quantifiers will have to be rejected,
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since the positions are mutually contradictory. the
auestion of other points of relation "between negatives
and quantifiers, it was accepted that the Lakoff-Oarden
thesis was no further distant from a solution than any
other thesis, "but in itself this was hardly a strong
argument for accepting it.
The fourth and final justification was the apoeal
to the notation of symbolic logic. It was agreed that
this was an interesting point, "but there were crucial
differences to "be noted, mostly in the matter of aims,
between logic and grammar, which suggest that although
symbolic logic is an essential helpmate in the construc¬
tion of a grammar of a natural language, it would be
unwise to accept that logical systems should determine
the underlying structures which grammarians propose.
mhis justification, therefore, is no more valid than the
others we have discussed, and it is necessary to con¬
clude that the Lakoff-Carden hypothesis has not been
shown to have a good chance of being correct, ^here are
now two courses open to us: we could either try and find
other justification for their theory, or see what just¬
ification competing theories might have. In view of the
flimsiness of this present hypothesis, it seems only
correct that we should consider other theories, and they
are therefore the subject of study in Chapter 6. After
that we can continue, in Part III, with our own propos¬






The particular theory of grammar which one esnouses,
and within that theory which analysis one prefers, is
obviously the prime issue for a linguist, and it is to
he hoped that in this chapter the study of quantifiers
will he seen to he of some relevance to this issue. mhe
choice of a theory is not an a priori matter, even
within transformational grammar and despite the remarks
of Hall (1968), cf. Hogg (1970) and Pullum and Humber-
stone (1971). It is an empirical issue, and so we must
examine the evidence with which natural languages pre¬
sent us. In this respect we have already noted in §5.5
that the approach of certain generative semanticists is
occasionally misconceived. Quantifiers have a very
important empirical role to play, and this is not only
because of the kind of evidence we presented in Chapter
4, which suggested that the theory that the underlying
representation contains all the necessary semantic
information for the understanding of a sentence was best
equipped to explain the semantic and syntactic charac¬
teristics of both. That, of course, is important, but
there is another matter which, perhaps accidentally, is
even more important.
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The reference here is to the status of the Lakoff-
Garden proposals discussed in Chapter 5. As we have
observed, the hypothesis that quantifiers are derived
from higher predicates is argued for solely in terms of
the theory of generative semantics. Further, for most,
but not for all, cf. §6.6, generative semanticists, that
hypothesis is the accepted explanation of the behaviour
of quantifiers. Now, the arguments of Chapter 5 show
that the La.koff-Carden hypothesis is insufficiently
supported by the semantic and syntactic evidence to be
acceptable. Yet it is apparently crucial to an accept¬
ance of the theory of generative semantics, ^here are
two reasons for this: firstly, and here the principle is
universally valid, if the theory of generative semantics
cannot give an adequate account of such a major area of
English grammar as the quantifier systems, then it must
be rejected totally; secondly, some generative semantic¬
ists have elevated the Lakoff-Carden hypothesis to the
status of a necessary foundation for their theory. but
that point is rather trivial and in any case not true
for all generative semanticists, and so it can easily be
claimed that the Lakoff-Carden hypothesis is wrong but
the theory of generative semantics right, thus ignoring
the second point above.
On the other hand, it seems only reasonable to take
the claims of the relevant generative semanticists at
their face value, and accept that the inadequacy of the
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Lakoff-Carden theory implies that we should turn to some
other theory - although keeping within the context of
transformational grammar, for the reasons briefly out¬
lined in Part I. Therefore, we now have to examine any
other analysis of quantifiers which is consistent with
some theory of transformational grammar. If such an
analysis can be found and then shown to be adequate,
then it cannot be doubted that we must accept the theor¬
etical consequences that that analysis has.
Unsurprisingly, such analyses have been proposed,
and amongst those the one which is perhaps the most
comprehensive is that which has been put .forward in
several papers by Ray Jackendoff (1968, 1969, 1921a and
1972b), and therefore it is to that theory that we must
first turn our attention. The first three papers differ
considerablyin their aims: Jackendoff (1968) is an
attempt to determine the underlying syntactic structure
of quantifiers and pays comparatively little attention
to semantic features; Jackendoff (1969, 1971a) are
attempts to provide rules of semantic interpretation
(see below, §6.5) for quantifiers and, but this will not
concern us greatly, for other items too. Jackendoff
(1972b) contains a more general account of these and
various other topics, mainly semantic.
The split between syntax and semantics seen in the
earlier papers is possible only because Jackendoff is an
adherent of the theory of interpretive semantics. This
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theory holds that not all semantic information is con¬
tained. in underlying representations. Transformations
may change meaning and rules of semantic interpretation
may add meaning, cf. Partee (1971) for further background
information. Thus Jackendoff's semantic interpretation
rules do not apply only to underlying structures, but
may also apply to intermediate and surface structures,
and even cyclically; see Jackendoff (1977b:378) for a
concise definition of the applicability of semantic
interpretation rules at different grammatical levels.
This leads to a certain amount of difficulty within our
present discussion, for which should be thought of as
prior: the underlying syntactic representations, or the
rules of semantic interpretation? If one set of rules
is shown to be incorrect, does that mean that the other
set is wrong too? Logically, that seems to be most
probable, for if, for example, the underlying represen¬
tations are incorrect and must be altered, then the
structures upon which at least some interpretive rules
operate will also be altered and so these latter rules
will have to be changed too. Perhaps the reverse is
less likely, but it is an open question.
Further, it may even be the case that we conclude
that only a semantically-based underlying representation,
containing all and only all the semantic information
necessary, is adeauate. In that case it must be con¬
cluded that both parts of Jackendoff's theory are
-236-
inadeouate, whatever the adeauacy of one part or the
other in isolation. hut it would he preferable to delay
such a problem until we are directly confronted by it.
For the moment we shall proceed by first examining the
adequacy of Jackendoff's underlying syntactic represen¬
tations .
6.2 Analyses in conflict
Jackendoff (1968) considers three groups of words
which occur in similar noun phrase constructions. The
first group consists of noun phrases, e.g., a group, a
wagonload, a pound, a number, a pair. Group II involves
at least the following quantifiers: some, each, few,
which, all and both. In Group III there is another set
of quantifiers, including a. few, many, one, three. ^he
distinction between Group II quantifiers and Group III
quantifiers is a. familiar one, for the latter may appear
in postdeterminer position, the former may not, cf. the
discussion in §5.3. It would therefore seem appropriate
to say that Group II Quantifiers are 'relative' quant¬
ifiers and those in Group III 'absolute' quantifiers.
And indeed it is the case that there is a large measure
of agreement between the categorisation provided by
Jackendoff (1968) on the one hand and Partee (1970) and
Lakoff (1970d) on the other. Only one serious discrep¬
ancy arises: to use Partee's terms, Jackendoff (1968:
423) claims that few is a 'relative' Quantifier, whereas
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it can be deduced from the remarks made by Lakoff (1970d:
396) that he would consider the instances of few in (1)
and (2) to be identical:
(6.1) The few arguments in favour of the
proposal were easily dismissed
(6.2) inhere were few arguments in favour
of the proposal
and therefore that few is an 'absolute' quantifier.
Since for Jackendoff a few is an 'absolute' quantifier,
it must be the case that he would regard the occurrence
of few in (1) as derived from a few. mhis is quite
plausible, since, as Perlmutter (1970:244-45) claims, it
is reasonable to believe that £ is always deleted when
immediately following the. although in Chapter 11 we
shall offer an alternative analysis of a which rules out
such an explanation in the case of a. few, where a is not
precisely equivalent to the normal 'indefinite article'
and may be better considered as idiomatic.
But there are some very strong arguments against
Jackendoff's position. mhus, although in §5.3 we were
reluctant to accept the conclusions drawn by Lakoff and
Carden from an examination of the so-called 'archaic'
constructions with quantifiers in predicate position, it
seems reasonable to accept that there is a high correl¬
ation between the grammaticality of quantifiers in post-
determiner position and of quantifiers in predicate
position; thus compare the examples below:
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(6.3) a The many arguments
b The arguments are many
(b.4) a *The some arguments
b *The arguments are some
Now although few is grammatical in predicate position, a
few is not:
(6.5) a The arguments are few
b *Che arguments are a few
Thus it would seem most probable that few in (1) must be
derived from few rather than a few, otherwise the correl¬
ation would be destroyed.
Another argument against Jackendoff follows from
(3). Lakoff (1970d:395) argues that few ought to be
derived from not many. We shall see in Chapter 8 that
this is probably an over-simplification, but neverthe¬
less the basic principle, that few is to be derived from
a source very similar to that of many, apnears to be
correct. Now there is no disagreement that many is an
'absolute' auantifier, and given that that is the case
and that the source of few is so nearly identical, it
surely follows that few must also be an 'absolute', not
a 'relative', quantifier. If few were a 'relative'
quantifier the only possible explanation for the con¬
sequent contrast between its syntax and that of many
would be that the underlying negative element had caused
the switch, and that is plainly implausible.
-?39-
It is instructive to consider why Jackendoff does
not take note of such arguments. In the first case
Jackendoff explicitly rejects any analysis of Quant¬
ifiers as predicates (1972b:205) and thus commits him¬
self to ignoring the evidence of (3) and (4). His only
reason for doing so appears to be that sentences such as
(4b) are ungrammatical, and while, as we agreed in §5.3,
this weakens the Lakoff-Carden position considerably, it
is an insufficient condition for complete rejection of
their proposals. A similar, but equally unsatisfactory,
position is held by Chomsky (1972a:184). It is not at
all clear how Jackendoff would generate Quantifiers in
predicate position, but the denial of the crucial correl¬
ation is clear. In the second case Jackendoff (1969:
235; 1972b:341-42) argues against a rule deriving few
from not many because of the "unsystematic and sometimes
drastic changes in 'spelling'" which can occur. To some
extent this also affects Jackendoff's attitude to the
some-any rule discussed previously, but both these
points will be taken up more fully in §6.5.
In both instances there seems to be the same fault,
namely that Jackendoff takes only a rather restricted
set of surface structure paradigms in order to establish
putative underlying structures and further imposes the
restriction that so-called 'spelling' changes, as of not
many to few "are exactly the sort of changes we are
trying to eliminate" (Jackendoff, 1972b:342). Hut to
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restrict an analysis of quantifiers to prenominal posi¬
tions only is empirically falsifiable, and we have alrea
seen, in Chapter 4, that the lexicalisation transform¬
ations to which Jackendoff objects are theoretically
desirable, for otherwise not only might it be difficult
to explain correctly the behaviour of few, but it would
also be almost impossible to characterise the grammar of
an item such as both. therefore Jackendoff's theory
seems to be poorer both empirically and theoretically
than, say, that of Lakoff and Carden, at least with
respect to the grammar of few. This is a very grave
disadvantage, which must be borne in mind when we pro¬
ceed, immediately below, to more detailed analysis of
each of Jackendoff's three groups of quantifiers. We
should not, however, prejudge the adequacy of Jacken¬
doff's theories on his failure to describe accurately a
single quantifier.
6.3 Quantifiers as nouns
Jackendoff (1968) takes as his starting point for
his discussion of quantifiers the structure of TP's
containing Group I words. For NP's such as:
(6.6) a A group of men
b A gallon of the whisky












(For (6"b) the Art? node would dominate the.) Jackendoff
notes two restrictions which apply between the head noun
phrase and the complement prepositional phrase, ^he
first of these is that it is not possible for both the
•article' of that noun phrase and the 'article' of the
complement phrase to be 'definite' at the same time,
unless there is a relative clause present. ^he second
restriction is that those words belonging to Group I can
never take a singular noun phrase complement, although
some can take mass nouns. This, it is interesting to
note, is some support for a theory that mass nouns
should not be thought of as singular nouns, except per¬
haps in matters of noun - verb concord. It seems fairly
clear that the syntactic behaviour of mass nouns is much
closer to that of plural nouns than to that of singular
nouns. However that is not to say that they are T+p'lur-
all, for as was observed in §4.1, that is patently not
so. But see below for a partial resolution of the
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problem of marking the number of mass nouns, especially
when they are syntactically plural.
Jackendoff is undoubtedly correct in noting the
above two restrictions, but at least as far as the
second restriction is concerned there seems a great deal
more to be said. Consider firstly the status of nouns
which are plural syntactically yet refer to one object
only, for example, scissors, trousers. In these cases
we find a Group I construction, apparently, which refers
to a semantically singular but grammatically plural
object:
(6.8) A pair of trousers/scissors
Perhaps this would not be worrying if it were not for
the existence of analogous surface structures where the
referents are more than one:
(6.9) A pair of doves/hawks
The problem with Jackendoff's analysis is that he refers
simply to syntactic number, which implies that reference
in (8) is made to the same number of objects as are
referred to in (9). But it is clear that semantically
this is not so. Note for example the contrast between
(10a) and (10b):
(6.10) a *A couple of trousers
b A couple of doves
'//hat we find is a situation where a. pair accepts all
grammatical plurals in the complement, but a. couple, and
almost all the other comparable words belonging to Group
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I, only accept semantic plurals (including, in some
cases, mass nouns). That a pair only accepts semantic
singulars if they are grammatical plurals is shown by
the ungrammaticality of:
(6.11) *A pair of hawk/dove
A solution would seem possible if we reconsider the
notion of 'counters' which is presented in Tanucci
(1952) and briefly mentioned in §2.2. It will be recal¬
led that 'counters' are words used to change a noncount
noun into a count noun. A good example of this occurs
with the word tea in its sense "a beverage". Both forms
in (12) seem acceptable, although perhaps (12a) is the
1
older and more standard form:
(6.12) a Two cups of tea, please
b Two teas, please
Since tea in the sense described is not usually count¬
able, a construction was found in order to deal with a
situation where a specific number of portions were being
referred to. This was effected by introducing cups as a.
carrier of the [+count] marker in sentences such as
(12a). It would appear that tea has itself become
acceptable as [+count] in this sense, and therefore the
existence of (12b). But the important point is that the
At least for British English (12b) is ambiguous,
since teas may refer to a. meal, but that point is ig¬
nored here.
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two phrases are nearly semantically equivalent - indeed
in many contexts they are equivalent. It can therefore
be observed that cups merely carries the [+countl values.
This is not to deny that there is some extra semantic
value in (12a), but that seems to be related to the
causes of ungrammaticality in sentences such as:
(6.13) a *A herd of marshmallows ...
b *A cord of lettuce ...
which are noted by Jackendoff (1968:424).
If we accept the proposition that 'counters' are
used to change noncount nouns into countable ones, then
there seems to be no good reason why we should not use
'counters' to explain constructions such as (8). In
such cases the 'counter' a pair is used to show that the
syntactically plural scissors has only singular refer¬
ence. It is not clear what mechanism is necessary to
account for this, but perhaps something along the fol¬
lowing lines will be adequate. Let us assume that
scissors is [-count, +plural]. Of course, this is a
highly dangerous assumption since the two features are
apparently contradictory; but how else can the following
sentences be explained, even in a. modified form of
Jackendoff's theory?
(6.14) Scissors are made in Sheffield
(6.15) *1 want to buy two scissors
The only alternative would be to assume that scissors
is, in underlying structure, [-count!, and then have a
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very late transformation which changed it to [-t-countl
for grammatical concord only. But this would appear to
be open to the objection from Jackendoff, as an inter-
pretivist, that the underlying structure would then be
determined on semantic rather than, and in opposition
to, syntactic grounds. Another possibility might be to
have two categories of number, one semantic, one syntac¬
tic, rather like the two categories of sex and gender,
which are both needed to explain the following French
sentence:
(6.16) Le professeur est enceinte
which is discussed briefly by Langendoen (1969:39-40).
However, although there is good reason to suppose that a
sex - gender split is necessary, see too Jones (1967),
we can hardly claim to have sufficient evidence for an
exactly analogous split in number. Yet Perlmutter
(1972) contains a number of important points which may
indicate that some kind of split in number is necessary.
We must therefore accept, at least temporarily,
that scissors is indeed to be categorised as [-count,
+plurall, for which we shall need to use the theories of
exceptions and markedness introduced by Lakoff (1970b).
Whatever the disadvantages of this, at least it provides
It should be noted that the remarks made here are
perhaps in contradiction of the claims about number and
countability made in Lakoff (1970b:11).
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an explanation of (14) and (15). Also, there is no
doubt that scissors is a highly marked form, and the
semantic categorisation shows this precisely. The
question now is: how do we deal with the type of syntac¬
tic structures exemplified in (8)? I would suggest that
we have a rule which is of the form:
In other words, this (optional) change in categorisation,
which is highly marked, takes the form of a segmental-
isation, along the lines suggested by Postal (1966).
Although Postal's segmentalisation rules have been
attacked on both theoretical and empirical grounds,
notably by Delorme and Dougherty (1972) and Sommerstein
(1972), there does appear to be strong supoort for such
rules, as we shall see when we come to discuss the
grammar of a in Chapter 11. There seems to be no a
priori reason why (17) should in fact be rejected.
The segmented, feature [+count], the result of (17),
is then realised as a pair. That this is necessary is
clear not only from (8), but also from constructions
such as:
(6.18) A couple of pairs of trousers
Other strings where two Group I words cooccur are at
best dubious:
(6.17) N >
-ct [+c 11 [+pll
+plj
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(6.19) ?A group of companies of soldiers
(6.20) ?A wagonload of tons of potatoes
We have therefore provided a derivation of a pair in
certain environments which is rather different both from
other derivations for a pair and from the structures
which Jackendoff proposes for Group I words generally.
This would suggest that the above instances of a pair do
not belong to Group I. Now this is important for one
reason only: namely, Jackendoff offers no criterion for
judging when double nominal constructions are classed as
Group I constructions and when they are not. A further
example of this can be seen in the following pair:
(6.21) A wagonload of potatoes is standing
at the corner
(6.22) A group of men are standing at the
corner
The contrast of singular vs. plural noun - verb concord
clearly has to be explained, but the structures which
Jackendoff (1968) proposes plainly do not enable us to
account for these differences, since the structures for
these two sentences would be identical in relevant
respects.
The evidence which we have presented above suggests
strongly that the underlying structures proposed by
Jackendoff are insufficiently discriminating. Not all
of the surface structure constructions which he discus¬
ses can be derived from the same underlying source, and
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this casts doubt ixpon the validity of his analysis as a
whole. Also, since such similar siirface structure
constructions as:
(6.23) a The love of God
b T'he shooting of the hunters
are certainly derived from different underlying struc¬
tures, cf. Lyons (1968:249-53), Jackendoff's proposals
must be sceptically received.
Although we have not provided an alternative under¬
lying structure for all Group I constructions - but that
is not the purpose of this chapter - it is certain that
the structures proposed by Jackendoff (1968) are not
'deep' enough. Nevertheless, there remain two possibil¬
ities: firstly, that he has provided the correct surface
structure; secondly, that he has provided a correct
intermediate structure. The first possibility is to
some extent accepted by Garden (1970b:287), and we shall
not discuss it, but rather address ourselves to the
second possibility.
Perhaps prepositions are one of the most controver¬
sial of linguistic entities, since they appear to be
surface realisations of several different underlying
structures, cf. Pillmore (1966b). Thus in (23) we find
two strings which are reducable to TIP of NP, yet in each
case the relationship between the two MP's is, or may
be, quite different - (23a) and (23b) are ambiguous.
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If we then consider (6) once more, we again find strings
reducable to HP of HP, and the relationship is again
different. But it is noticeable that (23a) and (23b)
have a common feature which does not occur in (6a),
although it perhaps does in (6b): in the former two
cases the of may be replaced by another preposition.
That this has the result of disambiguating the sentences
only adds strength to what I wish to say: in each case
of is, as it were, a dummy preposition, which can stand
for a number of others.
It will be necessary now to omit from our discussion
the partitive-type constructions illustrated by (6b),
which, contrary to my suggestion in Hogg (1972), are
rather different from (6a). It must be said in passing,
however, that this fact is also a disadvantage for both
the Lakoff-Carden theory and the Jackendoff theory. But
as I state in the above paper, Lee (1971) is quite
incorrect in relating (6b) to simple possessive con¬
structions. r!'he whole question of the status of parti¬
tive constructions involving quantifiers will be more
fully and precisely discussed in §10.3. Now, let us
claim that in (6a) of is some kind of dummy preposition,
but of a different order from that in (23) and, perhaps,
(6b). For this possibility to be plausible _of must be
fulfilling one of two functions. Either it is the
marker of a more complex structure, or it is inserted in
order to create a grammatical surface structure.
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^he former of these has indeed been suggested
elsewhere. Klooster (1971:205) makes the claim that
Dutch van (= "of") in sentences such as:
(6.24) Het "boek van Jan
("The book of John's")
(6.25) Een lengte van twee meter
("A length of two metres")
can be considered as a lexical entry of the form:
(6.26) S
#vanf
However, Dutch shows quite clearly that van has a re¬
stricted occurrence; for example, it does not occur in:
(6.27) a Honderden kilometers
("Hundreds of kilometres")
b Een paar blikjes frambozen
("A couple of tins of raspberries")
Although Klooster (1971:247) does specify that the
"genitive marker" in English is zero after quantifiers,
we have in (27) strings which quite clearly show that
the same appears to happen in Dutch even when the pre¬
ceding word is not a quantifier. This would suggest
either that in (27) no relative clause is found in
underlying structure, rather than that the Dutch geni¬
tive marker is zero here, or at least that (24) and (25)
are derived quite differently from (27). Indeed, (24),
-251-
as Klooster points out, is a standard possessive con¬
struction, for which see our remarks above.
But the fact that the structures in (27) are clos¬
est to the Group I constructions of Jackendoff (1968),
and further, the fact that:
(6.28) *Honderden van kilometer(s)
is ungrammatical in Dutch, leaves the way open for our
second possibility, that of in English is inserted to
preserve surface grammaticality, presumably because of
a constraint that exists in English but not in Dutch,
rather than its being a true reflection of some under¬
lying configuration. A simple comparison of (27) with
the equivalent English sentences suggests that this
constraint might be that adjacent NP's form an ungram¬
matical string in English, i.e., *NP NP. Unfortunately,
matters are not so simple as that, for consider:
(6.29) John gave the girl a kiss
This perfectly grammatical sentence clearly violates our
putative constraint. One way out of this might be to
accept the case theories presented in Fillmore (1968),
and then state that NP NP sequences are ungrammatical
only if both NP's are dominated by identical case nodes
(but not necessarily one and the same node). To go even
further, if we accept Anderson's (1971a) claim that it
is preferable to formulate a case grammar in a depen¬
dency framework, we could reduce the constraint to
adjacent identical case nodes. Thus we could preserve
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(29), yet. (30) might still "be ungrammatical:^
(6.30) a M group men
b *A gallon whisky
"But there is no need to accept case theory in order
to accommodate these facts. If we modify (7) so that no
of is present, as .in (30a), we obtain:
(6.31) MP
a group men
This shows that it is possible to constrain occurrences
of (30) by a modification of the adjacent MP constraint
which states that adjacent MP's which are immediately
dominated by the same node do not form grammatical
strings, that is:
(6.32) * NP
The adjacent MP constraint will not block derivations of
(29), for these derivations will not generate structures
Of course, it remains to be shown that the two
nouns in the examples of (30) are dominated by identical
ease nodes. Also, it is useful to compare here the
Dutch forms een groep mannen and een liter whisky.
of the form (3?)•A
-2r53-
Mowever there appears to be at least two types of
surface structure constructions which involve violations
of this constraint. Consider firstly the case of lists
or coordinations:
(6.33) Bob saw Ted, Carol and Alice




or at least that would appear to be the case. That it
will be observed that NP^ dominates an asymmetrical set
of nodes. Although the argument cannot be discussed in
depth here, there can be little doubt that in shallow
structure, cf. Postal (1972:42), there is also an and
between :TP^ and NTP^. One might conclude from this that
(32) applies at that level rather than the surface.
However, it is interesting to consider the intonation
A similar constraint is to be found in Chomsky
( 1 970: -11 -42) and Jackendoff (I972b:135), 3ee below for
further comments.
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and stress patterns of sentences such as (33). It seems
to be the case that between NP, and EP, there is some3 A
kind of phonological marker, perhaps the "silent stress"
mentioned by Abercrombie (1967:35-36). Even if the
present theoretical state of transformational grammar is
not properly equipped to deal with such a phenomenon,
that is hardly a reason for disputing that there must be
some element between 'IP^ and NP^ at surface structure
upon which, as it were, to peg the phonological event.
Once that is done, we can see that even at the level of
surface structure (33) will not violate (3?), as does
(34), and that therefore it is not a counter-example to
the claim that (32) operates at the surface level.
The second posssible counter-example is found in
phrases of the type:
(6.35) A sausage salesman
The validity of this counter-example rests upon a claim
that two "IP's are present in (35), one of which domin¬
ates sausage, the other salesman. But such a. claim has
the unfortunate consequence that it then seems impos¬
sible to explain a correctly. The 'indefinite article'
clearly collocates with salesman, as can be observed if
we pluralise (35) in different ways:
(6.36) a A sausages salesman
b Sausage salesmen
That being the case, however, a should appear after
sausage, not before it. ^he only way to avoid this
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would be to segmentalise (see above) the a out of its VP
to a position before the left-adjacent TIP. This seems
highly implausible and in any case does not explain why
sausage cannot have an 'article'. But two other hypo¬
theses will explain the paradigm: either (35) contains a.
compound noun or sausage is there an adjective. qihere
is no need for us to decide between the two, although
the latter may be the more probable, since both show
that there is no string IP NP and thus that (35) is not
a counter-example to our constraint.
It is not relevant at the present time to consider
why particular items are inserted between adjacent NP's.
It seems quite certain, however, that and and or are
markers of coordination. This leaves the way open for
of to be the marker of non-coordinating relationships,
including, but not exclusively so, subordination. If in
fact of does have such a wide range, this will help to
explain the multiply ambiguous nature of the genitive
construction. One important point is that there will be
no need to demand that possessives and the constructions
we have discussed above have very closely related under¬
lying structures. All that they need have in common is
that there are in surface structure two adjacent NP's
related by a means other than coordination.
We may therefore conclude that the structure given
in (7) is perhaps the correct surface structure for
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Group I constructions, "but it is certainly not the
5correct underlying structure. We apoear to have wand¬
ered some way from the syntax of quantifiers by now, but
this is not so, for Jackendoff (196^:427) claims that
Group III words, e.g., many, three, have the same struc¬
ture as Group I words. Thus we are already in a posi¬
tion to state that Group III words, or 'absolute' quant¬
ifiers, cf. §6.7, do not have quite the underlying
structure which Jackendoff claims for them.
Jackendoff bases his claim on the apparent fact
that Group I words and the 'absolute' quantifiers have
virtually identical surface structure patterns. The
only difference, he claims, is that of is deleted when
the following NP is 'nondefinite', since (37) is ungram-
matical:
(6.37) *!*any of men
This is an interesting point, since it bears clearly
upon our putative constraint (32). Let us suppose that
many is not an NP in surface structure, whatever it may
be in underlying structure, but simply a Quantifier. We
can then propose:
Definitely not in the case of a pair. Note that we
have now provided an explanation of the occurrence of of
after a pair, which we had not previously done, and




as a surface structure for (37). xt will "be noted that
then no of-deletion will he required, although it will
still be possible to derive (6a). This appears to be a
significant improvement on Jackendoff*s formulation,
since we do not require his ad hoc rule to delete of,
but can appeal to a rather more general grammatical
constraint. Indeed, Jackendoff (1972b:135), like Chomsky
(1970:41-42), seems to accept that some kind of of-
insertion rule is needed in the grammar, and this great¬
ly strengthens our case against his.
Jackendoff (1968:428) claims, however, to have
found several coxmter-examples to this solution, which
are to be found in the paradigm:
(6.39) a Guess what we don't have any of:
insect repellent
b We don't have any insect repellent
c *Guess what we don't have any:
insect repellent
d *We don't have any of insect repellent
Jackendoff suggests that preposing of what in (39a)
prevents the of-dropping which occurs in (39b). There¬
fore an of-dropping rule seems necessary, but this
ignores the fact that we find:
(6.40) We don't have any of what?
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Jackendoff's rules would predict of-deletion here. It
might therefore seem reasonable to suggest that the
constraint (32) might be modified to:
(6.4-1 ) * NP
where 0. and C. are identical grammatical categories.
J
There does seem to be a good case for this, as can be
observed from the existence of strings such as:
(6.42) Three of seven of the men
but it is dubious as an explanation here, for we find in
addition to (40):
(6.43) We don't have any what?
There is also the fact that no justification has been
given for assigning any and what to the same grammatical
category. This latter objection is avoided by Flooster
(1971:247), who gives, in effect, a rather more restric¬
ted variant of (41), but his proposals cannot account for
the grammaticality of both (42) and (43).
But consider now possible answers to these two
questions. To (40) one may answer:
(6.44) We don't have any of the tomatoes
and to (43):
(6.45) We don't have any tomatoes
but the answers cannot be reversed. This would suggest,
contrary to Katz and Postal (1964:91-93), that what may
be either 'definite' or 'indefinite', according to
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circumstance. Now in the case in which it must he
'definite', (40), we find of, in the other case there is
no of. If we agree with Jackendoff, uncontroversially,
at least at present, that of is not deleted before
fi
'definites', "but still claim that of is not present in
surface structure before 'indefinites', which implies
quite different processes of derivation in the two
cases, we can explain these cases simply, without need¬
ing the of-deletion which Jackendoff proposes.
Even if it is correct that of-deletion is not
needed to generate the correct surface structures for
constructions involving Group I and Group III words,
this does not have the consequence that Jackendoff's
major assertion - that 'absolute' quantifiers are at
least very closely related to nouns in their syntactic
behaviour - is incorrect. Indeed, we may say that that
assertion has in no way been denied. We can therefore
conclude that we have not yet found much evidence,
although we ought to bear in mind the case of few, to
substantiate a claim that 'absolute' quantifiers are not
noun-like. There is in fact a fair amount of evidence
which will cast doubt upon Jackendoff's position, but we
shall discuss that in the section which follows. So far,
It should be remembered that our remarks above
suggest that _of_ is never deleted, but rather that it is
occasionally inserted, due to (32).
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however, our argument has primarily "been that Jacken¬
doff 's proposed underlying structures are insufficiently
'deep'.
6.4 Quantifiers as 'articles'
Group II quantifiers are distinguished from Group
III quantifiers at two points in their surface struc¬
ture. Firstly, they may not he preceded hy a 'definite
article'; secondly, the Group II quantifiers may he sub¬
divided into 'singular' and 'plural' Quantifiers, and
the former of these subsets may take one when followed
by a 'definite' complement (Jackendoff, 1968:437).
These two differences are exemplified by:
(6.46) a *The some men
4fter a consideration of various alternative analyses,
Jackendoff (1968:439) proposes (49) and (50) as the most
adequate underlying structures for (47) and (48) resnec-
tively:
(6.47) Every one of the men
(6.48) Every man












A transformation named "ones-absorption" then deletes
°ne in (49). This transformation is probably optional in
the case of the 'singular' quantifiers, except that it
is blocked with every, and obligatory with 'plural'
quantifiers. Group II Quantifiers will never apnear in
postdeterminer position because they are determiners
themselves and of will not be deleted (from (49)) because
is not "[ +0] ".
Jackendoff thus appears to have three different
reasons for postulating radically different underlying
structures for Group II quantifiers against Group III
quantifiers: (i) the surface apnearance of one; (ii) the
lack of a grammatical postdeterminer position for Group
Jackendoff (1969:440) offers an alternative nota¬
tion to handle ones-absorption, but, as he says, "there
are no different claims made by these two variants". We
shall therefore confine our remarks to the one variant
which we have outlined and assume, with a fair amount of
certainty, that these remarks apply eaually to the other
variant.
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II; (iii) the distribution of of. In fact this third
reason plainly does not exist: the distribution of _of is
identical for Group II and Group III, for _of appears
before the but not before an 'indefinite' noun. The
mere fact that Jackendoff gives quite different under¬
lying structures serves to disguise this, and therefore
the parallelism of the distribution is a strong argument
against making the distinctions which Jackendoff makes.
Of the other two reasons, let lis first discuss the
occurrence of one. The formalisation of the ones-absorp-
tion transformation claims that every and the 'plural'
quantifiers are marked items and that the 'singular'
quantifiers are unmarked. This is because every must
not undergo the transformation and the 'plural' quant¬
ifiers undergo the transformation obligatorily. In the
other cases the transformation is optional. In terms of
Lakoff (1970b) every is a negative absolute exception
and the 'plural' qiiantifiers are positive absolute
exceptions. Mow while it seems correct to consider
every a marked item, it is rather less obvious that this
is the case with the 'plural' quantifiers.
In the first place, these quantifiers have exactly
the same distribution with respect to one as do the
quantifiers in Group III, which suggests that it is they
which are normal. In the second place, the very term
'singular' quantifier is something of an apparent
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contradiction, for, with the exception of one, which is
clearly unique, we might expect quantifiers to operate
over plurality, or, in the case of much, etc., which
collocate with mass nouns, at least over non-singularity.
Indeed, the referents of any NP including a 'singular'
quantifier are always at least two, given the exception
of mass nouns or not. In order to handle this, it would
appear that we shall have to propose that (48) has an
underlying structure corresponding to *every men, and
that a later transformation accounts for the shift in
number to singular. This is therefore another case of
the distinction between semantic and syntactic number
discussed in §6.3.
Now consider what happens in the case of (46b). If
we choose the option without one, we have what appears
to be a reasonable reflection of some underlying struc¬
ture parallel to that for (48), at least with respect to
the expression of plural reference. But it is impos¬
sible to make men singular here, for then we obtain:
(6.51) *Each of the man
The reason for this is presumably that the semantic
plurality is disguised (although we shall discover more
compelling reasons in Chapter 9), perhaps because two
NP's, if we accept Jackendoff's analysis, are then
singular. However, the exact explanation is not neces¬
sary here, only an exposition of the surface facts which
show that men must remain. Now if men cannot carry the
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marker of syntactic singularity, it seems reasonable to
suppose that the quantifier should do so. hut quant¬
ifiers show no apparent marker of number. The obvious
explanation, therefore, is that one is inserted precise¬
ly to carry the syntactic singularity, ^his does not
explain why every must collocate with one in such con¬
structions, and each, either, etc. only optionally have
one, but it does explain the various distribution of the
Group II quantifiers in a revealing manner, especially
in that it claims that every and the 'singular' quant¬
ifiers are more marked than the 'plural' quantifiers,
with every the most marked of all, which accords with
the intuitions of the native speaker; and we shall be
able to observe in Chapter 11 that this solution pro¬
duces a useful parallelism with the syntax of the 'in¬
definite article'. A further consequence is that it can
now be stated that the appearance of one is not a justi¬
fication for distinguishing between Group II and Group
III quantifiers in the way that Jackendoff does. One-
insertion does not require the underlying structure of
(49), but works equally satisfactorily with (7).
Thus the only reason remaining for Jackendoff's
claim that Group II and Group III quantifiers have the
different underlying structures which he proposes is
that only Group III quantifiers appear in postdeterminer
position, cf. §§5.3 and 6.2. We have already noted that
Lakoff (1970d) and Carden (1970c) use the same fact to
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justify their claim that all quantifiers are predicates
in underlying structure. In §5.3 we discussed the
validity of that claim and concluded that although the
evidence which had been cited did suggest that the
•absolute' quantifiers involved an underlying predica¬
tion, the hypothesis that any or all quantifiers invol¬
ved only an underlying predication had not been justi¬
fied. Now Jackendoff (1968) denies that any predication
at all is involved in the underlying structure of even
•absolute' or Group III quantifiers. And so we have to
decide, firstly, whether or not this leads to any fail¬
ure in generating the correct surface structures. Quite
simply, the answer is that it does, for Jackendoff is
unable to generate the occurrence of 'absolute* quant¬
ifiers in predicate position, and it is far from certain
that he can emend his analysis to do so, cf. §6.2, above*
for further discussion.
Perhaps, however, it is best that we attempt to
find other reasons for concluding that Jackendoff's
proposals are incorrect, especially in view of the
marginal status of quantifiers as surface predicates.
Therefore, let us consider the claims made by Jackendoff
about a construction such as (3a), repeated here for
reference:
(6.3) a The many arguments





Def many Det N
the Indef arguments
(52) shows quite explicitly that in (3a) Jackendoff
considers that many is 'definite' and that arguments is
'indefinite'. There are arguments against each of these
propositions. Firstly, it is far from clear what it can
mean for a quantifier to he 'definite', a point which we
made in §4.1. If we accept the hypothesis presented
there, that quantifiers do not have underlying deictic
characteristics of their own, then (52) will have to he
excluded from the grammar as impossible. Secondly, all
the evidence which we have lends weight to the belief
that it is indeed arguments which is 'definite' in (3a).
There is surely no difference in the scope of the deixis
between (53) and (54):
(6.53) The arguments which were presented
in the previous section are all
equally specious
(6.54) The many arguments which were presen¬
ted in the previous section are all
equally specious
The problem would appear to be that Jackendoff has an
excess of Determiner nodes, and he is therefore obliged
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to make the wrong node 'definite'. Only one Determiner
node is needed in (3a), and that must certainly be a
sister node of the N dominating arguments. But in order
to achieve that, Jackendoff would have to abandon the
claims he makes about the nominal status of quantifiers
such as many.
The conclusion which we must draw from this is that
Jackendoff's underlying structures do not represent
correctly the syntactic and semantic facts about Group
III quantifiers. Further, we have seen that none of the
three reasons for distinguishing Group II quantifiers in
the way that Jackendoff suggests is satisfactory, for
the only possible reason - that Group II quantifiers do
not appear in postdeterminer position-has been misinter¬
preted by Jackendoff. On top of all this, we have
already noted that Jackendoff's suggested underlying
structures are simply not 'deep' enough, for both syn¬
tactic and semantic reasons. For example: his Group I
is in some measure a rag-bag of quite distinct items;
the status of of is more closely related to surface than
to underlying structure, at least as far as structures
like (6a) are concerned; he is unable to account for the
distribution of few, and perhaps a few, correctly.
Interestingly, however, we have not found any
evidence which completely excludes the possibility that
Jackendoff is correct in claiming that quantifiers have
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some of the syntactic (and semantic) characteristics of
nouns. Certainly, we have noted that he fails to account
for their predicate-like behaviour, but it may be that
quantifiers are in some way a combination of nominal and
predicate features. This would imply that we have to
search for the means by which the more Justifiable
elements of the Lakoff-Carden hypothesis can be recon¬
ciled with Jackendoff's theory and within one theory.
The reconciliation of these nominal and predicate feat¬
ures will be the subject of study for Part III.
6.5 Interpretive rules for quantifiers
It was mentioned in §6.1 that one contrast between
Jackendoff's position and that of Lakoff and Garden was
that Jackendoff claims that the underlying structures do
not. necessarily contain all the information which is
needed for semantic interpretation of the surface struc¬
ture. Therefore, Jackendoff states, rules of semantic
interpretation which operate at at least one level which
is not the level of underlying structure are required.
A clear example of such a rule is to be found in Jacken¬
doff (1969s232);8
For definitions of "Affective" and "in construction
with" see the article quoted. Jackendoff (1972b;348)
gives an amended variant of this rule, intended to co¬
here with a wider range of semantic interpretation rules.
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"In this formulation [of the some-any rule:
RMH] we will consider some and any ... as
separate lexical items differing by a
feature, say [1x1 (some is [+Xl). There
will be rules of semantic interpretation
which specify which value of the feature
must appear in what environment, much as a
selectional restriction specifies features
of NP's in relation to verbs.
The rule will be stated more precisely as
follows:
(58) [+indeterminate1 >
[ —X] in construction with Affective")
L +X] elsewhere [
The convention for application of this rule
is as follows:
(59) If an indeterminate is unspecified
with respect to X, the rule fills in
the feature according to the envir¬
onment. If the indeterminate is
already marked with respect to X,
the sentence is marked semantically
anomalous if the inherent feature
and the feature assigned by the rule
disagree."
as Jackendoff (1969:233) points out, there is no essen¬
tial difference between the second part of his convention
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and a filtering transformation which might block incor¬
rect constructions. Only the first part, which adds
semantic interpretation after the underlying structure
has been generated, is irjcontradiction of the principles
of generative semantics.
Let us, therefore, look at the first part. Its
purpose is to avoid having to generate two lexical items
with an identical phonological structure, as, for exam¬
ple, a^ which would be [+X] and a^ which would be [-X]:
(6.55) a John bought a1 house
b John didn't buy a2 monkey-wrench
But this case, which forms Jackendoff's prime example,
rests on two assumptions which he does not prove. The
first of these is that there is no other justification
for two sources for a. We shall see at a later stage
that Jackendoff is probably correct in this respect, so
we may accept that assumption. The second one is that a
does have the two meanings which he describes. It is
unlikely that that assumption is correct, for it is more
probable that it is the specificity of the whole noun
phrase in (55) that is at stake, cf. Chapter 11 and our
earlier discussions in §§1.5 and 2.3. This, of course,
is not necessarily a counter-argument to Jackendoff's
claim, but if it can be shown that the specificity can
be determined by postulating quite different underlying
structures, Jackendoff's position is rather weaker. We
shall, however, leave this point here and return to it
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when we discuss the syntax of the 'indefinite article'
in Chapter 11. See too our discussion of any in §10.2.
Jackendoff presents another argument, which mainly
concerns the correctness of generating both some and any
and then having a rule such as his (58) - (59) which
blockes their ungrammatical occurrences. This argument
is based upon the lexicalist hypothesis presented in
Chomsky (1970), and states, inter alia, that transform¬
ations should not be used to generate morphological
changes. This is a complex problem, but we need only
note that Chapter 4 was an attempt to show that trans¬
formations are required to do exactly that. In so far
as that attempt was successful, the lexicalist hypo¬
thesis can scarcely be considered binding, cf. too
Anderson (1968), Postal (1970) and the works cited in
§4.3. A further point is that since Jackendoff (1969:
235; 1972b:336-37, 341-42) argues against transform¬
ations inducing morphological change in Contemporary
English because "unsystematic and sometimes drastic
changes in 'spelling' occur", cf. §6.2, would he then
argue that transformations performing the same syntactic
task in Old English are required, precisely because the
'spelling' changes are phonologically regular and not at
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all drastic, cf. Campbell (1959:113, 147)?^
We may therefore conclude that Jackendoff's exam¬
ples do not show for certain that an interpretivist
hypothesis must be accepted, even if a closer examin¬
ation of his argument must await a later moment, cf.
§8.4. The implication of this fact for Jackendoff's
proposed underlying structures is most probably that
they are insufficiently abstract. This was also our
conclusion at the end of §6.4, and therefore it scarcely
marks any progression in our argument. Nevertheless, it
is a further consolidation of that argument, and we can
fairly claim that an adequate solution of many aspects
of the quantifier problem will be rather different from
the one proposed by Jackendoff in his various papers.
6.6 Further analyses and conclusion
With our analysis of Jackendoff's hypothesis con¬
cluded, we have ended our discussion of the two principal
hypotheses concerning the status of quantifiers in recent
Interestingly, Jackendoff is joined by R. Lakoff
(1969a) in a rejection of Klima's (1964) some-any rule.
But R. Lakoff would also reject the interpretivist
hypothesis, so this is not relevant at present. The
relationship between some and any, and the validity of
any transformation which relates them, will be discussed
in §10.2.
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transformational theory. This chapter commenced with an
outline of the contrasts between Jackendoff's theoretic¬
al stance and that of Lakoff and Carden. As was hinted
at then, the theoretical standpoints are not in fact
primary, for they have to he substantiated by relevant
syntactic and semantic evidence. Therefore in §6.2 we
examined a conflict in analysis between the two hypo¬
theses, with respect to the status of few, and decided
that the more serious disadvantages lay on Jackendoff's
side, and that they were quite fundamental in origin.
In §6 .3 we examined Jackendoff's claims about his
Group I and Group III constructions. Here we found that
in several details Jackendoff's hypothesis was faulty,
yet this did not contradict completely his assertion
that the so-called 'absolute' quantifiers were rather
like nouns in certain (but not all) aspects of their
syntactic behaviour. However, it was found to be the
case that the proposed underlying structures were inade¬
quate for an expression of the correct generalisations,
and that therefore some alterations were necessary.
In the following section the evidence which led
Jackendoff to propose two different underlying struc¬
tures for 'relative' and 'absolute* quantifiers was
examined. There appeared to be three pieces of evidence
for his proposal. Two of these - the surface appearance
of one and the distribution of of - were shown to be
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false, in that there was no need to postulate different
underlying structures in order to generate the correct
surface distribution. The third piece of evidence
concerned the postdeterminer position, which is only
possible for 'absolute' quantifiers. It was shown here
that Jackendoff's structures made incorrect claims about
NP's with postdeterminer quantifiers, and that the
Lakoff-Carden hypothesis was much more satisfactory in
this respect. But the hypothesis that quantifiers are
closely related to certain nouns, advanced in Jackendoff
(1968), was not totally excluded. It was merely stated
that an adequate account of quantifiers must make room
for both that hypothesis and the hypothesis advanced by
Lakoff and Carden that quantifiers have some sort of
predicate status.
Finally, in §6.5 we discussed whether or not Jack¬
endoff was correct in claiming that rules of semantic
interpretation, probably operating on an intermediate
structure, were necessary for the explanation of the
semantic properties of quantifiers. We saw that there
were two possible cases, but that neither of these cases
was indisputable and that therefore there was no decis¬
ive evidence to favour a theory of interpretive semant¬
ics. On the other hand, there was some evidence which
strongly supported the theory that the underlying struc¬
ture generated by the base rules should contain all the
necessary information for the semantic comprehension of
-275-
eventual surface structures.
In Chapters 5 and 6 we have confined ourselves
almost exclusively to a discussion of the theories of
Lakoff, Carden and Jackendoff. This should not be taken
as a denial that other scholars have worked on the
problems surrounding quantifiers, either within the
theory of transformational grammar or in totally differ¬
ent terms. But it seems fairly clear that these three
scholars have been the originators of recent quantifier
theory and that it is they who have provided the most
extensive analyses. Just as it is impossible to discuss
Jackendoff's work in the terms put forward by Lakoff and
Carden, although they can be compared, so it is always
more natural to discuss other work in terms of either
Lakoff and Carden or Jackendoff.
Perhaps the most original extension of the theories
of Lakoff and Carden is to be found in Anderson (1973c
and forthcoming). Anderson agrees with Lakoff and
Carden in that quantifiers are represented as some sort
of superordinate, i.e., they stem from a higher S, but
he disagrees in two respects. Firstly, he claims that
quantifiers are the subject of an existential predicate.
This naturally leads to the second difference, which is
that quantifiers, Anderson claims, are either nouns, or
nouns with a modifying predicate. We shall discover in
Part III that this suggestion is not very distant from
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the one that I wish to propose, and so the differences
which do exist are discussed then, otherwise the propos¬
ed solution will be over-anticipated and thus prejudiced.
One point, however, is worth mentioning now, and
that is that Anderson works within a theory of depen¬
dency case grammar, asset out in Anderson (1971b).
Therefore, for:
(6.57) Many girls read books




At the present crude stage of grammatical theory it
seems to make no great difference whether one works
within a dependency or constituency framework, within an
' NP VP' or a 'case' framework. At least this seems to
be true in respect of the grammar of quantifiers. Thus
it does not seem to me that Anderson's statements are of
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a different kind from those of, say, Lakoff, except in
what status he ascribes to quantifiers, and since a
'translation' from the one system to the other should
thus be possible without all the losses normally implic¬
it in that process, we shall ignore the differences
which are only a product of the basic theoretical divi¬
sion. 10
There has been very little extension of Jackendoff's
hypothesis by other scholars, with the possible excep¬
tion of a paper by Force (1968) and the more definite
one of two articles by Dougherty (1970, 1971), both of
whom introduce an element Q into the base rules. In the
former case, however, there seems to be little other
than a notational variant of earlier work on quantifiers
which we discussed in Chapter 3 and which Jackendoff
(1968:429-32) rightly dismisses. The papers by Dough¬
erty give insufficient evidence to determine the extent
to which his position differs from Jackendoff's, but
A test of the relative adequacy of dependency case
grammars and constituent NP VP grammars with respect to
quantifiers can only be made if we first have reasonable
analyses within both theories. Here we can only hope to
attempt that for one of the two. That the choice is
somewhat ad hoc has to be admitted, but only after the
consequences of that choice have been worked out can its
ad hoc-ness be evaluated.
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whatever the extent of that difference is, it is not
very great, and therefore there is no need to discuss
his position separately. Dougherty (1970:864-66; 1971:
333-35)departs from Jackendoff in claiming that quant¬
ifiers collocate with any 'major category', i.e., S, NP
or VP, although certain restrictions hold with a number
of the quantifiers. But at present we are only concern¬
ed with quantifier - noun relations, so we shall omit
discussion of that point too, apart from noting that
although it may he the case that it does, Dougherty's
hypothesis need not necessarily conflict with Jacken¬
doff 's analysis.
We can now, therefore, claim to have concluded a
fairly extensive survey of the various analyses which
have been proposed to explain the grammatical behaviour
of quantifiers. Although this survey has been critical,
that adjective should not be confused with negative, for
we have uncovered, admittedly bit by bit, many of the
more important facts about the grammar of quantifiers.
Nor is the task of discovering the errors, if errors
they be, of other scholars entirely fruitless, for they
may help us to avoid similar mistakes when we draw the
various strands together in an attempt to form a work¬
able theory for ourselves. The construction of such a
theory is the aim of Part III.
